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SUMMARY 
 
Globally, Payments for Watershed Services (PWS) make-up the largest ecosystem service 
market (Bennett et al., 2014b). Driven by the negative impacts of climate change and economic 
development for water quantity and quality provision, hydrological services are assuming a leading 
priority among forest and agriculture-based ecosystems. Indeed, afforestation and sustainable 
agriculture tend to be among the most rewarded management practices under contracts aiming to 
achieve additionality in upstream water storage, water quality protection and flood risk mitigation. 
Although conventionally PES is seen as a market-based tool, most existing PWS in Europe 
fundamentally depend on public bodies that act as intermediaries. European PWS are thus best 
described as “PES-like” schemes implemented by public entities, often acting in a rather complex 
institutional framework (Vatn, 2010). Accordingly, the research to date has tended to focus mainly 
on analyzing case studies from developing countries and US rather than Europe (Schomers and 
Matzdorf, 2013).  
Through a snowball approach and networking, the study provided the first most 
comprehensive inventory of PWS case studies in Europe. We then used the 76 case studies for a 
comparative analysis aimed to characterize institutional, economic and governance mechanisms 
associated with PWS in Europe. Besides, we conducted a more detailed institutional analysis of 
four selected case studies in Italy and England.  
The results show how co-investment approaches, public procurement and collaborative 
partnerships are substituting the theoretical idea of market transactions and commoditization of 
ecosystem services.  
Long-term durability of private driven PWS depends on the ability of integrating different 
sources of funding, starting from existing subsides, private investments and service beneficiaries 
funds. We found evidence that innovative governance models based on partnership may increase 
PWS success by developing schemes with a clear benefits related to social, carbon and 
biodiversity. Ensuring PWS related co-benefits is important in order to engage and have a positive 
actors’ interaction, thus increase capacity and scale through partnerships and cross-cutting 
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institutions. Collaborative approaches provide better territorial coverage, technical and financial 
capacity that has showed to be a key factor for PWS success.  
Regarding public schemes, PWS based on public budget allocation are often undermined 
by political instability that could affect the allocation of resources depending on availability and 
political decisions. To avoid instability public PWS should be coupled with regulations that set 
financial instruments such as water charges or funds that systematically raise financial sources to 
run the scheme. Considered schemes based on water charges are run on long-term and seemed 
to have bigger scale and impacts. 
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RIASSUNTO 
I Pagamenti per i Servizi Ecosistemici nel settore idrico (PWS, dall’inglese Payments for 
Watershed Services) costituiscono il mercato dei servizi ecosistemici più grande al mondo 
(Bennett et al., 2014b). I servizi idrologici stanno via via assumendo un ruolo di primo piano nella 
gestione degli ecosistemi agricoli e forestali, in modo particolare per contrastare gli effetti del 
cambiamento climatico e dello sviluppo economico sulla qualità e quantità della risorsa idrica.  
Infatti, il rimboschimento e le pratiche di agricoltura sostenibile tendono ad essere tra le 
pratiche di gestione più premiate nell'ambito di contratti di pagamento volti a tutelare la qualità 
della risorsa idrica e mitigare i rischio idrogeologico.  
Anche se convenzionalmente i PES sono definiti come strumenti di mercato, la maggior 
parte dei PWS esistenti in Europa dipendono fondamentalmente da enti pubblici che agiscono 
come intermediari per conto dei cittadini contribuenti. I PWS europei dunque vengono così meglio 
descritti come sistemi "quasi-PES" attuati da soggetti pubblici, spesso agendo in un quadro 
istituzionale piuttosto complesso (Vatn, 2010). Di conseguenza, fino ad oggi gli studi si sono 
concentrati principalmente su esempi provenienti dai Paesi in via di sviluppo e dagli Stati Uniti 
piuttosto che in Europa (Schomers and Matzdorf, 2013). 
Attraverso un approccio snowball e networking europeo, lo studio ha fornito l’inventario più 
completo di PWS in Europa. Successivamente, attraverso un'analisi comparativa di 76 casi di 
studio, sono stati caratterizzati i meccanismi istituzionali, economici e di governance associati ai 
PWS in Europa. Inoltre, per raffinare la comparazione tra casi europei, è stata condotta un’analisi 
istituzionale più dettagliata di quattro casi di studio in Italia e in Inghilterra. 
I risultati mostrano come gli approcci di co-investimento, gli acquisti pubblici e le 
partnership stanno sostituendo l'idea teorica di transazioni di mercato e commoditization dei servizi 
ecosistemici.  
Il successo dei PWS privati è spesso determinato dalla capacità di integrare diverse fonti di 
finanziamento, a partire dai sussidi esistenti, investimenti privati e fondi beneficiari dei servizi. I 
modelli di governance innovativi basati sul partenariato orizzontale (locale-territoriale) e verticale 
(rispetto alle istituzioni nazionali e internazionali) possono aumentare il loro successo legando gli 
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schemi di pagamento alla valorizzazione dei co-benefits legati alla biodiversità, allo stoccaggio di 
carbonio e agli obbiettivi di sviluppo socio-economico. Garantire i co-benefits è importante al fine di 
coinvolgere gli stakeholders e creare interazioni positive, aumentando la scala territoriale d’azione 
e la capacità tecnica e finanziaria, attraverso il partenariato e il networking. Gli approcci 
collaborativi forniscono dunque una migliore copertura del territorio, capacità tecnica e finanziaria, 
che hanno dimostrato essere fattori chiave per il successo PWS. 
Per quanto riguarda gli schemi pubblici, quelli che basono il sistema di finanziamento dei 
PWS sulla semplice allocazione di bilancio annuale, sono spesso messi in difficoltà dall’instabilità 
politica che influenza la disponibilità delle risorse in base alle decisioni e preferenze politiche. Per 
evitare l'instabilità e l’incertezza, gli schemi pubblici dovrebbero essere accompagnati da 
regolamenti che stabiliscono strumenti finanziari, quali tasse di scopo o fondi speciali di 
accantonamento, che aumentano sistematicamente le risorse finanziarie per alimentare lo schema 
di pagamento. I PWS che implementano la “tassa di scopo” sulla bolletta idrica e altri che creano 
fondi di accantonamento appositi dimostrano maggiore longevità, dimensioni e capacità di 
raggiungere gli obbiettivi prefissati in termini idrogeologici.  
13 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Background 
A large proportion of the world’s population is currently experiencing water stress. 
Population growth and economic development over the next years will dictate the future relation 
between water supply and demand to a much greater degree than climate change will do 
(Vörösmarty, 2000). The “nexus” among water, food and energy has been recognized as one of 
the most fundamental relationships and issues for society (Hussey and Pittock, 2012). Much of the 
world indeed will face substantial challenges associated with the implementation of response 
strategies to balance ecological and human needs. Water, inland water bodies and wetlands are 
among the most valuable ecosystems, in term of services provided to human society. The 
recognition of the value of water and wetlands and their integration into decision making process to 
ensure their wise use are, therefore, essential to meet future social, economic and environmental 
needs (Russi et al., 2013) 
One of the main challenges in water management is the adequate accounting and 
evaluation of positive and negative externalities of different uses to provide a better allocation of 
water resources among competing users. Payments for Environmental Services (PES) offer a 
promising mechanism in relation to this challenge, especially in the absence of a legislative 
framework or functioning local governance (Schomers and Matzdorf, 2013). According to the last 
EU blue print on water, in many European member states there seems to be a lack of integration 
and implementation of policies on water mainly due to the insufficient use of economic instruments 
and poor governance (EC, 2012). PES are therefore, in the same document, encouraged and are 
likely to become one of the most important tools that the European Commission will try to promote 
among member states in order to ensure the implementation of the Water Framework Directive 
(WFD). 
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In the literature, PES schemes are described as “(a) a voluntary transaction where (b) a 
well-defined environmental service (ES) or a land use likely to secure that service (c) is being 
‘bought’ by a (minimum one) service buyer (d) from a (minimum one) service provider (e) if and 
only if the service provider secures service provision (conditionality)” (Wunder et al., 2008). 
However, the development and the understanding of PES schemes in the real world are not 
without problems. These difficulties become more challenging when we apply the PES concept to 
the provision of water-related services. Payments for Watershed Services (PWS) are those PES 
schemes that reward farmers or forest managers for improving their management practices or 
restore valuable water-related ecosystems in order to increase the provision of hydrological 
services.  
1.2. Problem statement  
This paragraph describes the problem statements that provide fundamental basis for the 
present research project. The first problem is more connected with the ethics of the research, 
providing evidences of needs and applications of the possible outcomes.  
Problem 1: water-related societal issues and challenges  
First, the research focuses on PWS at EU level as an attempt to respond to water related 
societal challenges that the continent is facing in the last decades. Groundwater consumption is 
estimated 3.5 times the recharging capacity, leading to depletion of the most aquifers in Europe 
(Gleeson et al., 2012). According to the blue print on water, 38% of water bodies in EU are in a not 
favourable condition and are considered according to the WFD indicators as “polluted” water 
bodies (European Commission, 2012). Moreover at European level it is estimated that climate 
change will double river flood probability (Ciscar et al., 2011; Dankers and Feyen, 2008). 
Accordingly, large economic costs are likely to occur for re-establishing or improving green water 
infrastructure and related water services (Alcamo et al., 2003; Parish et al., 2012), however 
adaptation could be highly cost-effective, compared to a “no action” scenario (Rojas et al., 2013).  
15 
 
Worldwide, and so far marginally in Europe, PWS have demonstrated to provide a mixed 
public-community-market based tool for improving the provision of several hydrological services 
undermined by competing uses (agriculture, potable water hydroelectric power generation), such 
as in the case tap water provision in the city of New York and Munich (Grolleau and McCann, 
2012), water bottle industry (Perrot-Maître, 2006), and in the Murray–Darling agricultural Basin to 
increase environmental river flows (Wittwer and Dixon, 2013). Therefore, there is the need of better 
understating PWS in order to extend their use and provided greater positive impacts on water 
resource management.  
Problem 2: Lack of data on PWS within the European context  
Although, there is an increasing interest on PES from both policy makers and researchers, 
a recent PES scientific review provided by Schomer and Matzdorf (2013) shows that almost 75% 
of literature focuses on PES in developing countries. Approximately 15% of all published articles 
within the PES literature refer explicitly to the EU, US or Australia, with only 10 papers investigating 
on EU based case studies, of which most of them report on Agri-Environmental Programs (AEP) 
(Schomers and Matzdorf, 2013).  
Regarding water-related PES, in the last 2012 State of Watershed Investments identified 
only 15 active programmes in EU (Bennett et al., 2012), with a likely underestimation of the real 
number of initiatives. Within the literature review of the present research, a systematic search lead 
to a collection of only 16 papers on PWS in EU, of which around a quarter on peer-reviewed 
journals. Accordingly, there is the need to better understand the phenomena of PWS in Europe, 
providing a better estimation of number of programmes and create an inventory as a base for 
future studies and comparisons.  
Problem 3: Lack of recognition the institutional nature of PWS 
Finally, the lack of studies and inventories of PWS in Europe, highlighted in the previous 
sub-section, is mainly due to the lack of understanding about their aims and governance 
structures. Ideally, a PES should aims to “provide a well defined environmental service”, however 
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within the reported programmes, many payments are directed to avoid human impacts (use of 
fertilizers and other chemical inputs), enforce environmental water regulations, compensate 
farmers for forgone income or for legal restrictions, etc.. Therefore, understanding the nature of the 
payment and the real “hydrological service” targeted by programmes is of paramount importance 
for their classification and understanding. Moreover, the existence of a very articulated water 
institutional and legal framework that changes among Members States provides a very intricate 
context for the governance and forms of PWS. Therefore, current existing programmes are hardly 
classifiable and often not included in the literature of PES as for their PES-Like mixed nature 
(Wunder, 2005a). The present research can then respond to the need of a more comprehensive 
and detail understanding of PWS aims and governance structures in order to characterize 
numbers, scales, impacts and success of these programmes.  
Problem 4: Lack of understanding impacts and outcomes of PWS 
Some studies have tried to evaluate outcomes of PES schemes, however their diversified 
aims, mixed governance nature, different spatial and institutional scale, and long term relations 
between proxy management practices and service provision provide difficult base for outcomes 
and impacts evaluation. In some studies there was the attempt to provide a link between several 
characteristics of PES (type of payments, design, actors, scale, etc.) and their performances 
(Sattler et al., 2013). In others, the assessment of the link between stated goals and final 
monitored impacts  (Brouwer et al., 2011) and finally the institutional analysis of PES has brought a 
more contextualized and flexible way to assess multiple outcomes and co-benefits and governance 
of PES (Corbera et al., 2009; Muñoz Escobar et al., 2013; Prokofieva and Gorriz, 2013). Once 
identified the governance models and programmes goals, there is then the need to better 
understand evidences and assess outcomes in relation to the different PWS models. The link 
between governance models and outcomes will help to provide better theoretical and managerial 
insights to respond to water societal challenges for improving the provision of hydrological services 
and provide better trade off among competing uses.  
17 
 
In the next paragraphs, the research goals will try to set the basis of the research in order to 
respond to the four problems highlighted in this section.  
1.3. Research goals  
The present research has identified two main goals in relations to the four problem 
statements illustrated in the last paragraph.  
GOAL 1: Characterizing and critically evaluating PWS in EU with 
special regards to:  
2.1. Service provision (supply);  
2.2. Policy drivers and payments/markets (demand); and,  
2.3. Typologies of governance models (organizational arrangements). 
GOAL 2: Identifying organizational arrangements that may 
contribute to increase effectiveness of PWS toward their improved good 
governance  
Within the first goals, as we previously stated, there is a general lack of understanding and 
evaluation of existing programmes in EU. The first step consists in identifying programmes in EU 
and then characterizing and evaluating their characteristics. The research focuses on three main 
dimensions. The first is related with the service provision, therefore analysis the natural and human 
capital that are invested in order to provide the desired hydrological services, analyzing the type of 
service provided and therefore understanding the main aim of the PWS.  
Secondly, it’s important to characterize several features such as policy and market drivers, 
market dimension, type of payments, actors involved, scales and outcomes of programmes.  
These last elements, as more descriptive data, will eventually help the research to 
understand the different typologies of governance models, describe them and provide 
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categorization of programmes, helpful for future researchers, practitioners and policy makers, in 
order to link context, type of PWS and outcomes.  
1.4. Structure of the thesis 
The thesis is structured in 5 chapters. After introducing background, problem statements 
and research goals, Chapter 2 on the theoretical framework presents the theories and definitions 
behind the methods used to assess and evaluate PWS. Chapter 3 explains all methods and tools 
used to obtain results useful to achieve research goals. Chapter 4 presents 4 blocks of results, 
related with research goals and methods (for a better representations of links between research 
goals, methods and results, see Figure 8: Research design flow chart). Finally, Chapter 5 presents 
conclusions drawn from results. Annexes report programme database and tools used to assess 
PWS, which are explained in Chapter 3.  
Figure 1: Graphical representation of the thesis structure 
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2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
This Chapter first introduces the main elements related with ecosystem services and their 
relations with PES. Secondly, it describes the PES theory, such as the main principles and design 
components. Thirdly, it focuses on general information regarding PWS presenting some examples 
from the international and European context.  Finally, the Chapter concludes with a comprehensive 
view on institutional analysis of PES, providing the main theoretical background to the research 
methodology.  
2.1. Ecosystem services, functions and natural 
capital 
The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment defines ecosystem services as “benefits humans 
obtains from ecosystems” and emphasizes on society’s dependence on ecosystem process and 
functions (MEA, 2005). Ecosystems provide valuable services and resources that are often 
underestimated and are not internalized within the market (Coase, 1960; Hardin, 1968; Knight, 
1924). In recent years, there has been an increasing interest by land owners and decision makers 
on Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) as public-private tools to compensate voluntary and 
additional positive environmental externalities (i.e. ecosystem services) provided by land managers 
(Kemkes et al., 2010; Sattler and Matzdorf, 2013; Van Hecken and Bastiaensen, 2010). 
Consequently these mechanisms have attracted a lot of attention within the scientific and 
academic community (Martin-Ortega et al., 2013).  
A large body of literature describes PES as “(a) a voluntary transaction where (b) a well-
defined environmental service (ES) or a land use likely to secure that service (c) is being ‘bought’ 
by a (minimum one) service buyer (d) from a (minimum one) service provider (e) if and only if the 
service provider secures service provision (conditionality)” (Wunder, 2005a). Despite these well 
known definitions of PES, PES as an acronym, is still used in the literature without a clear and 
standardized definition, leading to many interpretations and conceptualizations (Schomers and 
20 
 
Matzdorf, 2013). Moreover, additional conceptualization issues arise from the complexity of 
classifying and evaluating “well-defined ecosystem services” (Boyd and Banzhaf, 2007).  
We thus purpose a new PES framework starting from clarifying two main areas of confusion 
in relation to the wording and theoretical definition of PES (paragraph 3.6.2 Assessment of the 
service provision within PWS schemes):  
 the use of adjective “ecosystem” versus “environmental” services (Derissen and Latacz-
Lohmann, 2013); and,  
 the distinction between “structure”,  “function”, “services” and final “benefits” (de Groot 
et al., 2002; Haines-Young and Potschin, 2011).  
Regarding the first area of confusion, within the PES acronym many authors use the term 
“environmental” or “ecosystem” interchangeably. Some of them distinguish “environmental” 
payments when the provided services are generated by the built environment (Muradian et al., 
2010; Wunder, 2005a),  while “ecosystem” payments are commonly referred to the services 
provided by natural, not actively managed, ecosystems (Corbera et al., 2009; Kosoy and Corbera, 
2010). There have been some efforts to distinguishing the “environmental” from the “ecosystem” 
adjective used within PES acronym (Derissen and Latacz-Lohmann, 2013). However, owing that 
the limits between “natural ecosystems” and “build environment” are not always well defined, 
attempts of categorization fail to meet the complexity of the relations between ecosystem and 
human dimension. Different author’s views provide contradictory definitions. For instance, 
according to Derissen (2013), PES can be referred only to “environmental” services because the 
payments are direct to land managers (which are actively managing the “built environment”) and 
not to the ecosystem itself. On the other hand, Boyd and Banzahalf (2007) conclude that, once 
ecosystem services are combined with other types of inputs (such as labour, social capital and 
capital works), their environmental benefits stop to be considered “ecosystem based”. We thus can 
draw a lesson from the comparison of the different definitions in the literature; all the proposed 
categories refer to a main common variable to discriminate between “ecosystem” and 
“environmental” services: the extent to which humans interact with ecosystems. Hereafter, we then 
refer to “ecosystem” services as those services mainly directly and spontaneously provided by 
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ecosystems, while we refer to “environmental” services for those services that are provided by the 
direct interaction of humans with ecosystems. 
The second area of confusion regarding PES conceptualization is linked with the unclear 
distinction among ecosystem “structures”, “functions”, “services” and the final “benefits” people 
gain. If these components are not clearly separated it is rather difficult to identify a “well defined 
ecosystem services” to pay for, as stated in the Wunder definition. In fact, according to some 
authors (Boyd and Banzhaf, 2007; Fu et al., 2010; Groot et al., 2010), the distinction between eco-
hydrological systems (structures, process and functions), their contribution to human well-being 
(services), and the welfare gains they generate (benefits), is necessary to avoid confusion and 
double counting. Many initiatives such as The Common International Classification of Ecosystem 
Services (CICES), The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity (TEEB) and The Millennium 
Ecosystem Assessment (MEA) have attempted to distinguish the different ecosystem services 
components and consequently provide ecosystem services classification systems (Haines-Young 
and Potschin, 2011; MEA, 2005). However, it is often difficult to make a coherent and consistent 
classification which is able to represent the complexity of ecosystem functions (Groot et al., 2010). 
The difficulty depends on the “multi-step process nature” of ecosystem service provision, which is 
made up by several intermediate steps (supporting services are for example input services to other 
final regulative, provisioning and cultural services). Therefore, in order to avoid confusion, we 
adopt the following definitions, based on the TEEB report: the “structure and process” are the 
physical ecosystems with their complex interactions of biotic and abiotic components, while 
“functions” represent the potential that ecosystems have to deliver a service. Thus, “services” are 
those intangible ecosystem functions and processes which are perceived by humans as economic 
goods and that ultimately generate welfare benefits (TEEB, 2010). As an example, riparian forests 
(structure), through their photosynthesis activity (process), absorb nitrogen and phosphorous 
(functions) thus decreasing nutrients concentrations (service) and lowering the cost for drinking 
water treatment (benefit). The distinction highlighted here is important to understand what in the 
following is considered an “input” or an “output” within the provision process of environmental 
services.    
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Starting from this first theoretical background and elaborating on production theory, the 
input-output analysis and the supply chain approach of environmental benefits (the pathway from 
ecosystem structure to human well-being), we develop a framework that helps to clarify the mixed 
human and ecosystem-based origin of the final environmental benefits rewarded within PES 
schemes (see paragraph 3.6.2 Assessment of the service provision within PWS schemes). 
The framework that we introduce here and we further develop within paragraph 3.6.2 is 
then used to assess inventoried PWS case studies in EU (see Annex 1: List of inventoried case 
studies). We finally discuss the outcome of the analysis within Chapter 5 (see paragraph 4.1 - 
What are PWS paying for? A critical analysis of PWS service provision).  
2.2. Payments for Ecosystem Services: definitions 
and overview  
As mentioned in the first paragraphs, although in the literature we find clear theoretical 
definition of PES, in the real world is quite difficult to find examples that strictly correspond to the 
theory. Recently, there has been an increasing use of Muradian et al. definition: “PES are… a 
transfer of resources between social actors, which aims to create incentives to align individual 
and/or collective land use decisions with the social interest in the management of natural 
resources” (Muradian et al., 2010). While Wunder stresses the point on the transaction 
mechanisms, Muradian et al. focus on type of actors and outcomes of PES. 
Several authors have therefore highlighted the discrepancies between the theory and the 
practice (Muradian et al., 2010; Sattler and Matzdorf, 2013; Vatn, 2010). The main gaps are related 
with the “market based” vs. “government based” nature of the system and with the “voluntariness” 
of the transaction. Many critical discussions also emerged regarding the “additionally” of many PES 
schemes worldwide. In fact, very few programmes are able to demonstrate their effectiveness in 
term of additional increase of service provision. As these general principles of PES theory are 
important and used within the methodology of Chapter 3 for the assessment of governance of 
PWS, we provide and discuss their definitions and implication.  
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Voluntariness of the transaction  
The voluntariness is the degree to which the contracting parties, the service provider(s) and 
the beneficiary(ies), enters in agreement and participate through a free and informed process of 
negotiation (Wunder, 2005a). The voluntariness principle is therefore a characteristic that 
differentiate PES from the more “government based” command and control measure. However, 
voluntariness is not a “black or white” principle as it might appear (i.e. voluntary vs. not voluntary). 
In fact, PES are negotiation processes where two or more involved parties are participating with 
different degree of power and participation (de Groot and Hermans, 2009). Therefore, we can 
distinguish different degree of voluntariness as for the actual degree of participation and level of 
information between the contracting parties (Fung, 2006). Moreover, the role of governments and 
regulations may influence the voluntariness only from the supply side (for example, through 
fertilizer restrictions imposed to farmers), or the demand side (for example, through higher water 
quality standards imposed to bottle water brands), or both supply and demand side.  
Actors involved 
Although PES theory mainly refers at two actors (a service provider and a service 
beneficiary), other actors can influence the design and implementation of the contractual 
agreement. We can therefore summarize the main groups that are typically involved in a PES 
scheme: 
 ‘Buyers or beneficiaries”: those who are willing to pay for an improved or safeguarded 
or restored ecosystem service. These include citizens, water utilities, municipalities, 
beverage companies, etc.; 
 ‘Sellers or service providers’: land and resource managers whose change of 
management practice can potentially secure or improve supply of the ecosystem 
service;  
 ‘Intermediaries’: who can serve as agents linking buyers and sellers and can help with 
scheme design and implementation. They often are NGOs, parks authorities, river 
trusts, farmers associations, etc.; 
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 ‘Knowledge  providers’: these include resource management experts, valuation 
specialists, land use planners, universities, participation expert, business and legal 
advisors who can provide knowledge essential to scheme development; 
 “Regulators”: who can impose command and control measure that influence PES or can 
regulate and/or facilitate the start up and the effectiveness of PES mechanisms.  
Figure 2 represents the different supplier(s)/supplier(s) combinations. We distinguish four 
types of market situation (Lockie, 2013):  
 One to one, represents a bilateral monopoly or oligopoly with only one/few ES sellers 
and one/few ES buyers;  
 One to many, represents a monopsony or oligopsony with many ES sellers but only one 
or few ES buyers;  
 Many to one, represents a monopoly or oligopoly situation with only one/few ES sellers 
but many ES buyers;  
 Represents a PES situation with many ES sellers and many ES buyers (polypoly).  
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Figure 2: Possible configurations of provider(s)/supplier(s) in PES schemes 
 
Source: (DEFRA, 2013a). 
Well defined ecosystem services 
The transaction and thus the whole PES design should be based on a “well defined” 
ecosystem service, which would be the subject of the contract. Specific metrics and monitoring 
process and output indicators shall be identified in order to verify the type of land use likely to 
secure the service and to measure the final service provided to beneficiaries.  
Special attention has to be given to identify the actual “environmental benefit” for the 
service user and to the management practice that is more likely to deliver that specific benefit 
(Keeler et al., 2012). PES worldwide are often considered not very effective as for the lack of 
targeting the payment to the best land management practices and to the land mangers that are 
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more likely to provide the defined service (Porras et al., 2013; Reed et al., 2014). Paragraph 2.1 
describes this aspect in more detail.   
Increasingly, there is a special attention to co-benefits of PES schemes, these last may 
assume different forms within the PES schemes, depending on how they are included within the 
payments and design of the scheme. We have therefore different situations that can be 
summarized as following (DEFRA, 2013a):  
 Bundling: a single buyer, or consortium of buyers, pays for the full package of ecosystem 
services that are provided from the same land manager and/or ecosystem (Kemkes et al., 
2010; Kosoy and Corbera, 2010);  
 Layering/stacking: multiple buyers pay separately for the ecosystem services that are 
provided from the same land manager and/or ecosystem (Porras et al., 2013); 
 Piggy-backing: in this case, not all of the ecosystem services generated from a single land 
manager and/or ecosystem are sold; instead, a single service (or possibly several 
services), is sold as an umbrella service, whilst the benefits provided by other services 
accrue to users free of charge (i.e. the beneficiaries ‘free ride’). 
Conditionality of the payment1 
Conditionality is the degree to which the service provision is conditional to the payment. 
This principle is often very hard to meet because of several factors. First, in many cases there is a 
lack of knowledge about the “baseline” scenario, so as to understand and measure how the 
payment have influenced the service provision, compared to a “no intervention” scenario (Kroeger, 
2013). Secondly, payments are often targeted to management practices that are already 
undertaken by farmers and forest owners, so these can be characterized as payments for “spill 
over” effects. Sometimes payments are used to enforce regulations that should anyway respected 
by law (Pirard, 2012). Therefore, there is a lack of real additionality of the payment respect to the 
business as usual scenario. Finally, lack of monitoring and real evaluation instruments lead to a 
                                               
1
 Conditionality means that with the help of PES the targeted ES are actually provided, while 
additionality means that the ES would not be provided in the absence of PES. 
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very poor understanding of the actual link between rewarded management practices and their 
effects on the service provision (Kroeger, 2013; Porras et al., 2013; Reed et al., 2014).  
Private vs. public PES 
In the literature, PES that strictly meet all above mentioned criteria are categorized as 
“Coasean PES”. The underlined theory says that, given certain conditions, and regardless the 
initial allocation of property rights, the problem of environmental externalities can be overcome by 
private negotiation between economic actors (Coase, 1960). These assumptions led to the 
definition of PES as a pure “market based” instruments. However, PES in practices do not meet all 
the “market based” criteria, following more a policy and regulation perspective, where governments 
have a strong influence in the system. These last schemes are categorized as Pigovian PES 
where environmental taxation and subsidization are seen as tools for the correction of negative 
externalities (Sattler and Matzdorf, 2013). This last category is also called “quasi-PES” or “PES-
like” and is defined by Muradian as:  “PES are transfer of resources between social actors, which 
aims to create incentives to align individual and/or collective land use decisions with the social 
interest in the management of natural resources” (Muradian and Rival, 2012; Muradian et al., 
2010). 
Thus the main distinguishing factor is the presence or absence of government intervention. 
The public sector can intervene both as buyer and/or as legal actor, providing a legal framework 
and/or obligations for the creation of PES. Figure 3 classifies four main types of PES governance 
models depending on the role of state: user-and non-government financed payments, government-
financed payments, compliant payments and compensation payments (Matzdorf et al., 2013).  The 
user financed PES, represent the classical Coasean type, market based instruments, where the 
contract are negotiated by two private parties, without any intervention from the government, either 
as a buyer nor as legal actor (Engel et al., 2008). 
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Figure 3: PES governance models depending on the role of state 
 
 
The categories where the government intervene in the scheme as a buyer correspond to 
the “Pigouvean approach”. The state can be seen as a “third party acting on behalf of service 
buyers” (Engel et al., 2008). This is the case of agri-environmental schemes or in those schemes 
where municipalities are paying farmers and forest owners on behalf of citizens to increase water-
quality within the water abstraction areas. These programmes are often associated to a lack of 
additionality and conditionality as the self-interest of the citizens is often not well reflected in the 
public body acting on their behalf. An interesting example of mixed model user-government 
financed payments can be found in those government led schemes where final users are charged 
with a water levy, such as in the case of Lower Saxony (Bluemling and Horstkoetter, 2007).  
In this case, the state act as legal driver, influencing the demand side by creating a “duty to 
pay” for environmental externalities (positive or negative) and providing a financial source for PES 
development. This is the case of wetland banking in the US (J.B.Ruhl and Juge Gregg, 2001).  
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The last category, compensation payments for legal restrictions, is related to those cases 
where the government regulates the supply side of ecosystem services. For example by imposing 
legal restrictions on land management practices. This is the case of groundwater protection 
compensations payments, where groundwater source areas are covered by legal restrictions on 
the use of chemical inputs and farmers are compensated for the income forgone. However, these 
last four categories are often providing mixed models between market and public intervention and 
a third institutional dimension, the community intervention (Muradian et al., 2010; Vatn, 2010). 
Figure 4 represents PES relations with the main governance types, the black circle is to indicate 
that real schemes are more hierarchy based then community and market driven (Vatn, 2010). 
Figure 4: PES and their relations to the main governance types 
 
Institutions of community are particularly relevant where PES target ecosystems where the 
social interest is very high and associated with many civil society organization institutional goals. 
Cooperation among different stakeholders, regulations from the state side, lobby and fundraising 
from the civil society side, and self private interest from the business sector, as well as intrinsic 
motivations and trust are important to deal with uncertainty in complex social–ecological systems 
(Ostrom, 2000).  
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2.3. PWS: global experiences and European 
perspective 
Definitions of Payment for Watershed Services 
While a variety of acronyms and definitions are in use to define those payments that reward 
ecosystem services managers for the provision of water-related services (see Table 1), this 
research recognize that the more correct definition is the one first suggested by Brauman et al. 
(2007), which directly refers to Payment for Hydrologic Services (PHS). Where Hydrological 
services are defined as “the benefits to people produced by terrestrial ecosystem effects on 
freshwater”. These services are organized into five broad categories: i) Improvement of extractive 
water supply; ii) Improvement of in-stream water supply; iii) Water damage mitigation; iv) Provision 
of water related cultural services; v) Water-associated supporting services.  
The PHS concept stresses the importance on the type of service someone is paying for (as 
such, final delivered services), regardless the specific ecosystem and the geographical boundaries 
that are responsible for its provision. The definition choice is made also on the fact that by 
considering the final services provided, or the benefit people receive from the ecosystem, we avoid 
confusion and overlapping. In some cases they are defined as Hydrological Ecosystem Services 
because there is a stress on their biophysical process that generates the final service (Brauman et 
al., 2007). In other cases, the geographical dimension is more important and the attention goes to 
water ecosystem that generate that service limited to a specific area, in this case they refers to 
"Catchment ES", or "Wetlands ES" (He et al., 2011; Taylor et al., 2011; ten Brink P., Badura T. and 
Note, 2012), or "Costal ES", or "Watershed ES" (Tracy Stanton, Marta Echavarria, Katherine 
Hamilton, 2010). Sometimes wording is changing according to the considered country, in US 
“Watershed” is the most common used term, while in the UK, “catchment” is commonly used to 
refer to “watershed”. The literature review founds many ways of naming water related PES, and 
they are listed in the following table.  
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Table 1: Overview of main definition for Payment for Watershed Services 
Acronym Name Description 
WPES Water Payment for 
Ecosystem Services 
Or water related PES, this concept stress the importance on payments that are 
related to all ecosystem services which are responsible to deliver water related 
benefits or final hydrological services.  
IWS Investments in 
Watershed Service 
Ecosystem Marketplace defines the term as to cover the broad diversity of 
incentive- or market-based mechanisms being used to protect the natural 
infrastructure of watersheds – including payments for ecosystem services 
(PES), payments for watershed  services (PWS), water quality trading markets, 
and reciprocal or in-kind agreements (Bennett et al., 2012) 
PWS Payment for 
Watershed Services 
This concept stress the importance on the geographical boundaries of the 
service production area which is identified as the “reference watershed” 
(Muñoz Escobar et al., 2013; Tognetti et al., 1999) 
NA 
Payment for 
Catchment Services 
This term is more often used in the United Kingdom and refers to those 
payments that are organized at catchment (watershed level) (Smith et al., 
2011) 
NA 
Payment for 
Wetlands ES  
This term refers to those incentive schemes that are targeted to wetland 
conservations. Wetlands mitigation banking schemes in the US are an 
example.   
NA Costal ES 
This term refers to those incentive schemes that are targeted to farmlands or 
forest areas which are directly connected with a valuable costal ecosystem 
(Essam Yassin, 2013) 
NA 
Payments for 
Groundwater 
recharge/quality  
Those payments that are targeted to a specific aquifer with the aim of 
enhancing the quality or quantity of groundwater  (Bluemling and Horstkoetter, 
2007; Brunner, 2008; Greiber et al., 2009) 
PHS 
Payments for 
Hydrological 
Services 
This concept stress the importance on the type of the service someone is 
paying for (as such, final delivered services), regardless the specific ecosystem 
that is responsible for its provision. Brauman et al. (2007) defines hydrologic 
services as “the benefits to people produced by terrestrial ecosystem effects on 
freshwater (Hack, 2011; Muñoz-Piña et al., 2008; Turpie et al., 2008).  
  
Nevertheless, if from a scientific point of view the term “Payment for Hydrological Services” 
is more correct and defines the scope of the present research, in order to improve the 
effectiveness of scientific communication of this research we deliberately refer both in the title and 
within the text to the most commonly used term “Payments for Watershed Services”.  
Finally, depending on the type of actors and the type of payment we can distinguish, who 
makes payments to operational programs for watershed services – and program investors, who 
contribute initial capital to develop programs. When referring to capital investments and start up 
contribution we will refer within the document to Investments for Watershed Services (IWS).  
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Markets and typologies of Payments for Watershed Services 
In 2014, Ecosystem Marketplace identified approximately 405 active PWS and Water 
Quality Trading (WQT) programs at global level. In 2008, the baseline year (first worldwide study) 
about 127 programs were actively receiving payments or transacting credits. In 2008, the 
transaction value from all active programs was estimated at € 8 billion and they seem to remain 
stable at € 8.2 billion for 2014. At EU level, the first report found only 1 active programme in 2008, 
15 active programmes in 2012 and 41 in 2014. It’s clear that the general trend is growing but at EU 
level there has been an historical underestimation and lack of data regarding existing and 
emerging programmes in different countries (Bennett et al., 2014b, 2012; Tracy Stanton, Marta 
Echavarria, Katherine Hamilton, 2010). By value, the field is still dominated by national public 
subsidy programs, which account for more than 90% of funding – and which came primarily from 
Chinese government agencies. Direct investment by water users was still relatively low. Water 
utilities’ engagement with PWS grew considerably in recent years (to $8.9M in 2013) but remained 
small relative to the sector’s risk exposure. Figure 5 shows the historical data of transaction value 
(2009-2013). Data for Europe did almost not exist before 2012. This research has contributed to 
provide data for 2012-2013, for more information see  Annex 2: Publication 1. 
Figure 5: Value of Global PWS by Region, 2009-2013  
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Worldwide we can find many typologies of PWS, especially in the US, the government 
acting as regulator, has promoted the creation of several systems to offset and compensate water 
footprint, such as Water Quality Trading, Wetland Banking, and Hydropower Mitigation Initiatives 
(Bennett et al., 2014a). These initiatives have also contributed to the development of private 
initiative of Water Footprint Offsetting. Table 2 presents the main broad existing forms of market 
mechanisms at global level. At EU level, the first two are the most commons; however, we can see 
a more in deep study of governance models within the Chapter presenting our survey results.  
Table 2: Types of Water Related Market mechanisms  
PWS type Description Payment mechanism Example 
Government 
PWS  
Publicly administered 
programs that use public 
funds to make direct 
payments to a private 
landowner, for stewardship 
of ES on their property or 
under their stewardship.  
Payments take the form of 
economic incentives and 
subsidy payments, cost - 
share arrangements, land 
purchase deals, direct 
transfer payments, and 
subsidized public/private 
funds.  
• US government water quality 
improvement programs via the Farm  
Bill   
•  China’s Sloping Lands Forest 
Conservation  Program  
•  NY City’s Watershed Protection 
Program  
Private PWS  
Private entity develops its 
own payment mechanism in 
protection of a vital 
watershed service for either 
business or philanthropic 
interests.  
Privately funded transfers 
that take the form of direct 
payments from one private 
entity to another and the 
purchase of land or 
development rights to land.  
•  Vittel in France   
• Uganda Brewery Wetland - 
Watershed program in Uganda  
Water Quality 
Trading  
Government sets a water 
quality standard on the total 
amount of pollution flowing 
into a body of water or 
watershed.  
Polluters collaborate to 
meet the standard by 
trading (buying and selling) 
pollution credits to 
maximum economic 
benefit.  
• Long Island Sound Nitrogen Credit  
• Salinity trading programs in NSW, 
Australia  
Wetlands 
banking  
A mitigation bank is a 
wetland, stream, or other 
aquatic resource area that 
has been restored, 
established, enhanced, or 
preserved for the purpose of 
providing compensation for 
unavoidable impacts to 
aquatic resources permitted 
under state or local wetland 
regulation  
The value of a bank is 
defined in "compensatory 
mitigation credits." A bank's 
instrument identifies the 
number of credits available 
for sale and requires the 
use of ecological 
assessment techniques to 
certify that those credits 
provide the required 
ecological functions.  
• US Clean Water Act and private 
wetlands banking  
Water 
offsetting 
schemes 
Certification schemes which 
allow to offset the water 
footprint trough the 
purchasing of "water credits" 
generated from water 
projects that enhance the 
quality or quantity of water 
flow or the provision of 
Water Ecosystem Services  
Certified projects generate 
"water credits" which are 
sold to private and public 
entities that wish to 
compensate their footprint. 
The value of the credit goes 
to finance specific water 
related projects.  
• Water Restoration Certificates 
(USA)   
•  Water Neutral (South Africa) 
•  GreenAdsBlue 
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PWS in Europe 
The EU has been historically less receptive than North America and Oceania to incentive-
based approaches in watershed protection, however the need for locally based solution for the 
implementation of the WFD, may be a policy drivers toward the adoption of PWS (European 
Commission, 2012). Water sector in Europe is politically dominated by public command-and-
control management. In some countries, notably France, the UK and the Czech Republic, the 
water industry is publicly regulated but services are largely operated by private companies with 
exclusive rights for a limited period and a well-defined geographical space. 
Nevertheless, although historically the literature has focused more on developing countries 
(Schomers and Matzdorf, 2013), EU also provides interesting examples of both public and private 
PWS. In the following pages we provide three examples cited in the scientific literature that are 
illustrative of the three main typologies, namely: private driven PWS of a bottle water company, the 
public driven water charge based PWS, and mixed public-private water utility budget allocation.  
In France since 1989, Vittel (Nestlé Waters), in order to address the risk of nitrate 
contamination caused by agricultural intensification in the aquifer, invested on financing farmers in 
the catchment to change their farming practices and technology. To manage the relations with 
farmers Vittel created a farmers-advisor association called AGRIVAIR, which managed the 
payments and the institutional relations on behalf of the bottle water company. The case has been 
named as “a perfect PES” as it involves a private actor as a main buyer. However, the drivers for 
Vittel originated from a very strict regulation on bottle water quality standards which expose the 
company to a high business risk (Perrot-Maître, 2006).  
In 1992, the Lower Saxony government promoted the so-called “Co-operation Decree” as a 
basis for the so-called “Lower Saxon Co-operation Model”. Its objective was to create a system to 
finance farmer’s groundwater protection payments through a specific water charge paid by tab 
water user. The government regulates and decides the type of interventions water utilities can 
invest in through the money collected with the water bill. The system is still working and collects 
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around 30 million euro/year that increase the area under organic farming, decrease fertilizer 
application and improve conditions of water protection areas (Bluemling and Horstkoetter, 2007)2. 
This system has then been implemented in other regions in Germany, such in the Munich area 
where, in order to overcome high cost of monitoring and to increase farmers’ acceptability, organic 
farming has been adopted as proxy management practice to reduce chemical inputs within 
groundwater protection areas. To increase the appealing of the system, the PWS has been 
coupled and developed in collaboration with organic farming associations, which help farmers to 
market their organic products and increase their benefit as part of the program (Barataud et al., 
2014; Grolleau and McCann, 2012).   
In Italy there are some quasi-PES described in the literature, however very few are close to 
the idea of a market-based mechanisms (Pettenella et al., 2012).  An interesting example which 
will be better explained as a case study in Chapter 4, is the one of Romagna Acque “Mountain 
Fund”, where a water utility invest 4% of its revenues for watershed protections activities within the 
mountain area surrounding the water damn. The utility has signed an agreement with the 
municipalities that are the direct beneficiary of the funds and carry out the environmental 
improvements of slopes and forest management. The PWS is directed to decrease the level of 
sedimentation of the damn, through the adoption of several interventions that are able to decrease 
run off and soil erosion.  
Europe offers much more examples and governance typologies that are better achieved 
and explained within Chapter 33 . The next paragraph provides the basics of the institutional 
analysis of PES, describing the main dimensions and factors that will be further analysed within the 
methodology and the results.  
 
 
                                               
2
 Updated information about this case study can be found on the regional government website 
3
 For more information regarding EU PWS please refers also to Annex 2.  
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2.4. Institutional analysis of PES governance  
This study adopts an institutional analysis approach to PES assessment, drawing from the 
Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework (Ostrom, 2011), and the conceptual 
framework developed for the study of the role of institutions in global environmental change  
(Mitchell, 2003), further refined for PES analysis from other authors (Corbera et al., 2009; Muñoz 
Escobar et al., 2013; Prokofieva and Gorriz, 2013).  
We define institutions as the “rules of the game” as all those informal and traditional norms, 
formal rules, contract as part of the “play of the game” and resource allocation rules (Williamson, 
2007) that shape humans and organizations by giving rise to social practices, assigning roles to 
different actors and structuring their relations and interactions (Mitchell, 2003; Prokofieva and 
Gorriz, 2013). Therefore, institutions differ from actors that are the “players” of the game, with a 
capacity to act upon their self-interests. 
PES are policy tools that build on the theoretical assumption that conventional markets are 
failing toward environmental conservation. Although mainstream economic models have proved to 
be efficient to manage private goods, they are less capable to cope with specific difficulty of 
exclusion and rivalness characteristics of public goods, such as hydrological services (Fisher et al., 
2009; Kemkes et al., 2010). Rivalness means that one person's use of a ecosystem service affects 
the availability of the service for another person, while the difficulty of exclusion arises because it is 
costly to exclude or limit potential beneficiaries of a service flow once it is provided by nature 
(Ostrom, 1999). Therefore PES are institutions that can internalise environmental externalities that 
are often not internalized within the traditional market mechanisms (Van Hecken and Bastiaensen, 
2010).  Watersheds can be considered as a complex Common Pool Resource (CPR) where many 
different groups (land users and water users) are competing for alternative uses of water resources 
(Agrawal, 2001). PWS are then defined as an institution established to resolve the environmental 
conflicts derived from competing users and uses of water resources (Muñoz Escobar et al., 2013).  
Institutional analysis can help to understand the organizational arrangements, design rules, 
motivational and cognitive structure of an actor interest and expectations within a PWS. It is also a 
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useful playground in order to understand the different interactions between external regulations at 
different level and the PWS design and adaptation response (likely future behaviour). Enhancing 
understanding of synergies between PWS and other policies and institutional goals can provide 
insights for a better integration of PWS with traditional land management practices and tools that 
are quite rooted within the EU policy context.  Moreover, institutional analysis can provide insights 
for the link between PWS design and their durability and sustainability. It can also provide a view to 
explain and balance the high transaction costs for implementing PWS and their several co-benefits 
in term of social capital (Miranda et al., 2003; Tognetti et al., 2005).  
A second step of institutional analysis explores how an “action situation” changes over time 
depending on how outcomes affect the evolution of perceptions and strategies over time. The term 
“action situation” refers to the process of isolating the structure affecting a process (in our case the 
governance structure of PWS) in order to explain regularities in human actions and results, and 
potentially to reform them. A common set of variables used to describe the structure of an action 
situation includes “(i) the set of actors, (ii) the specific positions to be filled by participants, (iii) the 
set of allowable actions and their linkage to outcomes, (iv) the potential outcomes that are linked to 
individual sequences of actions, (v) the level of control each participant has over choice, (vi) the 
information available to participants about the structure of the action situation, and (vii) the costs 
and benefits—which serve as incentives and deterrents—assigned to actions and outcomes” 
(Ostrom, 2011). 
The analytical framework used in this study is represented in Figure 6. In the following 
paragraphs, the different dimensions that affect institutions of PWS are explained. The study is 
structured into two main dimensions, internal and external to the program design/network, demand 
and supply (supply chain perspective). Six interdependent analytical components that derive from 
the institutional literature review on PES are identified and elaborated (Corbera et al., 2009; 
Kemkes et al., 2010; Muradian et al., 2010; Ostrom, 2011; Prokofieva and Gorriz, 2013; Vatn, 
2010): i) ecosystem structure, processes and service; ii) institutional interplay; iii) actors 
interactions; iv) institutional design; v) capacity and scale; vi) institutional performance.  
We assume that PWS services are highly influenced by the characteristics of targeted 
ecosystem structures, processes and hydrological services (especially in regards to their rivalry 
38 
 
and excludability) (Kemkes et al., 2010). Depending on the hydrological services, we have different 
internal actors’ interactions and a specific institutional interplay (e.g., hydropower related PWS 
would have a normative and regulation background that is different from the one of tap water 
provision). PWS schemes design is shaped by the type of actors and their power and expressed 
interests. The design is also highly influenced by the institutional interplay, that define the 
boundaries and the “rules” within which the actors can play “the game”. Finally, institutional 
performances are influenced by all these factors, however capacity and optimal scale are main 
factors that determine the success and the impacts of PWS.  
Figure 6: Conceptual framework for institutional analysis of PWS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
39 
 
2.4.1. Ecosystem structure, processes and services 
The institutional dimension of PWS is highly influenced by the type of ecosystem structure, 
processes and services (de Groot et al., 2002; Groot et al., 2010). They are the basis for the so 
called “functional interplay” (Young, 2000). Different ecosystems are covered by different types of 
institutions: therefore PWS that develop within agricultural catchments deal with different issues 
and interactions than those that develop within wetlands or rivers. The type of ecosystem eco-
hydrological processes that provide the final services are also very important as they influence the 
type of management practices that are rewarded within PWS schemes. The selection of the type of 
management practices adopted by the schemes influences the interaction of institutions and 
organizations. For example, reforestation and forest management would require the interaction 
with regional forest department, while conversion to organic agriculture would require working with 
organic farming associations and farmers unions. Finally, the type of ecosystem services (and their 
final benefits to the society) conditions the type of final suppliers and beneficiary and the set of 
property rights, institutions that regulate the specific ecosystem service (Haines-Young and 
Potschin, 2011; Keeler et al., 2012; Maille and Collins, 2012; MEA, 2005). For example water 
quality, hydropower generation, ecological river flow, and fishing, are all regulated from different 
organizations and institutions, both at horizontal and vertical level.  
The specific characteristics of the service, such as rivality and excludability, strongly 
influence the effectiveness of the scheme (Kemkes et al., 2010). Besides, the service attributes 
such as, quantity, quality, timing and the spatial characteristics of the flow between service 
provision and consumption also shape the scheme and influence type and location of interacting 
organizations (Brauman et al., 2007). Hydrological services are often mismatching on timing (for 
example in the case of groundwater recharge that happens during winter time to provide better 
availability during the dry summer seasons) and on spatial scale, where the service providers are 
often located upstream and service users are placed downstream (Serna-Chavez et al., 2014). 
This spatial mismatching increase the local horizontal interplay and is at the basis of PWS scheme 
governance systems.  
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For all these reasons it’s important to specify all these ecosystem structures, processes and 
services, their benefits and attributes, in order to better address all the other components of 
institutional analysis.  
2.4.2. Actors interactions 
After the understating of which are the ecosystem structures, processes and services the 
second analytical dimension is related to the identification of actors and their interactions. We can 
define the “actor” as a single individual or as a group functioning as a “corporate actor”, or a social 
group acting as one single organization. The type of actors and ecosystems both influence 
institutional interplay and design, and implementation of PWS schemes.  
We can identify relevant actors by analysing the type environmental problem or resource 
management and the type of hydrological services that are required by a certain group of 
beneficiary. Given the spatial mismatching of hydrological issues and services the spatial analysis 
is important during the identification phase (Borowski et al., 2008; Hauck et al., 2013; Serna-
Chavez et al., 2014).  
Actors can be identified through spatial stakeholder analysis, identifying external and 
internal actors, and those direct and indirect ones (Bryson, 2004; Hein et al., 2006). Following the 
IAD approach (Ostrom, 2011), the analysis have to take into account different aspects such as: i) 
preferences and resources roles, rights and responsibilities; ii) preferences, interests, expectations 
and values; iii) actions and interactions, use and management of resources; iv)  information 
sharing; v) lobbying; vi) deliberation. These aspects are all useful to understand better the 
decision-making processes upon resource strategy and management.  
Institutions are essentially deriving from actors’ interactions and their historical 
relationships. Institutions are rules that define what actors can do and cannot do while interacting 
among each other’s. Therefore, actors’ interactions originate the evolution and the patterns of 
institutions, and can determinate their positive or negative outcomes. Actors’ interactions create 
networks and rules on resource management and conservation. PWS are essentially networks of 
organizations and actors that set specific economic rules for the sake of a specific ecosystem 
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service provision, leading to social and natural capital improvement (England, 2000; Hejnowicz et 
al., 2014). Understanding actors’ interactions, their mutual preferences and expectations, helps to 
provide a better picture to forecast possible evolutions and actors’ reactions to a likely external 
institutional change or an internal reorganization of the system. 
2.4.3. Institutional interplay 
A third analytical dimension that externally influences the whole PWS supply chain, both 
supply and demand side, is that of institutional interplay (Mitchell, 2003; Young, 2000). The 
institutional interplay concern about how the scheme interacts with other institutions at different 
levels. The main assumption is that interactions between institutions can influence each other final 
outcomes. The results of the interaction can be positive (such as in the case where local 
institutional regimes are strengthened from international ones) or negative (such as in the case 
where national regulations undermine local traditional systems of land tenure or use rights). In the 
literature review there are three types of characteristics to describe institutional interplay: the level 
of interaction that can be horizontal or vertical; the nature of the interaction that can be political or 
functional; the asymmetry of relations that can be symmetric versus unidirectional.  
Institutions can interact both horizontally and vertically depending on the level of social 
organization they interact (Young, 2000). An example of vertical interplay can be related to the 
synergies between WFD (top-down policy instrument from the EC) and its implementation at 
national level and its impact on the acceptability and adoption of PWS schemes at local level. An 
example of horizontal interplay can be found within the integration of different local property and 
use rights regimes and the design of the PWS scheme. Commons are often interacting and 
influencing the ways of PWS schemes (Ostrom, 1999).  
The interaction can have also a dual nature: functional or political interaction. The first is 
more connected with the biophysical and the socio-economic context (given conditions, for 
example the type of ecosystems and their services) while the former is related to more intentionally 
and deliberately institutional links for achieving a collective goal and improving institutional 
effectiveness.  
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Institutional interplay can be more or less symmetrical, being unidirectional or reciprocal. 
For example, when national regulations strongly affect local institutions (such as property and use 
rights) and the local institutions have no chance to respond to very top-down approaches.  
PWS schemes at EU level operate in a very complex vertical and horizontal institutional 
context. Water uses such as tap water, hydroelectric power, irrigation, flood control, are highly 
regulated and generally, there is a stratification of institutions at all levels. Hydrological services are 
highly conditioned by other sectors’ institutions, such as agriculture and forestry, urban 
development, climate and health regulations (Tzoulas et al., 2007).  
PWS schemes can interact as a catalyst of these stratified institutions, creating synergies 
and harmonization of collective goals. However, if design doesn’t take into account all different 
aspects of institutional interplay, PWS scheme might overlap with existing regulations and creating 
conflict, especially regarding local existing property and user rights (Turner et al., 2003).  
Understanding the nature of interplay and its positive or negative attitude at different level, 
identifying synergies or conflict is a first step for PWS start-up, for decreasing transaction costs and 
therefore increasing their durability and sustainability.  
2.4.4. Scheme design 
The institutional design entails the analysis of drivers, scope of the PES scheme, the main 
actors (seller, buyers, and intermediaries), decision-making mechanisms, rules of the game and 
how these rules change through time (Corbera et al., 2009; Engel et al., 2008). The study has 
identified four analytical dimensions of institutional design: start-up, contract and procedures, 
payments and monitoring and evaluation.  
PWS design may be at different development stages such as exploration, 
piloting/development, implementation, and evaluation (Sattler and Matzdorf, 2013). First of all, it is 
important to understand why a PES has been proposed as a policy tool among other options 
(Kemkes et al., 2010). Secondly, an analysis of drivers and the affected actors of a scheme helps 
to understand how their interests are reflected within the design. The existence of feasibility 
studies, scientific mapping and design, before PES implementation also help to draw conclusion on 
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the type of approach and the durability of a scheme. Finally, it’s important to capture how the PES 
idea is communicated to internal and external actors, as it is a main factor of a scheme success 
(Sattler and Matzdorf, 2013).  
PES are basically contracts among resource users, therefore the analysis of the 
agreements and their procedural work can offer a better understanding about their sustainability 
and performances. Successful design characteristics have been summarized by (Wilson et al., 
2012) in these following points: “1) Clearly defined boundaries; 2) Proportional equivalence 
between benefits and costs; 3) Collective-choice arrangements; 4) Monitoring; 5) Graduated 
sanctions; 6) Conflict resolution mechanisms; 7) Minimal recognition of rights to organize; 8) 
coordination among relevant groups”.  
The assessment of the institutional design of contracts and procedures can be based on 
the analysis of the correspondence of the system toward these good governance principles.  
Payments are at the core of the institutional design of PES, tracing the source and the 
financial flows of money can help to map the design of the system and understand its functioning in 
detail. Several source, timing and modalities of payments have been identified in order to describe 
transactions within PES (see for detail Annex 5: Analytical framework for qualitative case study 
interviews). 
Finally monitoring and evaluation have been identified as one of the main factor in PES 
design and these dimensions are very crucial when targeting hydrological services. The definition 
of a monitoring system coupled with a clear identification of proxy indicator and ecosystem service 
metrics are essential for the whole system performance and durability (Keeler et al., 2012; Lu and 
He, 2014; Sandin and Solimini, 2009; SCBD, 2011). Clear proxy management practices, indicators 
and monitoring techniques avoid dispute within contract application and improve the performance 
of the system (Kroeger, 2013; Porras et al., 2013; Reed et al., 2014).  
 
 
 
 
44 
 
2.4.5. Capacity and scale 
 Capacity and scale are two crosscutting dimensions that influence all those explained 
above and thus determine the final performances and outcomes of a scheme.  
Corbera et al. (2009) defines the term “capacity” as the “availability of social, institutional 
and material capital to design and implement PES programmes to achieve their stated objectives”. 
Usually PWS are the result of an interaction of several organizations or groups with different 
capacity level. Therefore, it is important to assess each actor within the scheme, in term of 
technical, financial, legal and political capacity. PWS are quite complex systems that have to 
respond and adapt to different geographical, administrative, and institutional scales. A special 
attention goes to the existence of cross-scale institutions that are able to cope with this multiple 
scale of intervention (Heikkila et al., 2011).  
The concept of scale is of paramount importance to understand general phenomena. The 
concept of scale entails the spatial, temporal, quantitative dimensions to measure a certain object 
or process. A proper geographical scale for the implementation of PWS is of a high importance to 
improve outcomes within hydrological process (Wendland et al., 2010). Finally, we should 
distinguish the administrative scale from the implementation scale, as a scheme can be managed 
from a national administration but implemented locally, at catchment level.   
In the analysis of capacity and scale, scholars have to pay attention to how the design of 
the scheme responds to the need of targeting different governance and ecosystem scales, and 
therefore conditioning the final performances and outcomes of the scheme.  
2.4.6. Institutional performances and outcomes 
The institutional performance is an assessment of how and at what extent the PES scheme 
achieves its conservation goals. There are several dimensions of performances that have to be 
considered for its evaluation, they can be summarized as follows: scale, reference point, standard, 
and score. Figure 7 explain all different types of performance dimension (Mitchell, 2008).  
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Figure 7: Performance-related terms  
Performance dimension A specific aspect of an institution under evaluation 
Performance scale System of measurement for a given performance dimension  
Performance reference point Counterfactual point to which observed outcomes can be compared to 
identify institutional influence  
Performance standard Normative point to which observed outcomes can be compared to assess 
the magnitude of institutional influence 
Performance score The numeric or nonnumeric value assigned to an institutional outcome on 
a given scale 
 
However, the efficiency and thus its performances are also determinate by the costs at 
which the goals are achieved compared to other alternative institutional options (Falconer, 2000; 
Marneffe and Vereeck, 2010; Pannell et al., 2012; Williamson, 1981, 1979). These costs include 
the opportunity cost of alternative land uses, the implementation and operational costs of land use 
changes, and the transaction costs of programme management and monitoring (Wunder, 2007).  
Therefore, institutional performances assessment should evaluate results of the scheme 
monitoring system in terms of ecosystem services flows and impacts compared to a certain 
baseline. The additionality, conditionality, permanence, leakage, and negative side effects 
principles help to conduct this type of analysis (García-Amado et al., 2011; Pattanayak et al., 
2010). Sustainability and durability of the institutional governance should also assess 
performances against a set of principles, criteria and indictor for each of the dimensions 
considered (Secco et al., 2013). However, scheme performance should also account for co-
benefits that result from the scheme, such as biodiversity assets improvements and social capital 
(Hejnowicz et al., 2014). Taking into account also the existence of possible social negative side 
effects such as the change of ecosystem service gratuity provision and social disaggregation 
(Vatn, 2010). Some authors has also followed a capital asset framework to assess the outcomes of 
PES programmes, in term of financial, institutional, natural and social capital (Hejnowicz et al., 
2014). Moreover, acceptability and perceptions of service suppliers and beneficiaries are also 
useful to test PES institutional performance (Ma et al., 2012). 
Finally, Vatn (2010) identifies two types of performance criteria: outcome evaluation criteria 
(environmental effectiveness, efficiency and equity) and process evaluation criteria (flexibility, 
46 
 
implementation complexity, acceptability). These criteria will be taken into account for the 
assessment of case study performance following the framework provided in Annex 5: Analytical 
framework for qualitative case study interviews (Prokofieva and Gorriz, 2013). 
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3. METHODS AND TOOLS 
 
This section introduces the overall research design, network, methods and tools that have 
been adopted in order to achieve the research goals. The study was drawn from three parallel and 
complementary processes: i) EU inventory and data collection of PWS; ii) development of PWS 
analytical frameworks and tools; iii) assessment of inventoried case studies. 
The research used an inductive approach rather than relying on a pre-existing conceptual 
model or typology of PWS programs. Therefore tools and conceptual frameworks have been 
improved after a preliminary assessment of identified PWS, using the first findings to enrich and 
adapt the previously developed tools, in a cycle based improvement process.  
3.1. Research design 
The research project has followed a consequential and systematic logical framework. The 
research design is divided in three main steps, each one has specific methods, conceptual 
frameworks and tools which are expected to deliver intermediate results. Each step builds upon the 
previous step results. Finally, results are linked to the main two research goals.  
Firstly, scientific and grey literature review has been conducted with the support of existing 
databases, reference managers, and snowball approach in order to identify existing case studies at 
EU level. The final intermediate output is the most comprehensive inventory of PWS at EU level 
existing in the literature.  
Secondly, starting from the PWS collection, we provide an assessment of inventoried case 
studies and a market outlook, using both a set of assessment tools (see next paragraphs) and an 
online market survey. These two last activities delivered several outputs, such as a critical 
evaluation of service provision, drivers and market outlook, and a set of typologies governance 
models.  
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Finally, an institutional analysis approach has been adopted to assess four selected case 
studies from England and Italy. Both the qualitative focus on specific selected case studies and the 
assessment at EU level provide the basis for drawing conclusions about the relationship between 
governance models and degree of success. The below Figure 1 provide a flow chart which 
summarize the research design process. Each single step is then further elaborated within the next 
paragraphs.  
Figure 8: Research design flow chart 
 
3.2. The project network 
In order to achieve the research goals a network of key organizations was established. 
First, it was considered of paramount importance to involve a research institution in England, in 
order to have a strong basis for contacts with case studies and provide advice on the institutional 
background of the country. Therefore a cooperation agreement was signed between the University 
of Padova (TESAF, as home institution) and the Centre for Development Environment and 
Policies, SOAS, University of London (hosting institution). Within the agreement, the research 
institution co-supervised the research and became a hosting institution for the field work in UK, 
providing useful contacts and background information.  
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Secondly, the Mediterranean Regional Office of the European Forest Institute was involved 
within the EFIMED Short Scientific Visit program. The institute provided insights and feedbacks on 
adopted methods and tools.  
Thirdly, and agreement was signed with Forest Trends’ Ecosystem Marketplace, the main 
reference organizations on Ecosystem Markets (carbon, water and biodiversity) at global level. The 
collaboration aimed at sharing useful contacts at EU level, increasing the effectiveness of the snow 
ball approach and launching the online market outlook survey. The collaboration then lead to the 
co-authored publications which is attached in Annex 2: Publication 1. 
Finally, collaboration and confidential agreements were held with the reference 
organizations for the selected cases studies. Last but not least, some research and mobility 
funding proposal were successfully submitted to both Aldo Gini Foundation and European 
Commission in order to cover expenses of mobility and field work. Figure 9 summarize the 
institutions involved, reference contacts and their roles within the research project.  
Figure 9: The project network: partner organizations and their roles 
Institution Reference Contact Role within the project 
 
 
 
Davide Pettenella Home institution, sponsor and 
supervision.  
 
Laurence Smith 
Hosting institution, supervision 
and contact with case studies in 
UK  
 
Nicolas Robert  
Feedbacks on methods used 
and case studies in EU. 
Sponsor.  
 
 
Genevieve Bennett Online market survey and snow ball approach  
Aldo Gini Fundation & European Commission  NA Main sponsors  
3.3.  
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3.4. Secondary data collection: scientific and grey 
literature review 
The literature review was conducted using key words in four main EU languages (English, 
Italian, Spanish, and French) in Google Scholar and ScienceDirect. Among the key-worlds there 
are “payments for hydrological services”, “payments for water-related ecosystem services”, 
“payments for watershed services”, “payments for catchment management”,  “payments for 
wetlands”, “agri-environmental schemes”, and “cooperative agreements”. Only those publications 
related to the EU context and to specific “water related” case studies were selected. Very few peer-
reviewed scientific publications exist regarding examples of PWS in EU (Barataud et al., 2014; de 
Groot and Hermans, 2009; Garin, 2012; Grolleau and McCann, 2012; Pettenella et al., 2012).  
The same process, using the same key words, has been carried out for the grey literature 
review, using mostly Google search, in different languages. We found hundreds of reports, 
documents, websites, through a more focused grey literature review and web search. Materials 
were organized by country and by case study.  
From the grey literature review, we could assess the main international reports that provide 
worldwide or country case study collections. Few of them highlight cases of PWS at EU level 
(Bennett et al., 2012; CTFC, 2012; DEFRA, 2013b; Ham et al., 2009; OECD, 2013; United Nation, 
2013). These reports helped to add to the scientific literature review other lesser-known examples. 
The literature review allow to set the basis to create a first database of EU PWS and related 
contacts to start the snow ball approach and launch the online market survey.  
3.5. Primary data collection: inventorying, online 
survey and qualitative interviews 
The primary data collection was organized through three and complementary processes: i) 
Snow ball approach and inventorying of PWS in EU; ii) EU online market survey; iii) qualitative 
interview to selected case studies.  
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To analyze PWS in EU, we developed a database of projects and schemes by conducting 
an extensive inventory and data collection of these initiatives. The inventory drawn case studies 
identified through the scientific and grey literature review and the snowball sampling approach. We 
then established contacts with at least one university expert team per country and/or at least one 
environmental NGO/consulting firm working on PWS per country (EU15).  
For all EU fifteen countries and especially for those where no major findings had emerged 
from the literature, we investigated the water sector and explore several websites of Water Utilities 
Associations and Water Works Associations. In some cases such as England, Netherland, 
Belgium, Denmark, the assessment was done for all water utilities, as the number is very limited. In 
countries like Italy, where the water sector is very fragmented with hundreds of utilities, the search 
was just partially covered and more focused on associations of utilities and river basin authorities. 
The investigation had the aim to find water protection projects that provided evidences of a 
compensation or payment system. Eventually we collected a list of around 100 informed contacts 
of scheme/project managers, university experts and informed consultants as a basis for finding 
new schemes and collecting data4.  
Thanks to the collaboration with Forest Trends Ecosystem Marketplace, from April and 
June 2014, we could merge existing contact and project databases and lunch the Water Survey to 
collect data on identified schemes at European level. The online survey was launched by 
Ecosystem Market Place at global level, through their targeted information and promotional 
channels. The data collection at EU level was managed directly through the author of the present 
research project. For more information refers to Annex 4: Online Water Survey. Several recalls 
were carried out and where there was missing information, we improved the data collection 
through phone calls. Drawing from multiple sources (literature review, website analysis, online 
survey, phone and conference calls) we systematically organized all collected information by 
country and by case study. The case studies were selected according to the following criteria: i) 
meet the broader definition of PES according to both Wunder and Muradian (see first Chapter); ii) 
                                               
4
 For privacy policies, the contact database with sensitive data is not attached as Annex. However, 
we report a list of considered case studies.  
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defined by the manager or by literature as “PES”; iii) with a primary aim of provision of hydrological 
services (bundled ES-based initiatives were excluded); iv) be implemented at EU level. Although 
all cases were inventoried only those established beyond a pilot phase were assessed as those in 
design phase diDK’t have enough data to be analyzed. Annex 1: List of inventoried case studies 
reports the selected case studies.  
Finally, four cases studies from Italy and England were selected for qualitative direct 
interview. The qualitative analysis helped to improve the information collected at EU level and 
provide more in detail interpretation of trends, drivers and institutional perspective of PWS.  
Drawing from collected secondary and primary data, each inventoried PWS was assessed 
against the conceptual frameworks and analytical tools. The next paragraphs provide a detailed 
description of adopted conceptual frameworks and tools. 
3.6. PWS assessment tools 
This paragraph present in details the different frameworks and tools used to asses 
inventoried case studies. Firstly, we introduce the general assessment tool, including all 
considered dimensions. Secondly, we focus on the framework used for the critical evaluation of the 
service provision, which build on the theoretical background of paragraph 2.1. Thirdly, we explain 
in detail the governance assessment framework that builds upon the theoretical background 
provided within paragraphs 2.2 and 2.3. Finally we present general details of the four selected 
case studies and the framework used for qualitative analysis, which build on the theoretical 
background illustrated within paragraph 2.4.  
3.6.1. Multi-classification assessment for PWS 
From the literature review we identify the main gaps, definitions, principles and existing 
PES analytical frameworks, e.g. discussed by (Derissen and Latacz-Lohmann, 2013; Muradian 
and Rival, 2012; Muradian et al., 2010; Sattler and Matzdorf, 2013; Sattler et al., 2013; Vatn, 2010; 
Wunder, 2005a). From this first process seven blocks of characteristics were identified (PES 
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general details, ecosystem services, type, payments, actors involved, scale, impacts and success) 
and for each of them a more specific literature review was conducted in order to further detail the 
number of considered aspects and specification per block. We then used an inductive approach to 
refine our framework rather than relying only on existing conceptual models of PWS programs. The 
analysis of the inventoried case studies contributed to draw examples of proxy management 
practices, actors involved and institutional arrangements from the multifaceted nature of the PES in 
the water sector at EU level. Therefore, case studies helped to provide a series of specifications 
targeted for the PWS and make our framework more robust. Table 3 represent the framework, 
which specify the general aspect, the characteristics (with a specific code) and relative 
specifications and references.  
Table 3: General multi-criteria assessment framework 
Aspects Code Characteristics Specifications 
PES ID 
ID1 Country [Descriptive] 
ID2 Scheme name [Descriptive] 
ID3 Programme administrator [Descriptive] 
ID4 Region [Descriptive] 
ID5 Location [Descriptive] 
ID6 Source of information [Scientific, grey, website, primary data] 
Ecosystem 
services 
ES1 Type of Ecosystems [Forests, wetlands, Fresh waters, agricultural 
catchments, others] 
ES2 Water related issues 
[Nitrates, phosphorus, chemicals, biological, water 
colour, heavy metals, groundwater depletion, hazard 
control, missed cultural services] 
ES3 Rewarded management practices 
[Improved farming practices, chemical inputs 
restrictions, reforestation, improved forest management, 
farm capital works, livestock limits, wetlands 
restoration/maintenance, forest hydrology management 
practices, water ways monitoring and cleaning, organic 
certification 
water protection areas] 
ES4 ES - Provided Hydrological services 
as referred on site Descriptive 
ES5 ES - Type of Hydrological benefits  [IEWS; IISWS; WDM; WCS ] [Quantity/Quality based] 
ES6 ES Bundling  [Yes/No] [Carbon, Biodiversity, Social] 
Type 
TY1 PES Market situation [polypoly, monopsony/oligopsony, monopoly/oligopoly, bilateral monopoly/oligopoly] 
  Regulative background  [Yes/No] [Descriptive] 
TY2 Voluntariness [Completely voluntary, partly involuntary (demand side), partly involuntary (supply side), involuntary] 
TY3 Degree of voluntariness (supply and demand) 
[Regulated mandatory with penalties, regulated 
markets/agreements, voluntary with a regulation 
framework, voluntary without negotiation, voluntary 
through free and informed negotiation] 
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TY4 Degree of directness 
[Public procurement, scope tax (Water charge), tradable 
rights, beneficiary pay funds, bilateral voluntary 
agreements] 
TY5 Degree of commoditization [In-kind benefits, rewards, subsides/Incentives, payments, markets] 
TY6 Degree of conditionality 
[Payment by law, payment to enforce, payments for spill 
over effects, payment by conditional management, 
payment by service provision] 
TY7 Typology of PWS 
[Compensation for legal restrictions, Agro- 
environmental schemes, Water charge - public bilateral 
agreements, Regulated trading initiatives, Trading 
initiatives, CSR offsetting, Avoided impacts bilateral 
agreements, Multiple benefits partnerships, User funded 
schemes, Environmental benefits – bilateral 
agreements] 
Payments 
PAY1 Funding mechanism 
[Single source funding, multiple source funding, 
utility/public budget allocation, consumer water 
levy/fees, CAP payments, national/EU funding, private 
budget allocation, water rights] 
PAY2 Pay source [Public, private, mixed, citizens] 
PAY3 Pay mode [Input - based, output - based] 
PAY4 Pay type [Cash, in-kind, both] 
PAY5 Pay frequency [One off, periodical, both] 
PAY6 Pay time [Upfront, after adoption of management practices, after ES delivery] 
PAY7 Pay eligibility [Horizontal, targeted] 
PAY8 Pay amount in relation to costs of ES provision 
[Spill over, partial cover of costs, full cover of costs, 
above the costs] 
PAY9 Pay aim 
[Avoided negative externalities, compensate negative 
impacts, compensate opportunity costs, provide positive 
externalities] 
PAY10 Payment amount [€/Ha min, €/Ha max, total transaction last year 
available, historical transactions] 
Actors 
involved 
AC1 Service link providers and beneficiary [Yes/No] 
AC2 ES Provider [Private, public, CSO, cross-sectoral, partnership] 
AC3 Type of ES provider [Forest managers, farmers, both, other] 
AC4 ES Buyer [Private, public, CSO, cross-sectoral, partnership] [Descriptive main buyer] 
AC5 Type of main intermediary  [Private, public, CSO, cross-sectoral, partnership] [Descriptive main buyer] 
Scale 
SC1 Institutional scale 
[Large organization, public body, cross scale 
partnership, medium size organization, small size 
organization] 
SC2 Spatial administrative [International, national, regional, local] 
SC3 Spatial implementation [International, national, regional, local] [Hectares of area 
covered by the scheme] 
SC4 Time [Long term, medium term, short term] [Year of 
establishment] 
Impacts and 
success  
IS1 Status [Active, pilot, design phase, abandoned, unknown] 
IS2 Repeatability  [Multiple phase, phase one, applied to other areas, 
ongoing study or pilots, failed, unknown] 
IS3 Goal achievement  
[1-5 scoring based on the following criteria: Existing 
relevant literature, updated literature review and or 
multiple sources, positive evaluation of the existing 
literature, existing monitoring show goals achievement, 
repeatability (applied to other areas or second phase)].  
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The aspect related to ecosystem services provides useful data for the critical assessment of 
service provision. Assessed characteristics and specification are better elaborated in the next 
paragraph. The characteristics and their specification related to “type” dimension are better 
explained within the next paragraphs on governance assessment.  
3.6.2. Assessment of the service provision within PWS 
schemes  
Building on the theoretical background proposed within paragraph 2.1 we provide an 
original framework based on production theory and supply chain analysis of ecosystem services. 
We then create a system to assess the inventoried case studies.  
Production theory analysis of environmental services provision 
In economics, “production” means converting of inputs into outputs such as goods or 
services. This economic concept (i.e. production theory) can easily be extended to the ecosystem 
service provision process, with the main difference that human related service production is mainly 
voluntary, while ecosystem services are involuntary provided by nature (Witt, 2005). When PES 
schemes are activated for the specific provision of a certain desired environmental service, they 
influence nature (i.e. the built environment) through direct human-based inputs and the modified 
“natural” ecosystem processes. 
In order to simplify our model we can thus say that the main input for the provision of 
ecosystem services can be summarized with the concept of “natural capital” which consist of the 
stock of ecosystem structures, processes, functions and supporting services (Costanza et al., 
1997). Within the production theory, natural capital is therefore the production input that 
involuntarily provides ecosystem services to human being.  
As shown before, if the ecosystem services are the outputs of natural capital, environmental 
services rather result from a combination of two main input factors: i) human-based capital; and, ii) 
natural capital. According to Bourdieu (1986), the capital  can  present itself in three 
fundamental  forms: economic, cultural and social capital. “Human-built capital” (hereafter human 
capital) is defined in this paper as the combination of economic capital (financial capital, capital 
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works, infrastructures, property rights), cultural capital (knowledge, expertise and technological 
inputs), social & institutional capital (legal frameworks, institutions, social perceptions, values, 
institutions, governance arrangements and networks). Within PES schemes the three dimensions 
of capital are often fundamental inputs (and indicator of final performance) to actively organize the 
ecosystem in order to deliver the desired environmental service (Corbera et al., 2009; Gong et al., 
2010; Muradian et al., 2010; Vatn, 2010). In Figure 10, we use the input-output analysis to show 
how final environmental benefits targeted in PES schemes are eventually “final outcomes” that 
result from the combination of different inputs. Depending on the type of links and relations 
between the inputs, different outputs, in term of services, and outcomes, in term of benefits are 
obtained. Yet,  Figure 1 shows how the two main input factors (natural and human capital), by 
standing alone or by interacting, contribute to the provision of different types of services, namely 
ecosystem (a), environmental (b) and human services (c)5. These services have different nature 
but they all result in perceived “environmental benefits” (outcomes). While some ecosystem 
services originate directly from ecosystems without being combined with other inputs (a), 
“environmental services” (b) results from the interaction between ecosystem process, functions 
and human activities. However, sometimes, human capital, without actively interacting with the 
ecosystem structures and functions, generates “human services” that have “nature based” or 
“environmental benefits” as an outcome.  
Table 4 provides three examples with the aim of clarifying the above-mentioned concepts. 
                                               
5  The three categories of services do not pretend to substitute the MEA ecosystem service classification 
(provisioning, regulating, cultural and supporting) rather, they represent a larger set of “services” that humans benefit 
from and that are willing to pay for, within the framework of PES.  
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Figure 10: “Input – Output – Outcome” simplified representation of environmental 
benefits provision model 
 
 
Table 4: “Input – Output – Outcome” of different environmental benefits associated to 
ES supply chains  
 
Inputs 
 
Outputs (services) 
 
Outcomes (benefits) Ecosystem structure & 
processes 
Ecosystem 
functions 
Human based 
inputs / 
activities 
Forests ecosystem 
Maintenance of 
soil structure, 
water retention 
and 
bioremediation  
Improved forest 
management, fire 
protection, 
conversion to 
broadleaf  
Decreasing 
nutrients 
concentrations / 
Improving drinking 
water quality and 
quantity 
Availability (within time) of 
water at a certain quality 
and quantity  
Avoided water treatment 
costs  
Avoided alternative 
sources related costs 
Pasture lands ecosystem 
Maintenance of 
soil structure, 
water retention 
and 
bioremediation  
Grazing control, 
conversion of 
arable lands to 
grasslands, 
avoided use of 
fertilizers and 
chemicals  
Availability (within time) of 
water at a certain quality 
and quantity  
Avoided water treatment 
costs  
Avoided alternative 
sources related costs 
Wetlands ecosystem 
Bioremediation, 
water cooling 
and storage  
Wetlands 
restorations or 
Integrated 
Constructed 
Wetlands 
Availability (within time) of 
water at a certain quality 
and quantity  
Avoided water treatment 
costs  
Avoided alternative 
sources related costs 
Lower flood risk and 
associated costs 
Substitution between inputs: the physical interaction between 
natural and social capital  
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Within the neoclassic approach to production, the principle of substitution states that a 
certain quantity of output can be produced with more than one combination of inputs. This has 
been largely applied with regard to choice of technique in agriculture production, with combination 
of inputs such as land and labour or land and fertilizers (Ellis, 1993). Therefore, if we assume that 
PES schemes adopt ES provision technology that use both human and natural capital (input 
factors) to produce a certain service (output), we can thus apply the principle of substitution to 
environmental service provision systems.  
Figure 11 represents the production theory model, where the two input factors are 
respectively natural capital (Y) and human capital (X). The iso-product curve describes the entire 
range of possible combinations between the two input factors to achieve the same quantity of 
desired ecosystem-environmental-human service (output).  
Figure 11: Production theory model - substitution between two input factors: natural 
capital and human capital  
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For instance, a water utility that wants to meet the legally binding standards of water-
regulators has a range of different options to lower the level of nitrates or chemicals and eventually 
to provide drinking water at a reasonable price for its customers. On one hand, the utility can invest 
in protecting the land surrounding the catchment areas to be able to source water from an 
uncontaminated spring, adopting a strict ecosystem approach and taking advantage of the services 
provided by the natural capital (A). On the other hand, the utility could directly build a water 
treatment plant, investing in grey infrastructures, technology, and labour for plant maintenance, 
investing substantially on human capital (B). In some cases, water utilities achieve the quality goals 
through a combination of the approaches A and B, taking advantage of natural ecosystems 
(existing wetlands, aquifers, etc.), providing wetland restoration and afforestation, organizing 
training for farmers for win-win use of agricultural inputs, investing in capital works, etc. The 
optimal combination of inputs (units of natural and human capital) is in theory determined by the 
ratio of their prices. However, given the fact that natural capital has not been given a price yet (de 
Groot and Hermans, 2009) and the relative new introduction of the ecosystem approach, the real 
combination of inputs is rather driven by lexicographic preferences, political and negotiation 
process. Thus in some cases, one choice (i.e. water treatment plant) might exclude the other 
(ecosystem catchment approach). Yet, Figure 12 shows how different ranges of combination 
between inputs result in three main service areas: ecosystem service are those produced with 
intensive use of natural capital and little contribution of human capital, while human services are 
those produced predominantly by the use of human capital. Environmental services can thus be 
defined as those services produced using both medium-high quantity of natural and human capital. 
Section 2.3 thus characterizes PES by the type of inputs for service provision.  
PES analytical framework: characterizing PES by type of inputs for 
service provision 
Building on the theoretical assumptions presented within the previous sections, in our view 
PES schemes are production systems and/or networks/clusters that use - and thus pay, or are 
compensated for  - different combinations of natural and human capital, to produce the desired 
services in order to satisfy a certain human need and increase society wellbeing (environmental 
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benefit). Figure 3 shows how the two input factors interact all along the cascade framework 
proposed by Young (2007), where eventually, services are gained as “benefits”, i.e. real 
improvements of the quality of life, which are perceived through the interaction of the “services 
attribute” and the “human perception” (Brauman et al., 2007; Haines-Young and Potschin, 2007; 
Keeler et al., 2012). As we show from the different case studies in Table 5, PES may have different 
subjects of the payment (although the final aim remains the same, i.e. securing environmental 
benefits): a) Paying for ecosystem services that are naturally provided by the ecosystem process 
and functions to avoid reduction in the service that could result from potential human impacts 
(avoided deforestation in REDD+ projects and/or wetland conservation); b) Paying for land 
management practices that influence ecosystem functions and process in order to secure or 
increase the service provision;  c) Paying for human based actions that, without actively interacting 
with the ecosystem structure, functions and processes, provide or secure an environmental benefit.  
Figure 12: Interaction between ecosystem and human dimension and type of payments 
for securing environmental benefits  
 
 
Source: Adapted from Haines-Young and Potschin (2007) and Brauman (2007) 
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Under point “a”, we refer to those PES schemes where service providers are paid for “not 
doing” or just for the fact of owning a particular ecosystem, such as tropical forests (Fletcher and 
Breitling, 2012; Wunder, 2005a) and/or wetlands based PES. Therefore, the final service 
dependence on human activities, infrastructures or governance arrangements (i.e. human capital) 
is very low. In this case, beneficiaries pay for an “ecosystem function or process” which does not 
result from an interaction with human activities or inputs in order to deliver the expected ecosystem 
services. These types of payments are often result-based rather than input-based (Gibbons et al., 
2011). They usually work better when the monitoring of the service provision is relatively easy (For 
example, the persistence of forest), but at the same time they are argued to lack additionality 
(Pagiola, 2008). In reality, this type is barely put in practice while preference goes to those 
incentives that lead to the implementation of proxy management practices. 
Regarding the second point “b”, some other PES schemes show that services providers are 
paid for “actively managing and shaping the ecosystem”, interacting with ecosystem functions in 
order to deliver a specific well desired environmental benefit. This is the case of the 
implementation of land management practices that reduce runoff in the “Slowing the Flow at 
Pickering” (DEFRA, 2013b), or the case of systemic recreation of Forest Infiltration Areas in 
Veneto Region in Italy (Leonardi and Pettenella, 2012). These payments schemes require both 
high level of natural and human capital. Eventually, in other cases, under category “c”, more 
frequent in the water sector, PES schemes refer within the contract to “human based activities”, 
such as the number of hours of labour, avoided use of agricultural inputs (Bluemling and 
Horstkoetter, 2007), organizational arrangements (Giani, 2012), grey infrastructure improvements 
(Day and Couldrick, 2013), which ultimately, without actively interacting with the ecosystem 
process, terminate in a perceived “environmental benefits”. These last PES schemes are 
characterized by very high level of human capital, while the contribution of the natural capital to the 
final environmental benefit is very little.  
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Table 5 shows the definitions of the three categories of identified type of service areas, 
associated with case study examples of rewarded management practices, and final environmental 
benefits.  
Table 5: Explanatory table comparing differences between the concepts of ecosystem, 
environmental and human services  
 
Based on this classification, we develop a framework to assess PES schemes against their 
physical interaction between ecosystem functions/process and humans activities/inputs, i.e. natural 
and human capital. In order to rank the degree of service dependence on two main production 
factors, two tables with values, definitions and examples are provided. Table 4 explains the service 
dependence on natural capital on the basis of the extent to which the final benefits depend on 
ecosystem structures, processes, functions and provisioning services. The lowest level is allocated 
to those final environmental benefits that are delivered regardless ecosystem components 
(improving drinking water through reducing agro-chemicals). While the highest level is allocated to 
Type of 
Services Definitions 
Example of the rewarded 
services/management 
practice 
Example 
of 
environme
ntal  
benefit 
Case study 
(See Annex A) 
Main 
references 
a) Ecosystem 
Services 
Ecosystem services are 
all the benefits people 
obtain from natural 
capital. Produced 
naturally by the 
ecosystem, without any 
active human based 
management.  
Water quality 
improvements by natural 
wetlands 
Increased 
water 
quality 
Dune 
sustainable 
catchment 
management 
(NL2) 
(Derissen 
and Latacz-
Lohmann, 
2013; MEA, 
2005; 
Muradian et 
al., 2010) 
b)Environme
ntal Services 
Environmental services 
are those produced by 
actively managed 
ecosystems, through the 
combination of natural 
and human capital.   
Water quality improvement 
by reforestation projects 
Increased 
water 
quality 
SCAMP (UK4) 
(Derissen 
and Latacz-
Lohmann, 
2013; MEA, 
2005; 
Muradian et 
al., 2010) 
Water quantity provision  
Increased 
water table 
level 
Forest 
Infiltration 
Areas (IT1) 
c) Human 
Services  
The human services that 
land or PES scheme 
managers can produce 
through their labour, 
presence, technology and 
social capital (human 
capital), without 
interacting and actively 
managing the ecosystem. 
Eventually, these human 
services result in a 
perceived environmental 
benefit.   
Improving farm grey 
infrastructure to avoid 
nutrients run off 
Increased 
water 
quality 
Upstream 
thinking (UK3) 
Own 
elaboration 
Forest fire control  
Avoided 
risk of 
water 
quality loss 
Gulf de Saint 
Tropez fire 
protection 
scheme (FR7)  
 
Monitoring flood control 
Reduced 
flooding 
risk Land stewards, 
Tuscany (IT6) 
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final environmental benefits that depend upon a specific natural ecosystem process, function, etc.  
(For example, wetland water purification).  
Table 6: Service dependence on natural capital  
Level of 
dependence Definition Examples 
1 – Low The final environmental benefits are delivered 
regardless ecosystem structures and functions  
Flood & fire control and monitoring activities. All 
PES based on avoided use of agro-chemicals. 
PES based on capital works and grey 
infrastructures improvements 
2 - Medium 
The final environmental benefits depend partially 
from specific ecosystem structures and functions. 
They rely on built environment such as 
agriculture land or restored ecosystem  
Typically those agro-environmental benefits that 
depend upon specific land management 
practices, such as wetland restoration, 
reforestation, environmental friendly farming 
techniques 
3 – High 
The final environmental benefits depend from a 
specific natural ecosystem (wetlands, forests, 
and peatlands) with a particular combination of 
structure and functions  
Wetland water purification. Natural peatlands 
ecosystem services. Natural forest drinking water 
provision. Services derived from improved forest 
management. Generally, ecosystem services 
provided by natural protected areas.  
 
Table 7 explains the service dependence on human capital based on the extent to which 
the final environmental benefits depend on human inputs and activities (economic, cultural and 
social capital). The lowest level is allocated to the final environmental benefits that are delivered 
regardless human actions that help the production and delivery of the final benefit. For instance, in 
the case of wetland bioremediation, or tropical forests ecosystem services, where the human 
action is limited to “no intervention” on natural capital. Level two is allocated to those final 
environmental benefits which are delivered by avoided human impacts, which is traduced into a 
reorganizational arrangements (thanks to awareness raising and training) at farm level with low 
level of inputs (changing type of pesticides, conversion to organic agriculture, or avoided use of 
fertilizers). While the highest level is allocated to final environmental benefits that depend on 
service providers actions, behaviours or inputs (labour governance arrangements, infrastructures 
and social capital).   
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Table 7: Service dependence on human capital  
Level of 
dependence Definition Examples 
1 – Low 
The final environmental benefits are delivered 
regardless the human actions or inputs (human 
capital). Therefore land managers have no 
influence on the actual service provision 
Wetland water purification. Natural peatlands 
ecosystem services. Water provide by deep 
aquifers.  
 
2 - Medium 
The final environmental benefits are delivered 
thanks to "no actions" or avoided impacts of land 
managers through reorganizational 
arrangements of farm production     
 All PES based on avoided use of agro-chemicals  
3 - High 
The final environmental benefits highly depend 
on human capital. Service providers actions, 
behaviours or technical inputs, are the production 
factor for service provision (labour, governance 
arrangements, infrastructures, social capital)   
Flood and fire control and monitoring activities. 
PES based on capital works and grey 
infrastructures improvements. Typically those 
agro-environmental benefits that depend upon 
specific land management practices, landscape 
conservation, such as restoration, reforestation, 
other environmental friendly techniques.  
 
3.6.3. Governance assessment for PWS schemes 
Building on the theoretical framework presented within paragraphs 2.2 and 2.3 we introduce 
the assessment tool developed to analyse the inventoried case studies according to the main PES 
theoretical principles.  
Important principles of PES theory (Wunder, 2005b) have been used to derive four 
graduated axes of scheme design and governance. The aim is to better describe the variation in 
“PES-like” schemes found to exist in the EU context. Therefore, for each of the main principles 
(voluntariness, directness, commoditization, and conditionality) a set of type of corresponding 
governance arrangements has been identified in literature and within the selected case studies. 
Each governance arrangement has then been further described in detail, providing examples from 
the literature and associated case studies. The degree of correspondence to the theoretical 
principle is then rated from “very low” to “very high”.  
Degree of voluntariness  
The term voluntariness is defined as “Free and informed choice of both ES providers and 
beneficiaries to enter in a payment scheme”. This criterion is influenced mainly by the existence of 
mandatory or non mandatory regulations and the dynamics of negotiations between the contract 
parties. The level of information is playing an important role within the theory of contracts but is 
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difficult to estimate at program level (Salanié, 1997). Table 8 provides the five degree of 
voluntariness which is related to the existence of mandatory or regulating legal frameworks, and 
with the degree of free and informed negotiation between the parties.  
Table 8: Degree of voluntariness  
Type of governance 
arrangement Definition 
Degree of 
voluntariness Examples 
Regulated 
mandatory with 
penalties 
PWS that are enforced (from the supply or demand) 
through the use of mandatory regulations which are 
followed up by penalties. Usually these payments 
refer to environmental impact compensations.  
1 - Very low 
Hydroelectric payment 
scheme in Italy 
(Pettenella, Vidale, 
Gatto, & Secco, 2012) 
Regulated 
markets/agreements 
PWS that are enforced through the use of regulated 
markets. Usually these schemes are highly regulated 
and are related with environmental impact 
compensations or banking initiatives. Regulation 
often act both on demand and supply side.  
2 - Low 
Public-private river 
payback or wetland 
banking initiatives 
(Wittwer & Dixon, 2013) 
Voluntary with a 
regulation 
framework 
PWS that  are implemented voluntarily but following 
a detailed regulation that defines terms and 
conditions of the agreements. The regulation might 
apply to both supply and/or demand.  
3 - Medium 
Most of EU PHP, such 
those in UK where water 
company are regulated 
by OWFTA and DWI 
Voluntary without 
negotiation 
PWS that are implemented voluntarily by the two 
parties, but where one of the two is not able to 
negotiate the terms and conditions of the 
agreements. 
4 - High Most of PWS managed by municipalities  
Voluntary through 
free and informed 
negotiation  
PWS that are implemented voluntarily by the two 
parties, where the two are fully informed and able to 
negotiate the terms and conditions of the 
agreements. 
5 - Very high Vittel in France, Land 
stewards in Italy.  
 
Degree of directness  
By directness of the transfer, we refer to the extent to which individual providers receive 
direct payments from the ultimate beneficiaries of the environmental service (Muradian et al., 
2010). The less direct case is when governments play as an intermediary of the transaction 
between the final user and the service providers. This is the case, for example, of the agri-
environmental payments schemes such as Environmentally Sensitive Areas (ESA) and 
Countryside Stewardship Scheme (CSS) in UK where the government pays landowners in order to  
protect valuable landscape environment and biodiversity conservation (Dobbs and Pretty, 2008). 
Table 9 provides the five degree of directness, each of them correspond to a different 
scheme governance arrangement. 
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Table 9: Degree of directness  
Type of 
governance 
arrangement 
Definition Degree of directness Examples 
Public 
procurement  
PWS where the public entities are buying the 
environmental services on behalf of the general 
public/beneficiaries.  
1 – Very low 
The English Woodland 
Grant Scheme, 
Catchment Sensitive 
Farming, etc.  
Scope tax 
(Water charge) 
PWS where the public entities are buying the 
environmental services on behalf of the general 
public/beneficiaries through a specific scope tax.  
2 - Low 
Lower Saxony, 
Germany, Water 
companies levy water 
abstraction charge on 
consumers and money 
passed to state 
government who give it 
to the state forestry 
agency for afforestation  
Tradable rights 
PWS where through a banking system service providers 
and beneficiaries are connected through a 
brokering/credit developer.  
3 - Medium 
Wetland mitigation 
banks in USA and 
Australia 
Beneficiary pay 
funds 
PWS that are organized under third party funds or trusts 
that collect the beneficiaries payments and redistribute 
them to the service providers.  
4 - High 
Angling passport 
Scheme, where 
fishermen pays a River 
Trust (NGO) who directly 
pays the farmers.  
Bilateral 
agreements  
PWS where contracts are signed directly between 
beneficiaries and service providers.   5 - Very high Vittel in France  
 
Degree of commoditization  
By degree of commoditization we refer to the extent and clarity with which compensation 
received by the environmental service providers has been defined as a tradable commodity 
(Muradian et al., 2010).  Table 10 provides the five degree of commoditization, each of them 
correspond to a different scheme governance arrangement.  
Degree of additionality and conditionality  
We have additionality where the provision of ecosystem services is additional to the 
business as usual scenario and is conditional to the payment (Kroeger, 2013). The assessment of 
additionality and conditionality therefore depends on what is required by law, what is the additional 
effect of the payment, and at what conditions the payment is actually provided. Table 11 provides 
the different degrees of additionality and conditionality, providing definitions of related governance 
arrangements/situations and examples.  
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Table 10: Degree of commoditization 
Type of 
governance 
arrangement 
Definition Degree of 
commoditization Examples 
No monetary 
benefits 
Other types of benefits such as trainings, technical advice, 
etc. These benefits might indirectly improve management 
practices and influence the provision of the desired services.  
1 - Very low 
Most of PHP are also 
providing on the 
“payment package” non 
monetary benefits.  
Rewards 
Rewards are meant to provide social acknowledgement for 
resource managers who have historically played an important 
role in the provision of ecosystem services. Rewards are often 
direct to management practices that are already occurring 
regardless the payment (Muradian & Rival, 2012). 
2 - Low 
Most of PHS in 
developing countries fall 
under this category. 
Costa Rica case is a well 
know one (Fletcher & 
Breitling, 2012; Pagiola, 
2008) 
Subsides/Ince
ntives 
Incentives can also take the form of additional investments 
(the operational costs of reforestation, fencing, the cost of 
adopting new technologies, infrastructure, etc.) that users of 
the resource base are unable to undertake by themselves due 
to budgetary constraints. The external provision of such 
investments may become the ‘‘tipping point’’ in changing 
practices and behaviour. The difference between incentives 
and markets is that incentives do not cover fully the 
opportunity costs of more environmentally-friendly practices. 
3 - Medium 
All agro-environmental 
schemes such as The 
English Woodland Grant 
Scheme, Catchment 
Sensitive Farming, etc.  
Payments 
Payments have a high level of commoditization (the service is 
clearly defined) and a high level of conditionality. Payments 
are expected to cover fully the opportunity cost of more 
environmentally friendly practices.  
4 - High 
Vittel in France, Land 
stewards in Italy and 
SCAMP in UK.  
Markets 
Markets are consolidated payments flows among services 
beneficiaries and providers. These are the cases where we 
observe a fairly high degree of commoditization, often paired 
with some kind of marketplace exchange arrangement.  
5 - Very high 
Water quality trading 
programs in North 
America and Oceania fall 
into this group as do 
some quantity-driven 
mechanisms like 
groundwater mitigation 
banking programs and 
instream flow restoration 
certificates in the United 
States. 
Table 11: Degree of additionality  
Type of 
governance 
arrangement 
Definition Degree of 
additionality Examples 
Payment by law  
Payments are given for practices that are required by 
law (monitoring might exist or not depending on the 
regulation framework) 
1 - Very low 
Hydroelectric payment 
scheme in Italy 
(Pettenella, Vidale, Gatto 
& Secco, 2012) 
Payment to 
enforce  
Payments are given for practices that are required by 
law, but the PES ensure the enforcement of the law 
through incentives and monitoring 
2 - Low   
Payments for spill-
over effects  
Payments are made in relation to the cost of 
maintaining the business as usual scenario, 
monitoring check the land use management 
maintenance but not the service provision (the cost of 
provisioning the ES doesn't increase the Business as 
Usual costs) 
3 - Medium 
Some agro-
environmental schemes 
in Europe 
Payment by 
conditional 
management 
Payments are made in relation to the cost of 
implementing the management practices, monitoring 
check the land use management change but not the 
service provision  
4 - High Land stewards in Tuscany  
Payment by 
service provision  
Payments are made in relation to the cost of provision 
of the ES and monitoring ensure the implementation 
of the management practices and the actual service 
provision 
5 - Very high United Utilities, UK.  
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The assessment cube 
After a first assessment of all schemes we selected three dimensions (voluntariness, 
directness and commoditization) as we saw that most of the schemes has not such a 
diversification in term of additionality and conditionality, most of them are either payments to 
enforce or payment by conditional management. So the variable about additionality and 
conditionality was excluded although it has been taken into account for further elaboration and 
conclusions.  
By assessing the governance scheme of each PWS using the three tables outlined above 
(voluntariness, directness and commoditization), an institutional design space results that maps 
arenas of governance arrangements along these three dimensions. This can then be used to fully 
characterize the constellation of mechanisms and categories of PWS  and  make  assessments  of  
and  assessments  for  concepts  such  as directness, voluntariness and commoditization,  
particularly  when  used  in  conjunction with other information on the scheme. It must be 
recognized however, that PWS schemes are often composed of multiple tools and different 
mechanisms, so it is likely that there will be more than one mechanism to illustrate in the final 
“cube”. The three axes provide a ‘cube’ of ‘institutional design space’ and map governance 
arrangements. Our aim is to fully characterize the variation in mechanisms and categories of PWS 
examples that is observed to exist.  
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Figure 13: Case studies assessment framework  
 
 
 
 
 
3.6.4. Institutional qualitative analysis of PWS schemes 
This paragraph present how four selected cases studies have been assessed, following the 
institutional theoretical background presented in Figure 6 (paragraph 2.4), and an ad hoc 
institutional framework for qualitative analysis of PWS (see  
Table 15: Conceptual framework for institutional analysis of PWS). 
Case studies for qualitative institutional analysis were chosen according to the criteria 
presented in Table 12. Following these criteria we thus selected the case studies that are further 
detailed in the following Table 13. 
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Table 12: Criteria for case study selection for qualitative institutional analysis 
PWS selection criteria  Reason for 
Be selected among the EU 
inventory following the criteria 
explained within paragraph 3.4* 
This criterion allows us to compare the case study with the broad situation at EU 
level. Drawing more specific conclusions and better understand trends at EU level.  
*The case studies were selected according to the following criteria: i) meet the 
broader definition of PES according to both Wunder and Muradian (see first Chapter); 
ii) defined by the manager or by literature as “PES”; iii) with a primary aim of provision 
of hydrological services (bundled ES-based initiatives were excluded); iv) be 
implemented at EU level. Although all cases were inventoried only those established 
beyond a pilot phase were assessed as those in design phase diDK’t have enough 
data to be analyzed.  
Be representative of two 
opposite national institutional 
background, namely Italy and 
England 
This criterion allows us to compare and how different institution influence the 
development and implementation of PWS. Italy has a public managed water sector 
while England has a private system, although public regulated. The former has a 
national policy and strategy for the adoption of PES schemes while Italy doesn’t 
consider PES from a national policy perspective.   
Be considered successful PWS 
according to criteria set under 
Table 3** 
This criterion allows us to learn lessons about what systems are working and which 
the factors that influence their success are.  
** “Existing relevant literature, updated literature review and or multiple sources, 
positive evaluation of the existing literature, existing monitoring show goals 
achievement, repeatability (applied to other areas or second phase)”. 
Long term scale of 
implementation  
Selecting case studies with more than few years of existence allow us to have 
enough information and available data to see how PWS design and governance have 
evolved responding to institutional interplay and actors interactions    
Be relative new within the 
scientific literature review 
We tried to avoid the selection of well know case studies for which there are already 
several scientific articles in the literature. Especially for the case of Munich, Lower 
Saxony, Vittel, etc. This allows us to publish on quite original case studies and 
provide new insights on not well investigated PWS.  
Table 13: Selected case studies for qualitative institutional analysis 
Selected PWS Country Region Program 
administrator 
Type of main 
buyer 
Year 
establishment 
Type of 
service 
SCaMP England North west England United Utilities 
Private water 
utility 2005 Water quality 
Upstream 
Thinking England 
South West 
England South West Water 
Private water 
utility 2007 Water quality 
Land Stewards Italy 
Serchio 
Valley, 
Tuscany 
Unione Comuni 
Media Valle del 
Serchio  
Public 
watershed 
authority 
2007 Flood control  
Romagna 
Water Fund  Italy 
Ridracoli, 
Emilia 
Romagna  
Romagna Acque - 
Società Delle Fonti 
Spa 
Private water 
utility (public 
owned) 
1996 
Water quality 
and avoided 
dam 
sedimentation 
 
Due to the scarcity of published information on the schemes, information for the analysis 
was gathered using two main sources. Initially, we carried out a review of all publicly available 
information on the programmes, including normative background, implementation data, monitoring 
and evaluation reports, presentations, websites, etc. With then used the collected information to 
answer as many questions as possible, in order to reduce the number of questions and data to 
request to selected PWS stakeholders.  
The second phase, which was aimed at collecting the non-public available information, was 
complemented by face-to-face, semi-structured interviews with project managers, intermediaries, 
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knowledge providers, and researchers involved in the design, implementation or evaluation of the 
schemes (at least two per instrument, see Table 14).  
Selected experts were asked several questions and data following the framework 
summarized in the following  
Table 15 and further detailed within Annex 5: Analytical framework for qualitative case study 
interviews. The 6 dimensions identified within the theoretical background (paragraph 2.4), were 
further detailed into sub-dimensions, research questions and indicators. The framework has been 
taken and adapted from two main publications that has developed an institutional analysis of PES 
(Corbera et al., 2009; Prokofieva and Gorriz, 2013). The first about ecosystem services has been 
developed as a new block compared to the reference studies. Actors’ interactions, institutional 
interplay, capacity and scale, and institutional performances were taken mostly from the two 
reference studies, trying to complement aspects that were not covered by one or the other. 
Table 14: Profile of interviewed experts  
Organization Role within the 
organization Role within the PWS Case study 
United Utilities  SCaMP Programme Manager  Project manager/Buyer SCaMP 
RSPB Senior Water Policy Officer 
at RSPB  
Tenant - Intermediary - 
Knowledge providers   SCaMP 
South West Water Head of Sustainability at South West Water  Project manager/Buyer  Upstream Thinking  
Westcountry Rivers Trust  Development & Policy Director 
Intermediary - Knowledge 
providers  Upstream Thinking 
SOAS, University of 
London  
Head of the Centre for 
Development, Environment 
and Policy 
University – scientific advisor  Upstream Thinking  
CASCADE Consulting  Managing Director  Knowledge providers  SCaMP 
UK Ecosystems 
Knowledge Network Project Office  Cross Cutting National institution  
SCAMP, Upstream 
Thinking  
Ofwat 
 
Interim Environment Director  Regulator  SCAMP, Upstream Thinking 
Westcountry Rivers Trust  Senior Farm Advisor Farm Advisor / Intermediary  Upstream Thinking  
Unione Comuni Media 
Valle del Serchio 
Agronomist of the public 
body Project manager Land Stewards 
INEA Researcher  Knowledge provider/researcher Land Stewards 
Romagna Acque - Società 
Delle Fonti Spa Sustainability manager Project manager  
Romagna Water 
Fund 
University of Padova Researcher Knowledge provider/researcher  Romagna Water Fund 
 
The design block was further enriched drawing from Corbera and adding other sub-
dimensions related to technical aspects of scheme design.The general framework provided in 
annex 5 was used as guide for semi-structured interviews, however for each case study a previous 
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adaptation of the framework was carried out before the interview. The adaptation was made based 
on the case study characteristics, on the type of role covered by the interviewed expert and the 
information already available. Interviews were recorded with the use of a smart-phone. After a first 
phase of self-introduction, confidentiality statement, and background on the study, experts were 
asked to provide a general introduction on their role and on the scheme history. Secondly, experts 
were asked to respond to highlighted questions and missing data following the framework. Several 
paper documents and files such as maps, contracts, list of suppliers and their characteristics, 
transactions databases, and other relevant documentation were copied and or saved on hard-disk.  
Finally, experts were asked to add everything they thought to be relevant and that was not 
covered by the interview. Usually interviews last on average from 2 up to 5 hours, depending on 
the availability of expert’s time. 
Table 15: Conceptual framework for institutional analysis of PWS  
Dimension of the 
analytical framework  Sub-dimensions 
Ecosystem structure 
process and services 
Ecosystem structure, process, functions and services 
Environmental benefits 
Spatial temporal characteristics of flow between service provision and consumption 
Actor interactions   
Actors identification 
Actor roles, preferences and resources Roles, rights and responsibilities 
Preferences, interests, expectations and values 
Actions and interactions Use and management of resources 
Information sharing 
Lobbying 
Deliberation 
Institutional interplay 
Institutional interplay 
Policy interplay 
Instruments interplay 
Nature of the interplay  
Institutional design 
Start up 
Contract and procedures 
Payments 
Monitoring and evaluation 
Capacity and scale Capacity Scale 
Institutional performances 
Environmental effectiveness 
Economic efficiency 
Equity  
Flexibility 
Implementation complexity 
Acceptability 
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4. RESULTS 
 
As of 2012, according to the last Global State of Watershed Investments, only 15 active 
programmes in EU were identified (Bennett et al., 2012). Thanks to the systematic scientific and 
grey literature review, snowball approach, database collection and online survey we identified 76 
Payment for Watershed Services around the continent. The results of this section take into account 
all the information available for the 76 PWS. The list of inventoried case PWS is reported in Annex 
1: List of inventoried case studies6.  
Multiple sources of information have made possible to collect information for all 76 
inventoried PWS. Figure 14 summarize the percentage of information availability by type of source.  
 Firstly, grey literature was available for 88% of inventoried PWS, mostly project reports, 
NGOs reports, monitoring and evaluation reports, and European or international PES inventories 
such as Watershed Connect7 and other global studies (Bennett et al., 2012; CTFC, 2012; Greiber 
et al., 2009; OECD, 2013).  
Secondly, project websites were the second most frequent source of information, with 57% 
of identified programmes that had their own website or a dedicated section to communicate the 
programme actors, design and monitoring, sometimes providing updated and very good quality 
information that complemented other sources.  
Thirdly, the online survey obtained a response from 49% of identified PWS (37 programmes 
on 76). We then complemented the data collected through the online survey through emails, phone 
calls and direct interviews to selected case studies. Finally, only 21% of identified programmes 
were covered by scientific literature, with only very few peer-reviewed publications.  
                                               
6
 The attached publication “Gaining Depth State of Watershed Investment 2014” reports less case 
studies at European level than this thesis does. This is because the research at Ecosystem Marketplace was 
carried out till May 2014, while this thesis collected data till November 2014, increasing the number of 
identified case studies. For more information, visit: www.watershedconnect.org  
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Figure 14: Percentage of information availability by type of source (no. = 76) 
 
 
Pettenella (2012) described some Italian case studies on water related PES-like, regarding 
tap water provision and hydroelectric power generation (Pettenella et al., 2012). The negotiation 
process of some pilots PWS in Netherland were covered by De Groot (de Groot and Hermans, 
2009) and groundwater cooperative agreements (Brouwer et al., 2003).  
Some schemes in Germany were investigated by Grolleau for the case of Munich (Grolleau 
and McCann, 2012) and by Bluemling for the Lower Saxony regional groundwater protection 
scheme (Bluemling and Horstkoetter, 2007). Although the French case study on Vittel is the most 
known, there are no peer-reviewed publication specifically dealing with it, and we only found the 
report by IIED (Perrot-Maître, 2006). Other example from France on groundwater cooperation 
agreements (Eau de Paris, Saulce Plain, Lons le Saunier) have been recently investigated by 
Barataud who also compared French case studies with German ones such as Augsburg, Munich 
and SchALVO (Barataud et al., 2014).  
However, only 50 out of 76 are still active programmes, 15 are in pilot and/or design phase, 
four officially abandoned, and seven for which information of their status is not available. Figure 15 
shows the number of programmes by their activity status.  
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Figure 15: Number of programmes by activity status 
 
 
With the exception of Switzerland, programs are mostly concentrated in the EU-15 region, 
collected case studies are representative of 14 countries in the European continent (see more in 
detail Figure 16). The number of discovered case studies also depends on the difficulties to 
conduct a detailed literature review at country level without using the local language (for data 
collection we used only Spanish, Italian, English and French). Nevertheless, the collection is the 
most comprehensive one existing in the literature at EU level. Many local PWS, especially in non-
English or Spanish countries do not refer to the concept of PES when refereeing to payments or 
investments for increasing the provision of hydrological services. Many programs use other 
wording such as “Sustainable Catchment/River/Basin/Aquifer Management Plan”. The good 
representation for UK, IT, DE, FR, DKDK is due both for the existing literature review on the topic 
and by the fieldwork research. Nevertheless, the number of PWS by country is also explained by a 
existing regulatory frameworks or government investment programs (i.e. France, Germany & 
Denmark) and/or by specific hydrological conditions (Italy).  
The number of existing mechanisms does not tell us about the type of pure or quasi PES, 
while in UK they are almost all private-driven and pure PES; in the rest of EU they are almost all 
quasi-PES, public driven.  
76 
 
Figure 16: Identified schemes by country and program status in 2013/2014 
 
 
Most of the active schemes are concentrated in countries where there are high problems of 
water pollution from agriculture and/or high level of flood probability. Indeed the schemes are often 
dealing with these hydrological issues, as we will see in the next paragraphs.  
UK and France with a private or semi-private water sector have the highest number of PWS. 
However while England has a government programme that promotes adoption of PES schemes to 
solve water quality issues (see the high number of PWS in development), water utilities in France 
moves from cooperative agreements toward the acquisition of land and/or the set up of water 
quality legal restrictions (this trend is the same for Denmark and Germany).   
Given this general background on the most comprehensive inventory of PWS in Europe the 
next paragraphs, critically analyses and evaluate the following aspects:  
 service provision (supply);  
 policy drivers and payments/markets (demand);  
 typologies of governance models at EU level;  
 institutional aspects of selected case studies in Italy and England.  
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4.1. What are PWS paying for? A critical analysis of 
PWS service provision 
In this paragraph we first analyse the general characteristics of PWS in regards the 
targeted water issues and types of ecosystems, type of rewarded management practices and type 
of hydrological services provided by PWS. We then use the framework developed in Chapter 3 to 
assess all inventoried case studies8 (see paragraph 3.6.2 - Assessment of the service provision 
within PWS schemes).  
Programmes in EU generally focus on solving human induced water related issues 
generated by agricultural activities or high urbanization. The majority of PWS aims to improve 
groundwater and surface water quality related issues such as nitrates concentration (72%), 
chemicals residuals (56%), and biological contamination (35%). Amongst water quality issues, the 
watercolour (Coloured Dissolved Organic Matter - CDOM) has reported interesting issues, as the 
colour does not cause any health issue thus it is not regulated by law but just with customer 
satisfaction. Some catchment schemes in the UK are targeting Metaldehyde (a pesticide used 
against slugs and snails) which is difficult to remove using conventional water treatment plants. 
Schemes are also increasingly targeting “hazards and flooding” (31%) and groundwater depletion 
(13%). Public authorities and utilities often use PWS as a good strategy for climate change 
adaptation, including forest fires control, and groundwater recharge. Figure 17 summarises the 
frequency of water issues targeted by PWS. Therefore, generally speaking, PWS do not pay 
farmers and forest owners for providing hydrological services; instead, they are often paying 
farmers and forest owner to decrease their impacts on ecosystems and their hydrological 
functions.  
Schemes target for the 82% mainly the “built environment” such as agricultural catchments 
and reforested agricultural lands. While only 50% of them targets also forests, 22% freshwater 
bodies and 19% wetlands.   
                                               
8
 As for inventoried case studies in the design phase information was not always available we 
excluded them by the assessment. Therefore, we assessed only 68 PWS. 
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Figure 17: Frequency of water issues targeted by PWS9 
 
 
 
Figure 18 summarise the frequency of type of ecosystem targeted by PWS. Again, we 
reaffirm the idea that PWS are not paying natural ecosystems for their hydrological functions, 
instead they mostly pay farmers and forest owners to reduce their water footprint. 
Figure 18: Frequency of type of ecosystem targeted by PWS10 
 
 
                                               
9
 Categories are non-exclusive and a single transaction can include more than one type of water 
issue. Therefore, percentages do not necessarily add up to 100. 
 
10
 Categories are non-exclusive and a single scheme can targets more than one type of ecosystem. 
Therefore, percentages do not necessarily add up to 100.  
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In order to mitigate agricultural water footprint and to improve hydrological services, PWS 
adopt a portfolio of proxy management practices. Most of them aim to improve farming practices 
through better fertilizers management or sustainable agriculture techniques, fertilizers restrictions, 
livestock limits.   
Figure 19 summarizes rewarded management practices that PWS schemes use at EU 
level. Every scheme uses a portfolio of different measures, for example, the establishment of water 
and groundwater protection areas is often coupled with agriculture chemical restrictions and/or 
afforestation, fencing and grazing control. Forest related practices such as improved forest 
management (31%, for example fire control, conversion from pine to broadleaf forests, use water 
friendly forest technologies and management) and reforestation (40%) are also quite used to 
provide hydrological services. The importance of forests and trees within PWS is even bigger if we 
include other type of forest management such as the forest-hydrology management practices 
(19%). Improved agriculture practices (51%) and organic farming (18%) are also ones of the most 
used rewarded management practices which are likely to secure the service provision. Organic 
farming is often used as a way to delegate monitoring activities to a third party (certification body) 
and to provide market incentive to farmer (through marketing advantage of their products), such as 
in the case of Munich (Grolleau and McCann, 2012). PWS inventoried schemes reward a number 
of other management practices, such as rivers and water channels monitoring and cleaning, 
improving the access to angler’s sites, incentivizing blue mussels farming for nitrates purification 
and wetlands restorations. These latter, are all site-specific and water service-specific and they do 
not constitute a trend in the PWS in EU. 
The 76 case studies were classified against the Brauman output based hydrological service 
classification (Brauman et al., 2007). Most of PWS are dealing with improvement of extractive 
water supply (79%) and water damage mitigation (29%); these seem to be the first two priorities. 
We might expect an increase of both these categories, considering the fact that groundwater 
consumption is 3.5 times the recharging capacity (Gleeson et al., 2012), 38% of water bodies in 
EU are considered as “polluted”, and that climate change will double river flood probability (Ciscar 
et al., 2011; Dankers and Feyen, 2008) within the next two decades. Only 21% aim at in-stream 
water supply and only 10% to water related cultural services.  
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Figure 19: Frequency of proxy management practices rewarded by PWS11 
 
Figure 20: Frequency of hydrological services targeted by PWS12 
 
 
According to the WFD (2000/60/EC) implementation report, the main problem of EU rivers 
is the over abstraction with the consequence of reducing the minimum ecological flow (European 
Commission, 2012). This has serious consequence both on quality of water resources and on the 
provision of ecosystem services. Therefore, in-steam water supply might be a future area of 
                                               
11
 Categories are non-exclusive and a single scheme can reward more than one type of management practice. 
Therefore, percentages do not necessarily add up to 100. 
12
 Categories are non-exclusive and a single scheme can target more than one type of hydrological service. 
Therefore, percentages do not necessarily add up to 100. 
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expansion for PWS in Europe, together with recreational services such as fishing, etc. Regarding 
the service attribute, 57% of schemes deal specifically with water quality issues, while 22% with 
both quality and quantity, and only 8% are only dealing with quantity.  
The hydrological services as referred on site are important to understand which is the 
targeted policy and environmental priority and to avoid confusion during evaluation studies (Ojea et 
al., 2012). Generally, there is confusion when referring to the scope of the scheme, sometimes 
they refers to the hydrological services, sometimes to the causes of disservices, other to the final 
perceived benefits. That’s why it’s useful to classify schemes according to an output based 
classification (Brauman et al., 2007; Ojea et al., 2012).  
Regarding the situation of other ecosystem services coupled with the hydrological ones, the 
66% of schemes consider multiple benefits (i.e. they pay for projects that provide bundled 
services), and 34% do not. In most of the case PWS directly target biodiversity co-benefits (56%), 
social (41%), while carbon only is seen as a targeted co-benefits in 25% of projects. Generally, 
service suppliers receive monetary compensation for hydrological services, and then the 
programme additionally targets side benefits that complement the quality of the scheme. 
Therefore, the co-benefits often follow under the definition of piggy-backed, services that are 
provided by suppliers and enjoyed for free by service beneficiaries. However, as we see in the next 
paragraphs, the same PWS programme might be funded by several organizations with different 
aims. For example, while the water utility is often only looking to achieve water quality goals, 
environmental charities are looking at water-biodiversity related co-benefits. Therefore, although all 
funding agencies directly fund the water related scheme, they might ultimately target different co-
benefits.  
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Figure 21: Frequency of ecosystem co-benefits targeted by PWS 
 
  
In order to analyse each case study against the proposed framework (see paragraph 3.6.2 - 
Assessment of the service provision within PWS schemes), we assess the main water related 
issue, the type of ecosystems, and the processes and functions involved in the service provision13. 
These last three dimensions are useful to understand the extent to which the final service depends 
on natural and/or from human-built capital. On the other hand, we analyse service dependence on 
human capital taking into account the “conditionality of the payment” which means the type of 
inputs or rewarded management practices (i.e. human-built capital dependence). Then we classify 
all schemes according to the classifications systems presented within the Chapter on methodology 
( 
Table 6 and Table 7).  
The study and the interpretation of the natural and human inputs involved in the service 
provision results into a categorization of all PWS schemes that we summarise in Table 16 and 
graphically represents in Figure 22. The bubbles dimension within the graph represents the 
number of programmes falling under that specific category. 
 
                                               
13
 As for inventoried case studies in the design phase information was not always available we 
excluded them by the assessment. Therefore, the assessment results are based on 68 PWS.  
83 
 
 
Table 16: Results of service provision assessment of PWS 
Dependenc
e on human 
capital 
Dependence 
on natural 
capital 
No. of case 
studies 
Case studies (codes refer to Annex 1: List 
of inventoried case studies) Service category 
Low High 0 NA Ecosystem services 
Low Medium 0 NA Ecosystem services 
Low  Low 0 NA Spill over effects or by law due services 
Medium Low 9 UK3, UK4, UK24, FR1, FR2, FR3, FR4, FR5, SH1 Human services 
Medium Medium 0 NA Environmental 
services 
Medium  High 0 NA Environmental 
services 
High Low 34 
AU1, BH1, RO1, RO2, DK4, UK2, UK7, UK8, 
UK18, UK21, UK23, UK25, UK27, UK28, 
UK29, FR6, FR8, FR9, FR10, FR12, FR13, 
FR14, DE1, DE5, DE6, IT2, IT4, IT5, IT6, 
NL1, NL2, NL3, NL4, NL5 
Human services 
High Medium 18 
BE1, HU1, DK1, DK2, UK1, UK5, UK6, UK14, 
UK20, UK26, FR11, DE4, IT1, IT3, IT7, IT8, 
ES1, SE1 
Environmental 
services 
High High 7 DK3, UK13, UK15, FR7, DE2, DE3, PT1 Environmental 
services 
 
Figure 22: Graphic representation of results of the assessment of service provision of 
PWS 
 
84 
 
 
According to the assessment, none PWS is actually paying for services mainly directly 
provided by ecosystems. We can easily explain the no-representation of payments for “pure” 
ecosystem services in PWS by considering the fact that when nature already provides water 
related services, and if these services are not threatened by human activities, hardly someone will 
pay for them. This is the well-known “free-rider” problem, where for example water companies that 
source from protected areas benefit from pure and uncontaminated water without contributing to 
the protected areas associated costs. In this case, beneficiaries take for granted those ecosystem 
services generated by the natural capital. From the perspective of the production theory, this PWS 
category considers payment schemes that use little human capital in the “final environmental 
benefit” provision. In the case of drinking water industry, if the ecosystem delivers high quality 
water, the human capital employed to deliver drinking water is often limited to transport and 
logistics. When the human impacts harm the ecosystem’s capacity to deliver water related services 
we thus fall under other categories where human capital (through technology, organization 
arrangements and other inputs) is essential to deliver the final benefit to the society.  
On the contrary, the inventoried PWS bring a strong representation of payments for 
environmental services, i.e. payments for services that are generated by the built environment 
(Muradian et al., 2010; Wunder, 2005a) with a intensive use of human and natural capital. Within 
this category, we identified to main sub-categories.  
The first includes schemes that pay for environmental services generated by the built 
environment (18 out of 68, such as Forest Infiltration Areas, reforested agricultural lands, improved 
agricultural management practices in agricultural catchments) with a high level of human capital 
and medium level of natural capital. For instance in the case of Forest Infiltration Areas (Code IT1), 
high human capital is required to engine the combination of reforested agricultural land with the 
systematic water infiltration channels in order to increase water storage in the aquifer. Besides 
technical capacity, high level of social capital and collaboration among different institutions are 
required (river basin authorities, regional and provincial public bodies, municipalities, and farmers) 
(Leonardi and Pettenella, 2012; LIFE+ TRUST, 2012). Medium level of natural capital is required 
since these environmental services arise within agricultural lands and not in natural ecosystems. 
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Although Forest Infiltration Areas make systematic use of ecosystem processes and functions 
(water retention, infiltration and storage) in order to deliver the final service provision.  
The second sub-category (7 out of 68) includes those schemes that pay for services 
generated by natural ecosystems or “not-intensively managed ecosystems” (such as forest, 
wetlands or rivers) through improved forest management practices and wetlands restoration. This 
sub-category is characterized by a high use of natural capital because close-to-nature ecosystems 
are meant to be more valuable (in term of natural capital) than arable lands (Butler, 2009; De Groot 
et al., 2012). However, we chose to allocate a high level of human capital because both improved 
forest management and wetlands restoration require a high level of technical knowledge, 
organizational arrangements, technological investments and social capital.  
Finally, the last and newly introduced category named “human services” is represented by 
43 out of 68 case studies. These payment schemes pay for labour, organizational arrangements, 
grey infrastructures and social capital that, with little interaction and active ecosystem 
management, result in a perceived environmental benefit. This service type is thus characterized 
by a low level of use of natural capital and high level of human capital. This category encompasses 
all payments schemes that pay for services that are generated regardless ecosystem structure and 
functions. Within the category, we identified two main sub-categories.  
The first, with a value of human capital equal to “medium” that is represented by those 
schemes that pay for agriculture chemical inputs restrictions or substitution (9 out of 68). 
Therefore, the payment assures the service by the use of training, technology and incentives for 
farmers to lower their impact related to chemicals, and thus ensuring the environmental service 
provision. For instance, in the well known Vittel PWS (Code FR1), farmers are paid to decrease the 
use of agrochemicals and nitrates (human activity) within water source catchments, thus lowering 
the Vittel business risk (environmental benefit) of no compliance bottled water regulations (Perrot-
Maître, 2006). To implement the scheme and set the water quality parameters under regulators’ 
thresholds, Vittel had to create an institution, AGRIVAR, which works closely with farmers, 
providing win-win chemicals application solutions, training on farm nutrient plans, etc. Therefore, 
the inputs used in the Vittel scheme and the final environmental benefits are all human-related 
(knowledge, institutional and social capital). Another interesting example for this sub-category is 
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represented by Wessex Waters in the South of England (Code UK24), where the water utility pays 
farmers for substituting metaldehyde (a widely used molluscicide), with a more water-friendly 
pesticide (Wessex Water, 2013). In this way, farmers can still protect their crops from snails, while 
Wessex Waters avoids the risk of no-compliance with UK water regulators and decrease high 
costs related to metaldehyde water treatment.  
The second sub-category of human services (34 out of 68), with a value of human capital 
equal to “high”, includes schemes paying for services generated by capital works improvements (to 
avoid nutrients leakage), water channel fencing, monitoring activities for reducing forest fire (and 
thus reducing the risk on water quality provision), flood risk management activities, and forest 
hydrology engineer works. These schemes have the peculiarity of dealing mostly with ecosystem 
“disservice” (Lyytimäki and Sipilä, 2009; Zhang et al., 2007) such as flooding and fires and/or often 
require high level of infrastructural investments. For instance, since 2007, Natural England 
established The Catchment Sensitive Farming Capital Grant Scheme (Code UK23). This agro-
environmental scheme provides incentives to land managers in priority catchments to support the 
improvement or the installation of facilities that would benefit water quality by reducing diffuse 
pollution from agriculture (like water ways fencing, manure storage, etc.). In the same way but at 
regional level, Upstream Thinking (Code UK3), the most known PWS in the UK, operated by South 
West Waters (a water utility) in partnership with Westcountry Rivers Trust (charity organization), 
sets agreements with farmers providing incentives for capital work improvements that are directly 
linked with river and reservoir water quality. According to the UK Department for Environment, 
Food & Rural Affairs, Upstream Thinking is considered a proper PES scheme, because the capital 
works improvements go beyond the minimum legal requirements (the baseline). Farmers 
undertaking these grey infrastructure improvements directly contribute to improve drinking water 
quality and decreasing the cost of water treatment (otherwise beard by water utilities) (DEFRA, 
2013b). A third interesting example within this sub-category is the Land Stewards scheme in 
Tuscany, Italy (Code IT5). The public authority in charge of managing the mountain river basin 
Media Valle del Serchio, has established agreements with about 40 farmers and forest owners in 
order to improve flood risk monitoring and control over 500 km of water ways within the mountain 
basin. Farmers are paid for monitoring and evaluating the degree of risk and for providing an alert-
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report service to the public authority on any situation regarding slope instability or waterways 
obstruction. Land Stewards scheme has contributed to efficiently decrease the flood risk and the 
occurrence of water damage related costs, providing the society with an environmental benefit 
resulting from farmer training, organizational arrangements and networks (Giani, 2012; OECD, 
2013). The alert and control system works through an interactive Information and Communication 
Technologies (ICT) system (IDRAMAP) which helps land owners report and alert the public 
authorities and eventually deliver hydro-geological risk control of the district (Rovai et al., 2013).  
All three schemes are examples of payments for the provision of water related services that 
deliver environmental benefits and human well-being without any active management of natural 
ecosystems structure and functions.   
4.2. EU PWS policy drivers and market outlook 
In this paragraph we present the policy context and drivers, market actors and their 
characteristics, payments and investments scales at EU level. We also highlight some new trends 
at EU level giving the background to the following paragraph that better deals with typologies of 
governance models. All data presented are drawn from the online survey and a more detail 
institutional policy context analysis of several countries in EU.  
Water Framework Directive & greening of European policies give 
light to future PWS 
At European level, the policy context is increasingly providing a playground for the start-up 
of new PWS and the up-scale of existing ones. In fact, the EU water, biodiversity and Common 
Agriculture Policy (CAP) agendas are promoting several new initiatives and innovating existing 
financial instruments that will be likely to boost PWS as tools to meet water related goals and 
environmental conservation.  
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WFD looking for an ecosystem approach  
In the late 2012 the EU has published the EU blueprint on water (European Commission, 
2012). Despite significant improvements on water quality, just 53% of EU waters will achieve a 
good status by 2015. At national level, the lack of implementation of policies on water is often due 
to the limited use of economic instruments and poor local governance. Therefore, the EU Blueprint 
on water has stressed the need for a better horizontal integration with other policy areas such as 
CAP, Cohesion and structural Fund and renewable energy. With regard to the implementation of 
PWS the Blueprint set the agenda and a time schedule for implementing guidance documents on 
many relevant topics such as water trading schemes, water catchment accounts, Natural Water 
Retention Measures (NWRM), PES, among others14. Although not explicitly mentioned in the 
Water Framework Directive, the Ecosystem Approach appears to be a promising concept for the 
EC to help WFD implementation and the provision of ecosystem services at catchment level 
(Vlachopoulou et al., 2014). In particular, two relevant initiatives from the DG Environment are 
promising for the development and promotion of payments for watershed services, the Pilot Project 
– “Atmospheric Precipitation - Protection and efficient use of Fresh Water, Integration of NWRM in 
River basin management” for collaboratively building knowledge and promoting best practice on 
NWRM in Europe15. A parallel study on “Integrating Ecosystem Services with Water Framework 
Directive and Floods Directive Implementation” has a specific focus on how to implement 
payments schemes at river basin level16.  
Linking water and biodiversity policy agenda 
A favourable link between biodiversity policies and PWS is represented by the Habitats and 
Bird Directives that all together cover almost 18 % of the EU’s terrestrial territory and 21% of EU’s 
marine areas. These sites are facing both biodiversity and water related issues and, as our 
inventory shows, are often a good ground for the development of PWS. For example, this is the 
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 http://ec.europa.eu/environment/water/blueprint/index_en.htm  
15
 For more information go to Natural Water Retention Measures website: http://nwrm.eu/  
16
 For more information: http://www.watereco.info/  
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case of the SCaMP project of United Utilities in the North West UK, the Upstream Thinking project 
of South West Waters, where in both cases the relation with the habitat directive was crucial for 
their design and implementation (see next paragraph 4.4 on case study analysis). In order to meet 
with the directive requirements, management authorities have to identify the source of funding to 
manage their protected areas (through the elaboration of the so-called Prioritized Action 
Framework - PAF). Therefore the Commission, in order to raise private-public match funding has 
created a dedicated website, guidance and financing tools, encouraging members states and 
regional authorities to undertake innovative financing tools such as PES, visitor payback schemes 
and trust funds17. The elaboration of the PAF is now a prerequisite to accede to the Programme for 
the Environment and Climate Action (LIFE), the biggest environmental fund of the European 
Commission. In between 2014 and 2020 the fund is expected to provide € 3.4 billion which will 
mostly directed to Natura 2000 areas, with specific preference for project that will attract innovative 
governance/financing systems for environmental conservation and climate adaptation. A new type 
of regional project funded under LIFE, Integrated Project, will fund large scale interventions (€10-
20 M per project) for targeting the Habitat, Bird and WFD directives and projects able to show a 
link between biodiversity conservation and the implementation of River Basin Management Plans. 
The fund guidelines require a special regard for evaluation, assessment and restoration of 
ecosystems and their services and increase of the contribution of agriculture and forestry to 
biodiversity. 
The new Green Infrastructure Strategy (Green Infrastructure - Enhancing Europe’s Natural 
Capital Strategy) approved by the EC in 2013 will seek to integrate green infrastructure within the 
existing funding mechanisms such as CAP, the Cohesion Fund, the European Regional 
Development Fund, Horizon 2020, the Connecting Europe Facility, the European Maritime and 
Fisheries Fund and the Financial Instrument for the Environment (LIFE). According to the strategy, 
the EC together with the European Investment Bank will set up an ad hoc EU financing facility by 
2014 to support public and private organizations seeking to develop GI projects. Again, all these 
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 For more information visit Financing Natura 2000 website: http://www.financing-natura2000.eu/  
90 
 
public funds will look for possible match funding mechanisms, providing an opportunity for 
emerging PWS.     
 Considering that most of Natura 2000 areas are water related ecosystems, such as rivers, 
lakes, wetlands, peatlands, etc., many of the identified EU PWS have joined the support of the EU 
funds dedicated to Natura 2000 areas to cover start up, piloting and monitoring activities. The new 
trends highlighted above build a solid basis for future development of new PWS at EU level.  
Matching CAP payments with Private Watershed Investments      
In the new CAP reform, the expenditure for agriculture and rural development is financed by 
two funds. The first pillar, The European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF), is targeted to the 
provision of environmental public goods. From 2015 onwards, the CAP will introduce a new policy 
instrument in Pillar 1, the Green Direct Payment. Accounting for 30% of the budget, it will support 
permanent grassland, ecological focus areas and crop diversification, for a total budget of € 312,74 
billion 2014 and 2020. The second pillar, European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development 
(EAFRD), focuses on 6 priorities of which one is dedicated to “Restoring, preserving and 
enhancing ecosystems dependent on agriculture and forestry”, with 3 focus areas i) Restoring and 
preserving biodiversity (including in NATURA 2000 areas and areas of High Nature Value farming) 
and the state of European landscapes; ii) Improving water management; iii) Improving soil 
management. Sustainable measures account for 30% of the total budget, which account for 95,58 
billion euro between 2014 and 202018. Several cases studies from our inventory have declared to 
use CAP agro-environmental schemes as match funding for sustaining the payments for 
watershed services.  
For instance in the UK, almost all PWS are using the Catchment Sensitive Farming Capital 
Grant Scheme funds to help farm investing on capital works improvements and complement the 
payments of water utilities for improving water quality. Technical and advisory programmes, often 
financed by the Rural Development Plans, are providing capacity building and training to farmers 
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 For more information visit the CAP website: http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/cap-
funding/index_en.htm  
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participating in watershed payments. An interesting new measure of the CAP reform is related to 
cooperation among different actors for multiple purposes (Regulation (UE) N. 1305/2013 art.35, 
art.56, art.57). This measure specifically funds cooperation among farmers, forest owners and 
other actors, and among others actions, specify the use of cooperation projects for the 
improvements of water management.   
Policy drivers: a snapshot at national level 
Many EU PWS are often based on regulations that establish the right to economic 
compensation for legal restrictions toward drinking water source protected areas. This is the case 
of Germany (Article 14 Para.2 of the German Basic Law), Lower Saxony (Federal and Provincial 
States’ Water Acts) and in Bavaria (Art. 36 a Para 2 of the Bavarian Nature Protection Act), Italy 
(Galli’s Act indications - art.18 and 24, Law 36/1994), Netherlands (Groundwater Act 1981), Austria 
(Austrian Water Rights Act. article 34) and Switzerland (article 62 of the Federal Law on the 
Protection of Waters). In these cases the payments is targeted to cover the opportunity cost of 
farmers that face loss of income for legal restrictions on the use of agricultural inputs. Many of 
these regulations also introduce Water Levies (Netherland, Denmark, Lower Saxony, etc.) which 
helps to collect funds to reinvest in farmers compensations and other watershed management and 
monitoring.  
An interesting PWS in Italy, Land Stewards, in the absence of a national law that regulate 
payments for ecosystem services, has made use of a national law19 that establish the possibility for 
public bodies to contract private and public entities (thus including also farmers) to deliver 
landscape management works. This law was conceived in order to promote multifunctional 
agriculture but the concept of “provision of ecosystem services” is not properly achieved. 
Therefore, the contracts between public bodies and farmers refer to the number of hours of labour 
to carry out planned conservation works, instead of targeting the final ecosystem service provision.  
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 Decree 18 maggio 2001, no. 228 "Orientamento e modernizzazione del settore agricolo, a norma dell'articolo 7 della legge 
5 marzo 2001, n. 57“ and Law 97/1994 - Art. 17. Incentivi alle pluriattività. 
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In Spain, the new law for environmental compensation approved in 2013 has established 
the rules for creating a habitat banking system for the country20. New infrastructure projects will 
have to go through an environmental assessment and compensate the impacts on specific habitats 
(including water bodies, wetlands and coastal areas) therefore in the near future we expect the 
emergence of wetlands or habitat banks in the Iberian Peninsula.  
As the Figure 16 shows, England is leading on PWS implementation and emerging 
mechanisms and we dedicate a special section to explain what the drivers look like in the UK. 
PWS momentum in England 
We have identified 16 consolidated and 12 pilot schemes in England counting more than 
one third of the total PWS in Europe. In 2011, the UK Department for Environment, Food and Rural 
Affairs (DEFRA) had committed to set up a business-led Ecosystem Markets Task Force, to 
publish an action plan, to expand PES schemes around the country, to create a new research fund 
targeted at these schemes and publish a best practice guide to design them (DEFRA, 2013a, 
2013c, 2011). DEFRA has met all these tasks and has established a research fund that helps to 
set up new schemes around the country and to share the existing best practices. Moreover, in 
2011 the Government’s Water Strategy for England has set out Defra’s proposals for expanding 
catchment management schemes to address diffuse pollution to achieve compliance with the 
requirements of Article 7 of the WFD. Despite these efforts, DEFRA lacked of a participatory 
approach during the development of River Basin Management Plans (RBMPs) and WWF UK and 
RSPB have suited the UK government for non-compliance with Article 14 of the WFD on Public 
information and consultation 21 . In 2013, in order to achieve an integrated catchment based 
approach according the WFD, DEFRA published the Catchment Based Approach policy framework 
and set € 2 millions start up funding to support the establishment of Catchment Partnerships. 
These partnerships have engaged with a number of local and national stakeholders at catchment 
level while creating the basis for the adoption of PWS through bottom up approach. In fact many of 
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 Ley 21/2013, de 9 de diciembre, de evaluación ambiental  
21
 For more information UK compliance on WFD: http://www.eeb.org/?LinkServID=B1E256EB-
DBC1-AA1C-DBA46F91C9118E7D&showMeta=0  
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the first 20 funded partnership corresponds with the existing payments schemes. Partnerships now 
exist in all catchments across England. 
Another major driver in England has been the removal of a regulatory barrier. In fact, in the 
past, OFWAT the UK public water regulator did not allow water utilities to invest on catchment 
schemes because of concerns about subverting the “Polluter Pays Principle”. After the learning 
experience coming from the first two PWS in the country (SCaMP and Upstream Thinking, see 
paragraph on case studies) OFWAT now encourage private water utilities to invest on catchment 
management schemes to secure raw water quality where they believe this is an effective and cost 
efficient approach. As a result, water utilities responded investing € 77 millions on more than 100 
catchment management schemes and investigations around the country in between 2010 and 
2015 (OFWAT, 2011). We will therefore assist to an explosion of new schemes in the next two 
years as many PWS are still in the investigation phase.  
England thus becomes a hotspot of PWS in EU. The government under pressure of the 
WFD and environmental lobbers is creating an enabling policy framework while providing funding 
for investigation, best practices and pilot of catchment partnerships and payment schemes. The 
private water utilities are willing to invest millions of pounds in order to save operational and capital 
investments and deliver multiple benefits at catchment level, changing the traditional approach to 
chemical water treatment toward a more integrated catchment management. The water regulator, 
allows these investments only if they demonstrate to be cost effective in term of achieving water 
quality goals, thus inducing private companies to carry out baseline assessment study, 
investigation on pollutant dynamics at catchment level, and cost benefit analysis22 of the payment 
schemes in order to ensure the best value for money (Natural England, 2014; OFWAT, 2011). On 
the other hand, a very well organized civil society engages and sets up collaborative learning 
processes through farmer’s organizations, wildlife and river trusts, national parks and local 
authorities.  
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 The  Benefit  Assessment  Framework  is a tool that potentially allows catchment  schemes  to  be  
evaluated  in  a  standard  way  and  its  use  is encouraged 
http://www.waterrf.org/ExecutiveSummaryLibrary/4393_ProjectSummary.pdf  
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Other key drivers  
A key identified driver is the risk of non-compliance with increasingly demanding drinking 
water quality standards and coupled with increased uncertainty derived from climate change. Both 
water quality and quantity are often perceived at risk and operational and capital cost for delivering 
drinking water and other services are becomes a playground for competitiveness and profitability. 
Some water utilities have reported to adopt PWS for potential future water-quality risk, where they 
see that in 10-25 years time there might be and increased probability of nitrates or pesticide risks.  
Within water utilities payments schemes are in some cases reported as part of a broad 
CSR organization strategy, to increase social acceptability and the overall sustainability. For 
example, United Utilities is a company listed in the Down Jones Sustainability Index and the 
SCaMP programme is one of the elements that contribute to its sustainability performance 
evaluation. Both Upstream Thinking and SCaMP, as first best practices in the UK, have won 
several awards for sustainability performances and wetlands restoration.  
Actor’s analysis  
Service providers are mostly private (81%), only 22% are public, mostly forest managers. 
Civil society organization and partnership account only for 7%. Most of service providers are 
farmers for 43%, 21% of programmes targets both farmers and forest owners, while only 13% 
targets forest managers only. Farmers often manage the most sensitive areas in term of water 
quality and they are often the source of water issue targeted by the PWS, through overgrazing, use 
of fertilizer, pesticides and herbicides. Therefore, they are the most frequent service supplier. 
Public suppliers are mainly water utilities, which directly own or manage the land or natural 
ecosystems that provide raw water. In some cases public suppliers are local municipalities often 
owner of forest lands such as in the case of Romagna Acque spa scheme in Italy which pays 
forested municipalities around the reservoir to improve forest management and deliver other forest-
hydrologic engineer works (Pettenella et al., 2012). Non-profit suppliers are found only in United 
Kingdom, they are mainly charity organizations owning or managing high conservation values 
lands (parks, forest, wetlands, etc.) such as in the case of RSPB and Wildlife Trusts.  
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Although PES are often described as market based mechanisms for environmental 
conservation in this research we prefer to see them as a mix governance model between market 
and hierarchy (Muradian and Rival, 2012). In fact, most of the considered schemes are public 
managed. Service buyers are mostly dominated by public sector (about 60%), 25% are private 
multi-utility but publicly owned, 24% are public authorities such as municipalities, and 10% are 
public watershed management authorities. Private sector account for almost 38% including private 
businesses, beverage companies (distributed among water bottle companies such as Vittel, 
Danone or other beverage companies such as Coca Cola Portugal and Bionade in Germany) and 
private multi-utility. Citizens that directly pay for the service provision account only for 3%, 
therefore in just one case. Figure 23 summarises the share of main buyer types. PWS have always 
multiple buyers, however for this category we choose the most important buyer in term of 
investments for each of the PWS.  
Figure 23: Share of main buyer types 
 
Intermediaries and project support 
European PWS work with a very high spectrum of organizations starting from Civil Society 
Organization (CSO) (environmental charities, river trusts, farmers association, etc.), public sector 
(government agencies, local authorities, parks and protected areas offices), universities and 
consultancies. According to our analysis, the main intermediary is often a CSO for the 39% of the 
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schemes, a public sector organization for the 30%, and for the 31% it is a partnership of several 
organizations, where the local authority, charities, regional parks and farmers associations form a 
formal association for the management of the scheme.  
Farmers associations and their advisors are essential both in design and implementation 
phases in order to adapt PWS schemes to farmer’s needs and views, i.e. increasing system’s 
acceptability (such as Coldiretti in Italy in the case of Land Stewards, code IT5). In the case of 
Munich PWS, the acceptability of the scheme has increased thanks to the collaboration with 
organic farmers associations, as they could provide marketing co-benefits for those farmers that 
entered into organic agriculture schemes funded with water levy (code DE1). Many private and 
public investors (buyers) lack of local knowledge both in term of social (knowing how to engage 
with locals and using the right approach/wording) and ecological perspective (micro-scale 
catchment morphology and functioning). Their non-profit nature often increase the trust with 
landowners, therefore many private investors contract these associations to deliver payments or to 
carry out farm advice plans, monitoring and promotion. Environmental charities, depending on their 
level of activities, sometimes provide a similar role to farmer’s associations. However, they are 
reported to be more active in political support to increase the scheme acceptability by national and 
regional agencies, such as the Royal Society of Protection of Birds in the UK, which was 
fundamental in the development of SCaMP of United Utilities (code UK20). They often provide 
start-up funding and are able to engage with a number of local, national and international 
stakeholder groups, such as in the case of WWF in the Danube PWS pilot (codes BH1, RO1, 
RO2).  
Government agencies are often providing funds (for example, DEFRA pilot funds) legal 
advice and back up regulations (all PWS based on Water Acts). They are reported to be one of the 
main actors for schemes that provide joint PWS - CAP payments. Sometimes for public subsidies 
or programmes that provide match funding with CAP, monitoring activities are delegated to 
government payment agencies. Environment agencies are often taking part of monitoring the 
hydrological outcomes of some programmes. While local authorities, mainly parks and protected 
areas authorities, engage at design and implementation level, providing a very similar role as of 
farmers associations.  
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Eventually, universities and consultancies are often taking part of design process, for 
example in the case of Fowey River scheme, University of East Anglia was contracted to create an 
auction based system, and in most of the pilots project in England. They often carry out monitoring 
activities and support the cost benefit analysis of programmes. Consultancies are in some cases 
contracted to create participatory mapping approaches, elaborating viability studies, and trying to 
integrate PWS goals with other national policies and local planning tools.  
Each intermediary organization is often participating within the scheme in order to represent 
its own institutional goals and views. From farmer’s lobby, to scientific interests, to biodiversity 
related goals, for profit business, etc. Most of the considered PWS, thanks to intermediaries 
organizations and their “glue role”, has proved to be a “social infrastructure” useful to aligning 
different interest into community shared plans and goals to deliver multiple benefits projects, 
among multiple actors.  
Capacity and scale 
The concept of scale is central in analyses of institutions for environmental governance. 
Figure 24 thus analyzes all PWS depending on their institutional scale of the programme 
administrator. We considered the institutional scale a proxy for determining their capacity. The 
assessment shows that public bodies directly manage 49% of schemes; however, 29% are 
managed by cross scale partnership, which through collaborative approaches provide better 
coverage and capacity. When the private sector is involved, mostly only big organizations such as 
multinational companies such as CocaCola, Danone, Bionade are managing PWS.  
Small and medium size organizations account only for 4% of the total. Therefore, we can 
draw a simple conclusion that successful and existing schemes in Europe are mostly managed by 
organization with strong financial, territorial and technical capacity such as national, regional and 
municipal authorities and big private organizations. 
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Figure 24: PWS type institutional scale of the administrator 
 
 
PWS schemes are implemented at different spatial and administrative scales; they vary 
from small catchments areas of a municipality to national wide programs. However, whatever the 
administrative boundaries, they tend to be applied at significant hydrological scale in order to have 
an impact on the ecosystem provision, and fit the peculiarity of each hydrological services and 
spatial conditions. Therefore, they are often implemented at catchment level, aquifer level, or river 
basin level. Some programs are acting also in more than a river basin but they adopt specific and 
targeted measures. Table 17 shows the share of programs by administrative and spatial scale. All 
local classified programs (catchment or sub-catchment) are private driven and voluntary programs, 
where a specific interest of a water company is funding the program at local level. Most of 
municipal programs are related to cities that are paying or investing for securing water quality 
provision, especially for groundwater quality protection. All 11 public national wide programs are 
enforced under a regulated framework and half of them are mandatory.  
Table 17: PWS programs by administrative and spatial scale 
Type of scale Spatial administrative Spatial implementation 
Level National Regional Local (Catchment) National Regional 
Local 
(Catchment) 
Percentage 17% 45% 38% 5% 17% 79% 
Observations 11 30 25 3 11 52 
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Therefore, the river basin and or the catchment are the preferred spatial scale for the 
implementation of programmes. When programmes have regional or county scale, they are often 
targeting specific sensitive areas or catchment within the region. Also in the case of national 
programmes such as the Catchment Sensitive Farming programme in England, the scheme is 
targeting 66 priority catchments to help meet the requirements of the Water Framework Directive 
(WFD) and improve freshwater Sites of Special Scientific Interest (SSSIs), where evidence 
suggests that pollution from farming practices impacts significantly on water quality and aquatic 
habitats. Overall, PWS are catchment specific and within the same programme we find several 
adaptation and design mechanisms which are strictly connected with the scale of the catchment23 
(large catchment are more suitable for auction design system, while small areas are better 
addressed with advisory-led schemes), the type of ecosystem (agricultural, forest or wetlands) and 
the targeted hydrological services.  
We then analysed the area covered by each PWS, and classified them as shown in Figure 
25. Almost 30% of schemes cover areas in between 1.000 to 5.000 hectares; other 20% cover an 
area in between 250-1000 hectares. Therefore, most of the programmes are small or medium 
sized. However, both large scale (>150.000) and micro scale (0-50) account only for 7% each. 
Figure 25: Frequency of spatial scale of PWS programmes (hectares)  
 
                                               
23
 Day, B., Couldrick, L., 2013. Payment for Ecosystem Services Pilot Project: The Fowey River Improvement Auction. 
Norwich, UK. 
100 
 
Schemes were also assessed against their time scale and there is an equal distribution 
among those that are considered long-term (more than 10 years of activities), medium term (in 
between 5 and 10), and short term (less than 5 years). Historically taking into account the self 
declared data on survey and data provided in the literature review PWS in EU have covered 
around 2.360.582 hectares.  
EU snapshot on PWS transactions  
Across the 76 identified programs in 2013, data on payments for 2013 are available only for 
19 out of 68 ongoing projects, totalling around € 44.7 millions (Bennett et al., 2014b). Actual figures 
are probably much higher, as accurate data are missing for 50% of the active programmes and 
transactions are still not available for pilot projects. However, if we consider all transaction from the 
last year available we make up to € 164 million/year (considering values reported by 28 projects 
out of 68)24.  Similarly, making a projection on number of years of activity per scheme, declared 
last annual payments and/or historical transaction reported, historical payments are conservatively 
estimated to be up to € 1.64 billion.  
In many cases, the nature of PWS in EU makes very difficult to give an exact estimation of 
transactions, especially when the programmes are collecting funds from more than one source or 
when they are implemented by several organizations, as in the case of multiple benefit 
partnerships (see next paragraph for typologies of governance models). Besides, some PWS are 
targeting rivers, providing data on kilometres of watercourses restored instead of providing data in 
hectares, such as in the case of “Land Stewards” in Italy (IT5) and the “Angling Passport Schemes” 
in England (UK2).   
Transactions by type of buyer/investor 
In 2013 public sector, still keep the leading on demand and finance of PWS. However, 
compare to the last 2012 State of Watershed Markets private sector consolidate its position in term 
                                               
24
 Transactions have been collected both from the data provided on the online survey and in the 
literature review.  
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of both number of investors and share of total funding, accounting for 35% of total transactions. 
Business is a major force behind investments in natural infrastructure for water in Europe, 
delivering almost € 7.7 millions in 2013 to PWS. National government schemes provide the bigger 
share in term of funding while other non-profit, households and other public funding are not 
significant in term of transactions. Public investors are often national, regional or local governments 
or their public owned water utilities. Private investors are equally distributed between private water 
utilities and beverage companies (such as Coca-Cola France and Portugal, Bionade in Germany, 
Vittel and Danone in France, and Norda in Italy). However, the latter are often not significant in 
term of transactions, and in some cases, the schemes are better described as CSR projects than 
as investment/payments on watershed. 
Figure 26: Investors by sector, by share of all investors, and by share of total funding in 
2013  
 
 
Figure 27 compare the European private investments with investments worldwide. Contrary 
to what it was expected we can see how EU plays a major role within PWS transactions. In fact EU 
has been always seen as mainly public driven market for watershed services. However, the role of 
private water utilities in United Kingdom backed up with some private bottle water companies 
pushed up private investments.   
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Figure 27: Private investments by continent, role of EU (2013)  
 
 
In total 55% of inventoried programmes declared to use multiple source of funding, while 
the remaining counts on one main financial source. Figure 28 shows the frequency of source of 
funding. With the emergence of partnership schemes and match funding systems PWS have 
generally declared a main investors per project; however many schemes have reported the use of 
funds from EU projects, CAP payments and other local spot-donors which are more difficult to 
track. 
Figure 28: Frequency of source of funding of PWS  
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The most frequent source of funding is the utility or public budget allocation, accounting for 
half of the schemes. National EU funds are also the second most frequent source of funding and 
these are usually helping on the start up phase of new PWS. CAP payments are also coupled with 
other public and private sources and are usually a component of the payments. Consumer’s water 
levies, although they are less frequent, they are capable to collect the biggest amount of 
investments. Just to mention the lower Saxony scheme invests by its own almost half of the total 
budget invested in EU (about 20 million euro/year).  
Overall investors have already committed € 38.6 million in between 2014 and 2020. The 
share of project investors who have committed future funding is around 38%. Private sector seems 
to provide more certainty on future funding commitments. It is worth noting that (out of fourteen 
totals) five private sector investors have committed 100% of project funding. Perception in regards 
to public sector funding is often undermined by political instability and funds are uncertain 
especially in between the last EU funding period (2007-2013) and the new one (2014-2020).  
All business buyers tracked are either private water utilities (mainly in England) or beverage 
companies. Beverage companies include Coca-Cola bottling companies in France and Portugal, 
Bionade in Germany, Vittel and Danone in France, and Norda in Italy. Contrary to other regions 
where private sector contributions are relatively small, business delivers at least two-thirds of 
funding in half of the programs in which it participates. 
Among the top five motivations reported by investors, we found a clear link between water 
quality and biodiversity protection, followed by water availability risk as the major drivers for 
investments. This is certainly in line with the policy context where both water and biodiversity 
agenda are creating synergies and match funding opportunities.  
Regulatory compliances, Corporate Social Responsibility, reputational concerns are also 
very important drivers that emerge from European investors. Revenue opportunities connected 
with saving on operational and capital investment is certainly the first driver for private water 
unities, which is strictly connected with the water quality/quantity risks and regulatory compliance 
duties.     
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Payments  
Service suppliers are paid following the modality “input-based” rather than out-put based. 
Farmers and forest owner are paid based on the management practices they implement regardless 
the outcomes in term of services. And this confirm the trend found in other studies (Martin-Ortega 
et al., 2013; Schomers and Matzdorf, 2013). Only in 2 cases out of 68, suppliers are paid based on 
real programmes outcomes. These are the case of the Angling Passport Schemes in UK (code 
UK2) and the Visitor Pay Back scheme (code UK15), as in both cases buyers are paying for the 
recreational services they actually enjoy, such as access to fishing areas and recreational services 
around the lake areas. Therefore, most of the schemes are based on rewarding proxy 
management practices that in theory should increase the level of service provision.  
Cash is the most frequent way to reward service providers, accounting for 49% of the 
schemes. Only 7% are providing in-kind only, in forms of training and inputs, such as in the case of 
substitution of traditional pesticides with more water-friendly ones or through the instalment of 
capital works investments at farm level. Compared to other studies where schemes reward by cash 
or by providing in-kind inputs (Martin-Ortega et al., 2013; Sattler et al., 2013), Europe provide a 
very clear trend where payments are usually (44% of schemes) coupled with in-kind services or 
inputs. 
Pay frequency is periodical (annually) in the 70% of cases while in 30% is considered one-
off payments, especially for those capital works investments that aim to improve the farm 
infrastructures conditions, in order to improve water quality. Also in the case of afforestation we 
find one-off payment mode.  
Considering the pay time, it’s interesting to note that only 19% of schemes pay upfront, 
while 77% pay after the adoption of management practices, and only in very few, the payment is 
delivered after the provision of the service (corresponding to those two above mentioned case 
studies were payment is output based). In order to increase the efficiency and additionality of the 
payments almost 92% of schemes have proved to have a sort of system to target payments to 
those suppliers or areas, which are likely to be more effective, for soil or specific baseline 
conditions. Table 18 provides an estimate of average minimum and maximum payments per-
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hectare based management practice or for no-hectare based, such as capital works, fencing, etc.. 
We used both data collected through the online survey and the literature, extrapolating some 
values when both the value of total yearly transaction and land covered were available. Although 
the number of observations is not high, the reported figures are quite realistic. Many schemes 
apply price differentiation, providing a portfolio of different management practices, sometimes the 
adoption of two or more management practice bring an increase of the payment, although not 
always linear.  
Table 18: Buyer payments and seller receipts (last year available) - (€/year/ha) 
 
 
Units  Min Max 
Hectare based management 
practices  
Average €/ha  69 839 
Min/Max €/ha 15 6.936 
N° of observations  11 24 
Capital works or other no hectare 
based practices (fencing, capital 
works, etc.)  
Average €/Intervention  1.404 29.900 
Min/Max €/Intervention  35 60.000 
N° of observations  8 10 
 
Many are the factors that influence the payments and these are found in the literature of 
other inventories reviews: the type of management practices, land features, the number of adopted 
management practices, the size of the area landownership, previous interventions in the area, or 
the environmental quality of an area. 
We also tried to analyse payment amount in relation to costs of ES provision, therefore not 
providing an economic estimate but considering the aim of the payment. Payments aim to pay 
above the cost of the service provision (therefore tending to provide a profit to farmers) only in 19% 
of the cases. While in the majority (44%) the payment is direct to fully cover the cost of service 
provision (implementation of management practices, or opportunity cost): However, 35% is 
providing only a partial cover of the cost.  
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We tried to classify the main aim of payments in each scheme and 27% of PWS aim to 
avoid negative externalities of farmers, while 13% compensate the opportunity costs for loss of 
income for legal restrictions (where farmers have to respect a more strict environmental standards 
compared to others), and 9% aims to compensate negative impacts, such as in the case of CSR 
investments/offsetting of beverage companies (CocaCola or Bionade in Germany). Only 17% has 
as a main goal to provide additional positive externalities, such as an improvement or maintenance 
of hydrological services. These results show how weak are the fundamental basis of many PWS 
schemes in EU. They are often not funding the direct provision or maintenance of an ecosystem 
services, on the contrary they are paying to avoid water contamination, to compensate both 
opportunity costs and water footprint.  Can we consider all these schemes at the same level? This 
is a question better addressed within the next paragraph on typologies of governance models, 
where the aim of the scheme is a main factor to distinguish and classify them.  
Water outcomes: do investments pay back?  
Overall, 50% of European programmes (without considering the pilots case studies) have 
reported to be successful and therefore meeting water quality goals in a cost effective way. Most of 
the programmes seem to have conducted a sort of piloting phase or feasibility study before the 
actual implementation. 35% of programs have measured direct outcomes; however, outcomes are 
often measured in term of proxy management practices rather than effective hydrological 
monitoring. According to the attached report from Ecosystem Marketplace, program administrators 
have reported between 10-30% reductions in nitrates, 871,503,531 tons of avoided sediment 
loading (~33,500 Titanics full of sediment) and 429 ML of groundwater recharge (~172 Olympic 
swimming pools). However, these figures are far to be accurate, as many program managers have 
reported that results from monitoring is often catchment and climate dependent. Hydrological 
indicators change depending on the morphology and rainfall, project manager usually stated that 
outcomes are site and year specific. Especially when working on diffuse pollution, a change on the 
behaviour of few farmers in the catchment can provide significant changes on hydrological 
outcomes of the PWS. Outcomes are often under a high level of uncertainty. This has been a 
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major limit reported by several programmes, uncertainty is not recognized by regulation and water 
quality standards, therefore many water utilities cannot rely only on catchment management to 
ensure water quality as for their low level of assurance. It is interesting to note that in the UK, 
OFWAT the economic regulator, ask water utilities to conduct hydrological baseline and cost 
benefits studies before undertaking catchment management schemes. If hydrological outcomes 
are difficult to demonstrate, the utilities will not be able to invest.  
Multiple benefits outcomes  
Almost all programmes are in a way persecuting climate change and/or biodiversity co-
benefits. Some have specific link with biodiversity conservation programmes especially those 
schemes that use the ecological restoration of natural water rich ecosystem such as wetlands, 
rivers, peatlands and moorlands. In the United Utilities SCaMP programme, modelling of peatlands 
carbon fluxes predicts that restoration measures undertaking on 57.000 hectares will reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions by up to 544 tCO2e/yr25 . However, these co-benefits are always 
covered under the same funding as watershed protection activities. Same project managers have 
reported that biodiversity and climate co-benefits increase social and political acceptability of the 
schemes and increase the number of stakeholders interested to engage or willing to provide 
funding. Collective action funds are examples where climate and biodiversity organization are 
aligned with private companies to pursuit different aims but through a common project. 
Social outcomes are also considered multiple benefits; as previously mentioned PWS in 
Europe represent a consistent environmental fund for farmers (€ 44.7 million in 2013 for land 
owners), especially for those located in upstream catchments often related with low accessibility 
and income level.  
Some programmes based on local partnership reported the benefits in term of increased 
social capital and collective learning. Increasing the collaboration and trust among different 
organization, at horizontal and vertical level, certainly bring both benefits for the success of the 
scheme and the society as whole.  
                                               
25
 United Utilities corporate presentation based on Worrall (2012).  
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Economic outcomes  
Economic drivers are certainly important within European programmes; many water utilities 
are driven by the increasing operational and capital cost of water treatment. The potential business 
risk associated to non-compliance with drinking water quality standard is reported as inestimable 
value. Moreover, there is an increasing request from regulators and or investors for performances 
monitoring and cost benefit analysis.  
Land stewards project in Italy has reported a saving in operational cost of 1 to 4 (with or 
without project scenario). In fact, farmers provide a decentralized monitoring and management of 
water channels avoiding all cost of displacement within the large mountain catchment. 
South West  Water  indicates  that  reducing  pollution  at  source  rather  than  investing  in  
engineering solutions to treat polluted water downstream has a benefit-cost ratio of some 65 to 1. 
In addition, the scheme is expected to deliver up to twenty percent savings in the operational 
expenditure of existing water treatment plants. 
United Utilities CBA demonstrate how the positive cost-benefit ratio is given by the inclusion 
of multiple benefits such as carbon and biodiversity. Operational and Capital saving were 
considered very law because the methodology took into account only those investments and 
operational cost directly linked with the color removal and waste treatments, thus not considering 
BAU investments in new machineries. Therefore, climate and biodiversity SCaMP co-benefits 
strongly contribute to the economic sustainability of the programme, providing suggests a range of 
benefit to cost ratios between 2.24 to 25.38 (considering different optimistic and pessimistic 
scenarios in term of GHG, biodiversity and water quality response).  
Wessex Waters, with its Metaldehyde focused programme documented a benefit-cost ratio 
6:1 compared to the water treatment plant option26. In fact conventional water treatment methods 
are not effective to remove this particular pesticide, therefore the entire cost of a new treatment 
plant was considered in the “without catchment approach” scenario.  
                                               
26
 Wessex Water, 2013. Catchment management managing water – managing land, 2013. Bath, UK. 
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Overall, results on cost-benefits analysis depend on case by case and on the boundaries of 
cost and benefits considered during the study. PWS are not always a better economic option 
compared to conventional water treatment, however if we consider the co-benefit in term of social, 
biodiversity and climate outcomes, payment schemes are certainly a valuable options to address 
water quality and other policy goals.  
Monitoring and evidences of ES provision as successful factors 
All water utilities are by law monitoring water quality and potential shortage risks. However, 
when it comes to monitoring the effects of a catchment management scheme, project managers 
experience problems on setting the baseline scenarios. In fact, high variability of climate conditions 
(abnormal increase of annual rainfall, draughts, etc.) might change the hydrological baseline for 
certain parameters. Yet, the annual monitoring of the effects of a certain indicators might vary 
depending again on climate conditions. Under the uncertainty of climate change, it is rather difficult 
for project mangers demonstrating project outcomes in term of hydrological response to the 
management practices induced with the payments. Therefore, monitoring and outcomes results 
are often reported in terms of hectares of woodlands, wetlands restored, hectares of farmlands 
under the schemes, etc. rather than in term of hydrological attributes and services.  
Hydrological monitoring is relatively costly. As an example, United Utilities has reported a 
monitoring cost of 10% of the whole programme for the phase 1 of the project (out of $15M for 
2005-2010). However, in the second phase (2010-2015), by selecting only some model 
catchments and concentrating monitoring only on few hydrological parameters cost decreased to 
4% of the total programme investment.  
Projects located in small catchment or with a relative small number of service providers 
suggested that increased trust (among scheme participants) decreases the cost of compliance 
control regarding the actual implementation of management practices. In this situation, the 
“community control” increase and free riders are often reported by “good farmers” to the scheme 
manager.   
110 
 
Some scheme managers have reported the use of commodity certification standards as a 
tool for decentralized compliance monitoring and to increase win-win benefits for farmers & forest 
owners. Lower Saxony scheme and City of Munich in Germany are providing, among the portfolio 
of management practices, a payment for organic agriculture on groundwater recharge areas. 
Norda water (Monticchio Gaudianello) in Italy has a scheme based on organic certification of 
spring water catchments and promoted on the bottles’ label, using it to show corporate 
environmental responsibility to its customers. Fowey River scheme in South West England is also 
exploring to set a payment for pesticide risk control by using organic agriculture for upstream 
farmers. In Portugal, Coca-Cola is paying Forest Producers Association of Coruche (APFC) for 
improving the forest management of cork forest using FSC certification standards.  
Schemes that work through match funding with CAP payments often let the compliance 
monitoring to be executed by the payment agency in charge of controlling the correct use of EU 
funds. Therefore, the scheme manger relies on the activity of the government agency, saving on 
monitoring and enforcement cots.  
4.3. Characterization and description of identified 
governance models 
In this paragraph, we assess the PWS against the four principles of PES theory using the 
method explained in paragraph 3.6.2 (Governance assessment for PWS schemes). Secondly, 
following the conclusions of the first assessment we identify several typologies of PWS in Europe 
and characterize the main governance models.  
All inventoried PWS but those in design phase have been assessed (n°=68) against the 
four principles of PES theory, namely voluntariness, directness, commoditization and additionality. 
The following tables show the results of the evaluation and characterise the distribution of PWS 
according to the classified governance arrangements.  
Most of PWS in EU are voluntary (41 out of 68) but agreements are set without a proper 
free and informed negotiation process. This means that there is a main buyer (often a public 
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authority) that sets the price at which the service suppliers have to provide the service. Usually, 
programmes are designed without a participation process but through a “take or leave” approach. 
In some cases especially where farmers associations and other CSO are involved in the process, 
service suppliers obtain more room for negotiation and to design the scheme and set a fair prices 
that correspond to their cost or willing to stay in the agreement (21 out of 68). Three schemes are 
mandatory by law and associate with penalties for those that do not respect restrictions, such as 
use of fertilizers or chemicals in groundwater protection areas. Figure 29 shows the distribution 
among different categories. 
Figure 29: PWS degree of voluntariness  
 
 
Regarding the level of directness, we found two main groups, the public and the private 
driven schemes. The public-driven are divided into “public procurement” (26 out of 68) and “scope 
taxes” (11 out of 68) based schemes. The former are the less direct payments, with public budget 
allocation where the municipalities or the public water utility pay service providers on behalf of the 
final beneficiaries (citizens). Final beneficiaries are not willing to pay more for the service they 
receive nor are aware of the payment scheme. The “scope taxes” (water charge) related schemes 
have more directness between service suppliers and beneficiary. The link between the two parties 
is based on the application of a “scope- tax”, such as in the case of German schemes (Lower 
Saxony, Munich, etc.). Water bill payers find in their invoices a charge that goes directly to fund the 
PWS scheme. In this case, final beneficiaries are aware and “willing” to pay farmers and forest 
owners to improve hydrological service provision.  
The second group is related with private schemes. Beneficiary pay funds (12 out of 68) are 
less direct of bilateral agreement as an intermediary is connecting the beneficiary to the service 
providers, while the private bilateral agreements are payments directly from the final beneficiary to 
the service providers (17 out of 68). Figure 30 shows the distribution among different categories. 
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Figure 30: PWS degree of directness  
 
 
The degree of commoditization is related with the payment amount in relation to the cost of 
the service provision. As we previously stated many schemes cover or partially cover the cost for 
service provision, others provide in-kind services only. However, 40 out of 68 have been classified 
as payments, therefore providing monetary payments that aim at cover the full cost of service 
provision and in some cases providing a monetary benefit for the service providers. The following 
figure provides the distribution among different categories.  
Figure 31: PWS degree of commoditization  
 
 
The analysis of additionality does not show a high diversification. Mostly, we find two types 
of schemes, the ones where the payment is related to the enforcement of the law (where therefore 
the additionality is theoretically very low, as service providers should already meet the 
requirements) and the ones where the payment is conditional to the implementation of the 
management practices. The latter is the most common type of payment. Only in two cases, Angling 
Passport Schemes in UK (code UK2) and the Visitor Pay Back scheme (code UK15), the payment 
is conditional to the service provision, as in both schemes buyers are paying for recreational 
services they actually and immediately enjoy, such as access to fishing areas and recreational 
services around the lake areas. The following figure provides the distribution among different 
categories.  
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Figure 32: PWS degree of additionality 
 
 
Therefore, if we exclude additionality from our analysis and we cross the other three 
dimensions in the governance cube, we can see that the graphic representation results into 
different group distributed within the cube space. We can then identify the main PES groups that 
are already identified in the literature. Namely, the Coasean PWS, with private offsetting as a 
subgroup.  The Pigovians, with the regulated and no regulated. Mandatory payments are outside 
the main groups, as they are almost not considered PES as for their lack of voluntariness. This first 
assessment represented in Figure 33 put the basis for a more in detail classification of different 
typologies of governance models.  
Figure 33: Governance cube: results of the assessment at EU level 
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After the first assessment, there is the need for the integration of the PES theory with a 
critical assessment of the aim of PWS, in order to better define their typologies. Figure 34 shows a 
diagram for logical assessment of PWS typology of governance models.  
Figure 34: Diagram for logical assessment of PWS typology of governance models 
 
Regarding the voluntariness principle, a main distinction not frequent in the literature is 
related to the differentiation of supply and demand (Sattler et al., 2013). The first part of the 
diagram therefore separates all PWS that are not voluntary from the supply side, from those that 
are. This category (involuntary suppliers) corresponds only with mandatory schemes, therefore, 
service suppliers are obliged to take part of the scheme and they receive compensation for 
imposed legal restrictions. If the scheme is voluntary from the supply side and it is not from the 
demand side, we follow under the group of public driven PWS. Where beneficiaries are not 
voluntary paying service providers, instead public authorities do that on their behalf, without their 
prior informed consent. However, if we classify this large group of public driven PWS, according to 
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the directness principle, we can distinguish four main categories: agro-environmental schemes, 
public bilateral agreements, water charge based public bilateral agreements, regulated trading 
initiatives.  
Finally, if both demand and supply side are voluntary, we fall into the private driven PWS. A 
main element to distinguish this broad category is the main aim of the scheme. Therefore, we 
identified three main motivations, namely compensation (after the loss of ecosystem services), 
avoided impact (to avoid the future loss of ecosystem services), and ecosystem service provision 
(provide additional services, through ecosystem enhancement and maintenance). Table 19 
describe more in detail all identified typologies of governance models.  
Within the compensatory payments, if we again apply the principle of directness we find two 
subgroups: trading initiatives (such as the peatland code UK14) and CSR offsetting (such as 
CocaCola (FR11) and Bionade (DE3) payments.  
Avoided impacts payments are usually targeted payments to a specific water quality issues, 
such as chemical or nitrates. The approach followed by the utility or the buyer is focused on 
eliminating the cause of the impact instead of enhancing the hydrological functions of the 
ecosystems, therefore multiple benefits are often missing within these projects, for example in the 
case of Wessex Water (UK24), with the substitution of metaldehyde pesticides with more water 
friendly one.  
Leading and emerging mechanism 
We identified several design characteristics but programmes are often a combination of two 
or more design options. Besides, some programmes diversify and adapt their governance structure 
depending on the type of catchment, actors involved and existing regulations. An in depth study of 
PWS shows how frequent is this mix-model nature. Schemes that use a combination of design 
features and policy tools have proved to be successful in term of outcomes and amount of 
transactions, according to our survey. However, following the theoretical classification framework 
presented in the previous paragraphs we assessed all inventoried PWS with the aim of better 
understanding the frequency and the characterization of the main PWS typologies.  
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Table 19: Typologies of PWS in Europe 
Programme typologies Sub-type Major drivers Examples 
Public – non voluntary Compensation for legal 
restrictions 
Increase acceptance of 
legal restrictions through 
compensation of 
opportunity costs 
AU1, FR12, FR13, FR14, 
IT2, IT4, SH1, NL1, NL2 
Public regulated 
Agro- environmental 
schemes 
Public goods provision and 
partial cover of adoption of 
management practices 
UK1, UK23, IT7, IT8 
Public bilateral agreements Local public goods provision  
DK1, DK2, DK4, UK26, 
UK29, FR7, FR8, FR9, 
FR10, IT5, SE1, NL3, NL4, 
NL5, IT3 
Water charge - public 
bilateral agreements 
Investing on water quality. 
Charging costumers for 
water related services via 
water charges.  
DE1, DE2, DE4, DE5, DE6 
Regulated trading initiatives Regulatory compensation  ES1 
Compensatory private 
initiatives 
Trading initiatives  
Standardized water 
footprint voluntary 
compensation 
UK14 
CSR offsetting CSR water footprint 
voluntary compensation HU1, FR11, DE3, PT1 
Private voluntary 
payments  
Avoided impacts bilateral 
agreements  
Avoid use of chemical 
inputs through paying for 
opportunity cost incurred 
(no associated benefits) 
UK24, UK27, UK28 
Multiple benefits 
partnerships 
Improve hydrological 
service provision through 
natural capital maintenance 
and improvement. Based 
on partnership model.  
BH1, RO1, RO2, UK3, UK4, 
UK5, UK6, UK7, UK8, 
UK13, UK20, UK21, FR2, 
FR3, FR4, FR5, IT1 
User funded schemes 
Charging final beneficiaries 
to invest on targeted 
hydrological services. 
UK2, UK15 
Environmental benefits – 
bilateral agreements 
Improve hydrological 
service provision through 
natural capital maintenance 
and improvement. Based 
on bilateral agreement. 
FR1, BE1, UK18, UK25, IT6 
 
Figure 35 shows the frequency of the main typologies of governance models. The main 
groups are then characterised in the following pages.  
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Figure 35: Frequency of typologies of governance models 
 
 
Well known categories have already been addressed during the introduction, therefore we 
focused only on the new proposed and identified models, such as the “Multiple benefits 
partnerships”. 
Multiple benefits partnerships  
Multiple benefit partnerships represented 25% of schemes and the 16% of total 
transactions in 2013. An emerging and promising category that includes all those projects that 
have:  
 participatory and collaborative local-national governance including private companies, 
public regulators, charities organizations and local authorities. These actors are often 
organized under an umbrella organization, a partnership or a crosscutting institution;  
 more than one source of funding and are often base on the principle of match funding; and,  
 multilateral agreements (contracts are signed by more than an organization);  
 a focus on water related issues, however targeting also biodiversity, carbon and social 
benefits.  
In fact networks and collaborative approaches at local level seem to be a characteristics of 
existing successful case studies, where regulators, private companies, local authorities, technical 
and civil society organizations share their expertise and -through match funding- deliver high level 
watershed schemes around the region. For example, Upstream Thinking, is an “umbrella” 
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programme initiated by South West Water, which includes several sub-programmes (Exmoor 
Mires, Dartmoor Mires Project, WRT, Working Wetlands, Wild Penwith, Otter Valley, Fowey River, 
etc.) targeted to different catchments and water issues with a panel of different intermediaries, 
local authorities and suppliers. In some countries, partnerships emerge also in response to the 
requirements of Article 14 of the WFD on Public information and consultation, river, aquifer 
catchment partnerships/contracts movements are emerging. This is the case of River Contracts in 
Italy were many stakeholders interacting with the river system develops a political and economic 
agreements on long term planning of the river basin. The Italian case study of Forest Infiltration 
Areas is indeed part of a more broad “Aquifer contract” were public, private and civil society 
organization are committed to sustainable management of a specific aquifer. In England 
Catchments partnership are funded by a special government funds with the aim to meet the 
requirements of article 14. These local based partnership/contracts are a promising fertile ground 
for the emergence of new PWS around EU. Figure 36 represents a schematic model of multiple 
benefit partnership.  
Figure 36: Schematization of the PWS partnership model  
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Bilateral agreements  
Bilateral agreements are direct contracts between service suppliers and buyers. In this 
category, we grouped all those schemes where transactions (and therefore agreements) are 
mainly between two main actors. We divided bilateral agreements in the following subgroups:  
 Public bilateral agreements: those enforced by public bodies, on behalf of taxpayers, 
where suppliers (private or public) participate in the agreement on voluntary bases. 
They are mainly managed by municipality or public utilities. The funding mechanism 
is the direct budget allocation.  
 Water charge bilateral agreements: as above, but the funding mechanism is based 
on the adoption of water charges, which increase the directness between suppliers 
and beneficiaries. For example, in Lower Saxony Cooperative Agreements, funds 
are collected by utilities through a levy on water costumers’ bills (thanks to the 
Lower Saxony - Federal and Provincial States’ Water Acts), the funds are then 
transferred to Lower Saxony Government which sign individual “grant contract” with 
utilities on the basis of planned cooperative agreements to be signed with farmers. 
Eventually, utilities sign a bilateral contract with single farmers and forest owners. 
 Avoided impacts bilateral agreements: those leaded by a private organization (often 
a private utility or a bottled water brands), where the main aim of the programme is 
to avoid a specific hydrological issue, such as nitrates or agro-chemicals. The water 
company focuses on water related issues that can threaten its business, without a 
special attention to other important co-benefits. The focus is not providing improved 
ecosystem service based but simply avoiding a human impact. Cooperation with 
other actors is often missing in this model. The PWS managers usually work directly 
with suppliers, without collaborating with intermediaries or support organizations.  
 Environmental benefits – bilateral agreements: always managed by private entities 
unlike the previous, these bilateral agreements focus on improving hydrological 
services while increasing the provision of other co-benefits. These PWS adopt an 
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ecosystem approach to catchment management. Cooperation with other actors is 
often missing in this model. The PWS managers work directly with suppliers.   
Other types of schemes 
Compensation for legal restrictions are schemes used by state of regional authorities to 
compensate farmers opportunity cost to meet certain agricultural practices restrictions within 
drinking water protected areas. They are quite specific for the European context and they are often 
used to improve the acceptance of regulations or due to equity concerns. An example comes from 
the “Mutual Agricultural Claims Water extraction” in Netherland, where the public water utility 
(Water Bedrijf Groningen) compensates income loss for restrictions on the use of pesticides 
imposed by law to groundwater recharge catchments in the Drentsche Aa National Park. 
Regarding water targeted AEP we identify only 4 programmes which account for the 16% of 
transactions. As EC itself understood there is a lack of integration between the CAP payments and 
water quality goals, therefore most of AEP schemes lack of direct link with water quality goals set 
by the WFD. Two schemes were found in Italy directly providing payments for establishment of 
wetlands (one of which was for phytodepuration of wastewater purposes). Another national wide – 
although targeted to priority catchments- is the Catchment Sensitive Farming Capital Grant 
Scheme, which funds capital improvements that have a direct impact on water quality, with specific 
focus on nitrates and sediments. This last scheme has been found to provide match funding for 
many PWS in the UK.  
CSR offsetting still counts very little at EU level.  Out of four identified programmes, two are 
still in a pilot phase, and two are related with voluntary offsetting of water footprint, but with very 
little link between the actual impact and the compensative intervention. They lack of a proper 
methodology for compensation and they are usually related with a “spot” intervention. They all 
involve private beverage companies, such as Coca Cola, Bionade, etc.  
From the trading initiatives side a promising DEFRA pilot is the Peatland code. It is a 
voluntary standard for peatlands restoration projects in the UK, which tries to create a trading 
system for multiple benefits provided by peatlands.  The only regulated trading initiative in EU is 
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located in Spain, within the Special Plan for the Upper Guadiana, where the basin authority has 
established a trading system for water abstraction rights. However, according to WWF Spain the 
system has failed under corruption and over allocation of water rights that led to groundwater 
depletion (WWF, 2012).  
User funded schemes are usually private schemes managed by an intermediary that from 
one side collect money from beneficiaries (anglers, tourists, etc.) and on the other side pay directly 
the service providers or directly implement restoration projects. Under this category, we can find 
the “tourist pay back schemes” or angling passport in the UK.  
PWS as mix policy-operational tools 
Figure 37 represents the stratification and complementarities of policies, funding sources 
and payments tools that PWS uses, particularly in the case of multiple benefit partnership models. 
PWS are not stand-alone policy tools; they are indeed posing on an rather complex regulation 
framework that sets compulsory legal requirements on diffuse pollution under the principle of 
“polluter pay”. The first stratum represents the baseline in the provision of hydrological services, 
i.e. water related environmental regulation compliance.  
Secondly, most of PWS that develop on agricultural and forest lands rely on match funding 
coming from the adoption of good agricultural practices with “cross compliance” tied to the CAP 
subsides from the EU. In most of the cases these subsides cover from 50-80% of the cost of 
implementing a certain management practice or infrastructure improvements. PWS then, coupled 
with partnerships, win-win farm advice and capacity building services, are meant to supply 
additional funding to cover the co-funding of CAP subsides and the additional cost of providing 
targeted environmental services such as higher water quality for drinking purposes.  
The mix-model situation represented in Figure 37 has proved to be successful in the main 
catchment schemes in England such as SCaMP and Upstream Thinking and approximately 64% of 
PWS in EU directly or indirectly use CAP payments as match funding. Sometime scheme manager 
do driver the CAP payments to farmers and in other cases, they facilitate famers’ applications to 
obtain co-funding from CAP related payment agencies.  As explained in the previous paragraphs, 
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almost 50% of PWS couples payments with in-kind support, through training and free-advice that 
are likely to maximize the results.  
Figure 37: Mixed funding source model 
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4.4. Comparison of case studies from England and 
Italy: an institutional analysis  
This section presents the research finding from the institutional analysis of selected case 
studies. We first provide a description of each single selected PWS and then we proceed with the 
comparison among the four cases. Table 20 summarizes the selected schemes for institutional 
analysis and reports the main characteristics.  
Table 20: Summary table of selected case studies  
Programme Type of 
service Main buyer Funding source 
Governance 
model 
Funding 2013 
(€) 
SCAMP Water quality Private water 
utility 
Mixed: Budget 
allocation, EU 
funding, CAP.   
Multiple benefit 
partnership 2.300.000 
Upstream 
Thinking Water quality 
Private water 
utility 
Mixed: Budget 
allocation, EU 
funding, CAP.   
Multiple benefit 
partnership 1.000.000 
Land Stewards Flood control  
Public 
watershed 
authority 
Mixed: Budget 
allocation, EU 
funding, CAP.   
Public bilateral 
agreement  70.000 
Romagna Water 
Fund  
 
Water quality 
and avoided 
dam 
sedimentation 
Private water 
utility (public 
owned) 
Budget allocation 
(4% of revenues)  
Compensation for 
legal restrictions & 
Bilateral 
agreement  
838.308 
 
4.4.1. United Utilities SCaMP in North West England 
United Utilities (UU) is the UK's largest water company that manages the regulated water 
and wastewater network in North West England. UU owns 56,385 hectares of land to protect the 
quality of water entering the reservoirs, which help to supply nearly 7 million people. Around 30% 
of its land is designated as a Site of Special Scientific Interest (SSSI) constituting a nationally 
significant habitat for biodiversity conservation. However, many of the fragile habitats such as 
moorlands and peatlands in the upland catchment areas have been damaged by historical 
industrial air pollution, agricultural activities and climate change. Agricultural policies have 
encouraged farmers to drain the land and put more livestock on the fells. This has been at the 
expense of water quality, the landscape and wildlife. Therefore, over the last thirty years UU has 
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experienced substantial increase in the levels of colour of raw water in many upland catchments27. 
The removal of colour requires additional process plant, chemicals, power and waste handling to 
meet increasingly demanding drinking water quality standards and costumers satisfaction. 
Consequently, annual operational costs of water treatment have significantly increased.  
In order to address watercolour and turbidity issues, UU began its innovative Sustainable 
Catchment Management Programme (SCaMP) to benefit both water and wildlife. Between 2005 
and 2010, the project allowed working with farm tenants, providing them with € 14.1 million funding 
in moorland restoration, fencing, woodlands, farm infrastructure and protecting watercourses, 
across 27,000 ha of UU water catchment areas. However, at the beginning of the program 
OFWAT, the UK public water regulator who is in charge of approving water utilities’ management 
plans every 5 years, objected because of concerns about subverting the Polluter Pays Principal. At 
that time, SCaMP was the first existing payment for sustainable catchment management of its type 
in the UK and it was discussed in detail by regulators, who had to ensure that “best value for 
money” principle was respected. Based on its cost-benefit analysis and demonstrated multiple 
benefits28 (water quality, biodiversity and carbon storage), SCaMP was then approved by OFWAT, 
opening the door to the catchment approach within the water sector.  
SCAMP can be categorized as multiple benefit partnership. However, the PWS is managed 
within the own UU lands, therefore the utility exercise a “top-down” approach with tenants that are 
likely to enter in the scheme. Sometimes entering in the scheme is a condition to keep the tenant 
agreement. Nevertheless, in order to create a collaborative learning process on catchment 
management, UU made the case for a vast collaboration forming a National Stakeholder Group 
(crosscutting institution). The group includes the Department for Environment Food and Rural 
Affairs, Consumer Council for Water, Natural England, Forestry Commission, Environment Agency 
and Drinking Water Inspector, which eventually supported the project with new regulations, 
                                               
27
 Colour is realised by the peatland degradation into water.  
28
 Water utilities in the UK are considered private companies but public bodies under the s28G of Wildlife & 
Countryside Act. The Natural Environment and Rural Communities (NERC) Act, which came into force on 1st Oct 2006, 
requires all public bodies, including United Utilities, to have regard to biodiversity conservation when carrying out their 
functions. As a result of the SCaMP programme the company exceeded government Public Service Agreement targets 
for SSSIs returning 98.6% of its land into a favorable or recovering condition by 2010. In fact, the UU SSS duty was one 
of the main legal reasons that allowed at first OFWAT to approve SCaMP investments.   
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guidance documents and match funding through agri-environmental schemes. Besides, an 
intermediary organization RSPB (Royal Society for the Protection of Birds) was contracted to carry 
out the development of SCaMP Farm Plans together with helping explain the plans to tenants and 
submitting grant applications. Moreover, RSPB was essential in the first phase of lobbying with 
existing water authorities.  
UU also contracted a local consulting firm to provide the baseline for main hydrological 
indicators (e.g. Colored dissolved organic matter (CDOM), Turbidity Units (NTU), Dissolved 
Organic Carbon and level of water table). Annual monitoring has shown that SCaMP land 
management treatment does have a positive effect on water quality (United Utilities, 2012). Despite 
of its positive impact on water colour, a detailed and participatory Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) of 
SCaMP has indicated how the main benefit is overwhelmingly GHG due to the small capital and 
operational expenses savings (CAPEX and OPEX), with biodiversity also generating considerable 
benefits. The CBA model suggests a range of benefit to cost ratios between 2.24 to 25.38 mainly 
as a result of the error margins for net changes in GHG fluxes, future market values for carbon and 
potential variation in expected biodiversity benefits. The study considered very low operational and 
capital saving because the methodology took into account only those investments and operational 
cost directly linked with the colour removal and waste treatments, thus not considering BAU 
(Business As Usual) investments in new machineries (Higginson and Austin, 2014). Therefore, 
climate and biodiversity SCaMP co-benefits strongly contribute to the economic sustainability of 
the programme. Moreover, co-benefits helped to reach the socio-political and institutional 
acceptability of the scheme. 
SCaMP is now on its phase 2 (2010-2015) covering the remaining 30.000 hectares of 
United Utilities. In almost ten years of work it has created a national and local wide partnership and 
has encouraged regulators and other water utilities to promote catchment management schemes 
to secure raw water quality. In 2014, United Utilities has started to extend SCaMP approach in 
non-owned land, working with Catchment Partnerships around the North West England through the 
newly created funding schemes Catchment Wise and Safeguard Zones. UU demonstrated high 
replicability of the scheme and SCAMP is now an example at UK level.  
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4.4.2. Upstream Thinking in South West England 
South West Water (SWW) is a private company that manages the regulated water and 
waste water network serving nearly 600.000 customers in South West England. In the past years 
intensive mixed livestock farming, moorlands and peatlands degradation have decreased water 
quality in many reservoir, rivers and aquifers around the region. In 2008, SWW understood the 
potential for a catchment wide approach and started a pilot project (Exmoor Mires Project) to 
restore 326 hectares of peatlands within a SSSI. Additionally, Westcountry Rivers Trust (a charity 
organization devoted to rivers restoration and protection) through the EU funded WATER project 
demonstrated the success of payments and advice for farmers for sustainable catchment 
management. Following the success of these projects, SWW has started an “umbrella initiative” 
(grouping many different PWS under the same brand) called Upstream Thinking, which aims to 
improve water quality in river catchments in order to reduce water treatment costs and provide 
multiple benefits such as climate change mitigation and biodiversity conservation. In 2010 OFWAT 
approved SWW’s Upstream Thinking project with a budget of nearly € 12 million for 2010 to 2015 
(equivalent to 65p/year on each customer's bill considering an investment period of 25 years) to be 
spent in several sub-projects for restoring moorlands, fencing water courses, improving farm’s 
infrastructures and reducing use of chemicals in agriculture. Each single project share the same 
vision, representing a revolutionary approach by the UK water industry, by allowing capital 
investment on third-party land, for the first time (United Utilities in fact was previously investing but 
on its own tenants farmers). The initiative also contributed to move from the “water treatment” 
industry-based approach toward a more integrated and holistic catchment and ecosystem 
approach.  
The initiative is a categorized as a multiple benefit partnership where SWW delivers 
conservation funds in collaboration with a wide range of national and local organizations. Devon 
Wildlife Trust and the Cornwall Wildlife Trust are the main partners for moorlands restorations 
while the the Westcountry Rivers Trust with its deep technical experience delivers programmes 
targeting diffuse pollution from agriculture in West Penwith, the River Fowey, the Tamar, 
Wimbleball and Roadford catchments and the Otter Valley. Natural England, Environment Agency, 
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English Heritage, National Farmers Union have all supported the project through match funding 
with agro-environmental payments schemes, monitoring and policy advice. Universities such as 
Exeter and East Anglia were involved in the monitoring and design of the payments schemes.  
SWW has overall responsibility for managing the project and reporting progress against targets to 
regulators. Each individual project has its own management team and reporting arrangements and 
formal management agreements was established with each individual delivery partner. Financial 
governance and reporting is undertaken by SWW’s Finance and Regulatory function. The project 
has experimented two different types of payment delivery mechanisms:  
 advisor-Led PES mechanisms, where farmers were identified by advisors, and offered a 
fixed-price deal in which South West Water would pay 50% of the costs of the capital 
investments;   
 auction-based PES mechanisms, where farmers were asked to enter in competitive 
bids were the best value for money principle allocates the final grant request.  
A comparison between the two systems has shown that the auction-based system 
delivered between 20% and 40% better value for money than the fixed-price alternative. However, 
the advise–led system turned to be more appropriate for small scale projects where site-specific 
considerations are needed, while the auction were preferred for large scale catchments,  
particularly  where  there  is  little  detailed  local  knowledge  and the eco-hydrological conditions 
are quite homogenous around the sub-catchments. Beside the payment mechanisms, SWW has 
designed a “Conditional Grant Agreement”, which sets out the project, period, grant and terms, and 
a “Deed of Covenant” which ensures the Conditional Grant Agreement is passed on in the event of 
a sale or change of tenants. These agreements are to guarantee the permanence of the 
investments in a third party land, maintaining a legal interest in the capital works (paid with bill 
payers money) and securing that the investment will provide long term effects on water quality, 
therefore ensuring the best value for money. South West  Water  indicate  that  reducing  pollution  
at  source  rather  than  investing  in  engineering solutions to treat polluted water downstream has 
a benefit-cost ratio of some 65 to 1.  
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4.4.3. Land stewards in Tuscany (Italy) 
In Tuscany, in the hilly areas of Media Valle del Serchio, a public authority in charge of 
managing over 115 000 ha of mountain areas and about 1500 km of streams, has established 
agreements with about 40 farmers and forest owners in order to improve flood risk monitoring and 
control over 500 km of water courses within the mountain basin. Farmers and forest owners 
received a fixed payment (€ 6.000 per year during the initial phase and € 4.000 per year during the 
following years) for monitoring and evaluating the degree of risk and for providing an alert-report 
service to the public authority on any situation regarding slope instability or waterways obstruction. 
Based on the identified flood risk and slope instability related problems, landowners can provide a 
first maintenance works negotiating case by case with the public authority the terms and conditions 
of the interventions. Landowners usually contribute to remove trees and other sediments from 
riverbeds to avoid overflowing, together with the management of riparian vegetation. Land 
Stewards scheme has contributed efficiently to decrease the flood risk and the occurrence of water 
damage related costs, providing the society with an environmental benefit resulting from farmer 
training, organizational arrangements and networks. According to the public authority, the scheme 
has allowed 80% saving on the annual total cost for management interventions in the area. The 
alert and control system of landowners works through an interactive Information and 
Communication Technologies (ICT) system (IDRAMAP) which helps land owners report and alert 
the public authorities and eventually deliver hydro-geological risk control of the district. The 
scheme has also a high level of social co-benefits, providing an alternative source of income for 
marginalised landowners located in remote areas in the Serchio Valley. It also has improved the 
community participation in hydrological landscape management.  
Land Stewards, in the absence of a national law that regulate payments for ecosystem 
services, has made use of a national Law 29 that establish the possibility for public bodies to 
contract private and public entities (thus including also farmers) to deliver landscape management 
works. This law was conceived in order to promote multifunctional agriculture but the concept of 
                                               
29
 Decreto Legislativo 18 maggio 2001, n. 228 "Orientamento e modernizzazione del settore agricolo, a norma dell'articolo 7 
della legge 5 marzo 2001, n. 57“ and Legge 97/1994 - Art. 17. 
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“provision of ecosystem services” is not properly achieved. Therefore, the contracts between public 
bodies and farmers refer to the number of hours of labour to carry out planned conservation works. 
The scheme can be categorized as a public bilateral agreement, where the public authority 
directly pays (on behalf of taxpayers, through budget allocation) landowners for the provision of 
hydrological services. Therefore, regarding the directness we can classify the scheme as a “public 
procurement”. Regarding the voluntariness, the scheme has carried out several workshops to 
negotiate with service suppliers and to define the design, the type and amount of payment. Thus, 
the scheme is characterized by free and informed negotiation between the two parties. Land 
Stewards has also a high conditionality as the payment is divided in two types, a flat rate for being 
part of the scheme, and on demand/service based payment. This division create an incentive to 
meet the requirements of the scheme. The small number of landowners allows checking and 
monitoring the performance of each service supplier, while covering a vast remote area otherwise 
difficult to manage. A main weak institutional aspect of Land Stewards is related with the source of 
funding. The watershed authority decided on a yearly base the amount to be invested on the 
scheme, therefore service suppliers have very little trust on the long-term commitment of the public 
authority. The project manager reported the difficulties of managing a scheme with political 
instability and recent public austerity measures. Therefore, the “life” of the scheme is decided on a 
yearly base, depending on the financial availability and national and local political decisions. A 
change on the board of the authority can easily led to the termination of the scheme.  
4.4.4. Romagna Acque water fund in Emilia Romagna (Italy)30 
Romagna Acque S.p.A., is a public owned company managing all drinkable water 
resources of Romagna sub-regional area. It has started as a consortium of municipalities to reduce 
the cost of drinking water supply in 1966. Twenty years later, it was able to cover the distribution of 
water of the whole Romagna area and in 1994, Romagna Acque S.p.A. was founded, becoming 
owner of water resources in 2004. The most important water source of the company is a dam-
basin in the central Apennines (Ridracoli, municipality of Bagno di Romagna), which covers 50% of 
                                               
30
 The case study has been updated and elaborated starting from  Pettenella et al., (2012).  
130 
 
the Romagna tap-water supply (108 M m3/year). The economic profitability of the dam has soon 
been undermined by high level of sedimentation and water quality maintenance.  
In 1993, the company invested in research to understand how catchment management 
could have minimized soil erosion as well as improved water quality. The research shows the clear 
impact of forest operations such as clear-cut or forest conversion from coppice to high stands on 
soil erosion, while minimal silvicultural treatments or natural evolution of stands strongly reduce the 
erosion. These last two practices demonstrated to have a positive influence on nitrogen reduction 
and pH stability. Therefore, Romagna Acque Spa decided to invest part of annual revenues (4%) 
deriving from the water bill payers to set up an environmental fund to compensate landowners in 
the catchment areas, helping them to cover the costs related with management practices 
changes31.  
Romagna Acque Spa, in 1988 started to allocate 2% of its revenues (recently became 3% 
in 2008 and 4% in 2012), to the mountain towns of Santa Sofia, Premilcuore and Bagno di 
Romagna, where treatment plants of water resources are located. The utility allocate the funds to 
the municipalities to sponsor programs and initiatives to improve environmental conditions of the 
valleys and promote economic and social development of the municipalities. In 2010, the funds 
provided to the three municipalities surrounding the reservoir € 782.370, in 2011, €661.959, in 
2012, € 531.921, in 2013, € 838.308. The Romagna Acque Spa fund makes up a very important 
source for environmental protection of the valley.   
The positive impact of the PES scheme was accounted in a general decrease in soil 
erosion of 25% (from an initial 40 000 m3/year to the ongoing 30 000 m3 /year), and a consistent 
nitrogen reduction as well as pH stabilization. In terms of performance, both Romagna Acque 
S.p.A. and the landowners have increased their utility: the company has reduced its costs for water 
purification and assured longer dam life, while the landowners have increased or maintained their 
annual forest revenue.  
                                               
31
 Bagnaresi U, Minotta G, Vianello G, Barbieri A, Simoni A, Tedaldi G, Busetto R (1999). Rela- zione conclusiva del progetto 
di ricerca: effetti dei diversi tipi di trattamento dei boschi sul de- flusso idrico afferente al bacino di Ridracoli (anni 1993-1999). Dip. 
Colture Arboree, Univer- sity of Bologna, Italy. 
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The Romagna Acque Spa can be categorised as a public-public bilateral agreement, with a 
utility budget allocation source of funding system. The level of directness is still very low, falling 
under the definition of “public procurement”. The commoditization is very law as the actors involved 
is almost close to the situation of “one to one”, where there is just one main buyer and only three 
suppliers. The payment is based on the percentage that is applied to the annual revenues, not to 
the level of service provision or implemented management practices. Moreover, this scheme is one 
of the few that provides up-front payment to municipalities. In fact, the fund on yearly base 
transfers the money to the municipalities and they will use them to fund environmental restoration 
projects around the valley.  
The voluntariness of the scheme is very low, as the municipalities cannot decide to have a 
management that may affect reservoir water quality and sedimentation. In fact, among others, one 
of the reasons to create the fund was to compensate municipalities for the economic loses and 
additional costs related to the dam and the reservoir. Therefore, the Romagna Acque fund is a 
hybrid scheme in between a bilateral agreement and a compensation for legal restrictions. 
Moreover, another design characteristic that has allowed the fund to be successful in the long-term 
is the systematic application of a charge on the total revenues. This 4% charge, although not 
applied directly to costumer’s bills, allows having long-term assurance on financial resource, 
increasing the trust toward the fund and the general stability of the scheme.  
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Table 21: Key findings of the institutional analysis of selected case studies   
Dimensions  Upstream thinking SCaMP Land Stewards Romagna water fund 
Ecosystem structure, 
process and services 
Lowland intensive mixed livestock 
farming, underlain by mudstone and 
sandstone.  
Moorlands, peatlands, forests and 
pasturelands, hay meadows  
Mountain, slopes, rivers and water 
channels  
Mountain forests and artificial 
reservoir and dam 
Decrease of water quality treatment 
cost for South West Water (For 
reducing N, P, algae booms and 
sedimentation) 
Increase biodiversity and fish stock 
of rivers.  
Improve landscape beauty 
Decrease of water quality treatment 
cost for United Utilities (Dissolved 
Organic Carbon)  
Reduce runoff rates, sediment load 
and downstream flooding. 
Biodiversity conservation  in SSSI 
areas  
Decreased flood probability and 
reduced costs of hydro geological 
monitoring and infrastructure 
maintenance  
Provide economic opportunity for 
low income farmers  
Avoided dam sedimentation, 
nitrogen reduction as well as pH 
stabilization  
Provide economic and 
environmental development 
opportunities for mountain 
municipalities 
Actor interactions   
Buyer: South West Water (SWW)  
 
Suppliers: land owners and 
commons (300 farmers)  
 
Intermediary: Westcountry River 
Trust (WRT) 
Buyer: United Utilities (UU) 
 
Suppliers: 53 land owners and 
commons  
 
Intermediary: Royal Society for 
Protection of Birds (RSPB) 
Buyer: Unione Comuni Media Valle 
del Serchio 
 
Suppliers: land owners (30 farmers 
and forest owners and local service 
cooperatives) 
 
Intermediary: Coldiretti (farmer 
association)  
Buyer: Romagna Acque Spa 
 
Suppliers: public forest owners 
(three municipalities)  
 
Intermediary: Universities provided 
support for scientific basis of PWS 
WRT is originally an anglers 
association, which lobby for river 
quality improvement, it became the 
main Upstream Thinking 
intermediary working with farmers, 
and design the programme.  
 
Staff sharing or exchange within 
SWW and WRT for guarantee 
technical and political coherence.  
 
Regulators such as Natural England, 
Forest Commission, Environmental 
Agency have provided funding,  
regulation, monitoring and control 
support.    
RSPB has an high interest on 
biodiversity protection, however 
water quality improvements through 
peatland and moorland restoration 
provide evident biodiversity co-
benefits.  
 
RSPB had a key role for lobbying 
with water regulators (OFWAT) to 
accept catchment approach as a 
strategy to obtain water quality 
 
OFWAT initially opposed to SCaMP 
but then took the approach as a 
reference standard for England.  
 
Staff sharing between UU and RSPB 
for guarantee technical expertise  
 
Regulators such as Natural England, 
 
Universities sometimes have helped 
the scheme design process but they 
have demonstrated to have a spot 
approach, focused on publishing 
rather than contributing to the 
territorial process.  
Coldiretti (farmer association) 
provides support to work with 
farmers and University to organize 
the participation workshops and 
design 
Romagna Acque Spa has just 
recently changed the procedures to 
allocate the funding to Santa Sofia, 
Premilcuore e Bagno di Romagna. 
An auction system will improve the 
performances of the interventions 
funded by the water fund. 
 
Univerisity of Bologna has 
scientifically proved the effect on 
catchment management on the 
reservoir and dam sedimentation 
and water quality.   
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Forest Commission, Environmental 
Agency have provided funding and 
regulation support.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Institutional interplay 
Environmental lobbers have pushed 
the UK government to meet art. 14 
of WFD for increasing participation 
within RBMPs. A fund to create 
catchment partnership has been set 
by DEFRA and it positively interacts 
with PWS in England.  
 
Tenants and commons related 
institutions.  
Environmental lobbers have pushed 
the UK government to meet art. 14 
of WFD for increasing participation 
within RBMPs. A fund to create 
catchment partnership has been set 
by DEFRA and it positively interacts 
with PWS in England. 
 
The Natural Environment and Rural 
Communities (NERC) Act which 
came into force on 1st Oct 2006 
requires all public bodies, including 
United Utilities, to have regard to 
biodiversity conservation when 
carrying out their functions. This 
requirement has been the main 
driver that helped OFWAT to 
approve the first SCaMP investment.  
 
Tenants and commons related 
institutions. 
The PWS is base on Decreto 
Legislativo 18 maggio 2001, n. 228 
"Orientamento e modernizzazione 
del settore agricolo, a norma 
dell'articolo 7 della legge 5 marzo 
2001, n. 57“ and Legge 97/1994 - 
Art. 17. Incentivi alle pluriattività”.  
 
It establishes the possibility for 
public bodies to contract private and 
public entities (thus including also 
farmers) to deliver landscape 
management works.  
 
The watershed authority can charge 
the land and households to recover 
the cost of watershed management 
thanks to the Art. 860 of the Civil 
Code. 
 
 
 
Voluntary compensation, following 
the Galli’s Act indications (art.18 and 
24, Law 36/1994). The act formally 
introduced the concept of catchment 
area compensation (art. 18), even 
though it was just addressed to 
public or collective lands (art. 24).  
Water Management Plans of utilities 
have to be approved by OFWAT. 
Therefore, investments work only by 
5 years cycles and they extremely 
depend on OFWAT approval.  
Water Management Plans of utilities 
have to be approved by OFWAT. 
Therefore, investments work only by 
5 years cycles and they extremely 
depend on OFWAT approval.  
 ND 
There are several conflict within 
existing territorial planning 
instruments. Upstream Thinking 
aims to harmonize them. A set of 
different instruments interact with the 
scheme: 
- River Basin Management Plans 
- Catchment partnership 
- Catchment Sensitive Farming 
Initiative  
- Local Nature Partnerships and 
Nature Improvement Areas 
- Safeguards zones 
The scheme makes use of CAP 
payments to partially support the 
realization of some interventions. 
A set of different instruments interact 
with the scheme: 
- River Basin Management Plans 
- Catchment partnership 
- Catchment Sensitive Farming 
Initiative  
- Local Nature Partnerships and 
Nature Improvement Areas 
- Safeguards zones 
 
The scheme makes use of CAP 
payments and EU structural funds to 
partially support the realization of 
some interventions.  
ND 
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The scheme makes use of CAP 
payments and EU structural funds to 
partially support the realization of 
some interventions. 
The scheme makes use of CAP 
payments and EU structural funds to 
partially support the realization of 
some interventions. 
Win-win interplay among different 
institution is the strategy of 
Upstream Thinking.  
Difficulties to work with commons. 
Need for expert staff for 
engagement.  
Creating a trust relationship between 
farmers and empowering them was 
the main focus of the programme. 
Now farmers would keep monitoring 
the areas also without payments as 
they feel a responsibility on their 
“watch out” role.  
The scheme is facilitate for the good 
relations between the publicly owned 
private utility and the municipalities 
that are also part of the company 
itself.  
Institutional design 
(already addressed within 
previous paragraphs) 
The scheme was created by SWW, 
through the approval of OFWAT and 
with the help of the intermediary 
WRT.  
 
The main element is the use of the 
intermediary that facilitates the work 
between the utility and landowners.  
 
The multiple benefit partnership 
model has engaged with many 
actors that have all contributed to 
the success of the scheme. Both in 
financial and technical terms.  
  
The scheme was created by UU who 
first believed on catchment approach 
to solve water quality problem.  
 
The approach is much directed to 
capital works investments and try to 
match CAP payments with UU 
funds.  
Landowners can interact with the 
management authority through an 
interactive Information and 
Communication Technologies (ICT) 
system (IDRAMAP) which helps land 
owners report and alert the public 
authorities and eventually deliver 
hydro-geological risk control of the 
district. 
 
Training and trust with farmers is the 
main element for ensuring 
compliance with payments. 
Payments are based on 
performances and are agree time by 
time.  
Romagna Acque set up a dedicated 
fund that uses 4% of total annual 
revenues to funds the municipalities 
surrounding the reservoir.  
Capacity and scale 
SWW has a strong capacity in term 
of financial resources. It lacks 
technical and participatory capacity 
to work with farmers as historically it 
never dealt with the sector. This lack 
has been compensated by working 
with WRT.  
 
The partnership model allows SWW 
to have the right skills and to cover a 
huge areas working in cooperation 
with a set of different conservation 
organizations.  
UU has a strong capacity in term of 
financial resources. As a land owner 
it has the knowledge about the land 
it manage for water purposes. 
Therefore UU has just partially used 
a intermediary (such as RSPB), 
working directly with farmers, at 
least for the negotiation phase.  
UU made the case for a vast 
collaboration forming a National 
Stakeholder Group (crosscutting 
institution).  
It’s a public body of a very remote 
mountain area in Tuscany. 
Institutional changes and economic 
crisis have undermined the capacity 
of self-funding and political instability 
always undermined decision-making 
processes.  
The company (publicly owned) has a 
strong financial capacity and the 
long-term duration of the scheme 
confirm that the management is 
convinced about the benefits of the 
PWS.   
The PWS has a regional scale 
(South West) although it splits up in 
The PWS has a regional scale 
(North West) although it split up in 
Province of Lucca and Pistoia, 35 
Municipalities, 3 Unione dei Comuni 
Santa Sofia, Premilcuore e Bagno di 
Romagna are the municipalities that 
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many smaller schemes, which 
change and adapt depending on the 
water issue and on the catchment 
peculiarities.  
Geographical scale: 22.000 hectares 
of farmlands) 
 
 
two main areas:  
SCaMP 1 (2005-2010): 27,000 ha of 
water catchment in the Peak District 
and Bowland areas  
SCaMP 2 (2010-2015): 30,000 ha of 
land in the Northern and Central 
team areas which includes 53 
separate farms, bare land lets and 
commons between 2010 and 2015. 
(Garfagnana, Media Valle del 
Serchio e Altaversiglia) 1.500 km of 
water channels 2.600 opere 
idrauliche (briglie, argini, ecc.). 
115.000 ha extension, 60% forests. 
Although the project focus on the 
problematic areas in 700 kmq 40% 
of the total land and 30% of water 
channels.  
benefit of the fund: 47.000 hectares.  
Institutional 
performances 
Increasing permanence: SWW has 
designed a “Conditional Grant 
Agreement”, which sets out the 
project, period, grant and terms, and 
a “Deed of Covenant” which ensures 
the Conditional Grant Agreement is 
passed on in the event of a sale or 
change of tenants 
 
Cost benefits: South West  Water  
indicate  that  reducing  pollution  at  
source  rather  than  investing  in  
engineering solutions to treat 
polluted water downstream has a 
benefit-cost ratio of some 65 to 1. 
65p/year on each customer's bill.  
Despite of its positive impact on 
water color, a detailed and 
participatory study on Cost Benefit 
Analysis (CBA) of SCaMP has 
indicated how the main benefit is 
overwhelmingly GHG due to the 
small capital and operational 
expenses savings (CAPEX and 
OPEX), with biodiversity also 
generating considerable benefits. 
The CBA model suggests a range of 
benefit to cost ratios between 2.24 to 
25.38 mainly as a result of the error 
margins for net changes in GHG 
fluxes, future market values for 
carbon and potential variation in 
expected biodiversity benefits. 
According to the public authority, the 
scheme has allowed 80% saving on 
the annual total cost for 
management interventions in the 
area. 
 
Compared to the other schemes the 
investment is very low, around 
60.000 euro per year. This small 
amount allow to provide a 
hydrological service in a vast areas 
as mentioned above.  
From 1988 to 2013 the water utility 
has funded the 3 municipalities with 
11.966.016 €. The positive impact of 
the PES scheme was accounted in a 
general decrease in soil erosion of 
25% (from an initial 40 000 m3/year 
to the ongoing 30 000 m3 /year), 
and a consistent nitrogen reduction 
as well as pH stabilization. In terms 
of performance both Romagna 
Acque S.p.A. and the landowners 
have increased their utility: the 
company has reduced its costs for 
water purification and assured 
longer dam life, while the land- 
owners have increased or 
maintained their annual forest 
revenue. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
 
The Chapter discusses the main outcomes of the research. It is divided in four sections that 
follow the main areas of analysis: service provision, policy drivers and markets, governance 
models and institutional analysis of PWS. Each section starts by summarizing and discussing 
important background information and results, and provides conclusions and considerations on the 
topic. Finally, the last section highlights future challenges and research needs for PWS in Europe.  
Conclusions on service provision  
In this section, we discuss the results of the assessment of water services provision based 
on the production-theory framework presented in paragraph 3.5.2. Within the introduction, we 
started from clarifying the main areas of confusion on PES wording such as the interchangeable 
use of “ecosystem” and “environmental” adjectives and the differences between ecosystem 
structures, processes, functions, services and final benefits. Using an input-output approach, we 
thus argued that the services targeted within PWS schemes are the result of two main inputs, 
natural and human capitals, with different degrees of substitution. Moving within the entire range of 
possible combinations between the two types of input factors, we identified three main different 
categories of services generated by PES schemes depending on the type of inputs. The first 
category, ecosystem services, corresponds to those services generated directly by natural capital, 
with very low use of human capital. The second, human services, on the contrary, is related to 
those services that originate from human capital with very low use or interaction with ecosystem 
structure and functions (natural capital), but eventually deliver a perceived environmental benefit. 
The third middle-ground category, environmental services, refers to those services generated with 
high level of both natural and human capital. The proposed framework and the categorization has 
been then applied to 68 inventoried case studies of PWS in EU.  
Results show that none of considered PWS schemes deals with “pure” ecosystem services, 
25 cases actually pay for environmental services, while 43 out of 68 pay for human services that 
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finally generates environmental benefits. Without pretending to be representative, these case 
studies and the assessment results certainly highlight the human component and human 
dependent nature of the services targeted within PWS. We therefore developed a production 
theory based definition of PES: PES schemes involve production systems and/or networks/clusters 
that use different combinations of natural and human capital, to produce the desired services 
(ecosystem, environmental, human) in order to satisfy a certain environmental need and increase 
society wellbeing (environmental benefit). The different degrees of substitution between the two 
main types of capital investment (natural and human) within the service production process 
characterize the service and thus the PES scheme that pays or compensates for changes in the 
use of the production systems.  
Most attempts to classify PWS schemes and evaluate their successfulness refer to the 
design of the payment mechanism (Postel and Thompson, 2005; Sattler et al., 2013). The research 
contributed to increase the discussion about PES through the application of the production theory 
model and suggested a new category of human service-based PES. We therefore highlighted the 
role of human capital, as essential input factor, within the systematic provision of environmental 
services in PES schemes. Certainly, from a theoretical point of view, many could argue if this new 
PES category - since dealing mainly with human based inputs - can fall under the PES definition. 
From a practitioners’ perspective, as the considered case studies showed, PES based on human 
capital that result into a desired environmental benefit, are already a widespread environmental 
policy tool. Our refinement of the PES definition started from a provision perspective that 
complements the usual market perspective of PES defined by Wunder (2005) and Muradian et al. 
(2010). It enhances the currently existing classification schemes (e.g. Sattler, 2013) by integrating 
elements concerning drivers of the production process. 
Eventually, the production theory framework integrated with a supply chain approach of 
environmental benefits (the pathway from ecosystem structure to human well-being), helped us to 
identify inputs (natural and human based), outputs (ecosystem, environmental and human 
services) and outcomes (environmental benefits) that should properly be highlighted when 
designing, contracting and implementing PES schemes for the correct monitoring and performance 
evaluation. Thanks to this clarification, we can assess if a considered PES scheme aims to capture 
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benefits from natural or human induced processes or a combination of the two. This gives 
elements to legitimate the payment mechanism such a paying to change practices, create 
infrastructures or maintain practices that are not anymore economically viable. It is especially 
relevant when the aim of the payment is to offset the providers’ opportunity costs.  
As other authors have shown (Corbera et al., 2009), financial, institutional and social 
capitals are variables for PES success. In our framework they are considered as production inputs 
for environmental service provision. Therefore, during the feasibility, contracting and designing 
phase of PES, minimum level of institutional, financial and social capitals have to be assessed and 
identified, and linked to conditionality of the payment, in order to ensure the delivering of outputs 
and outcomes, thus ensuring additionality.  
Conclusions on policy drivers and markets 
Investments in watershed services in Europe are increasingly gaining importance as a tool 
to meet water policy targets and biodiversity conservation. All 15 schemes identified during 2012 
inventory remained active, while the 2014 inventory reported up to 50 active PWS. Existent 
successful schemes are consolidating and expanding in size and transactions, and new pilots 
projects will continue to spread in the coming years. For example, Danone scheme in Evian 
catchment in France has extended the payment system to other three new catchments (Volvic, 
Badoit, La Salvetat). United Utilities, after moving to the second phase of SCaMP (doubling the 
scale of intervention), in 2014 has activated two new programmes (Catchment wise and Safeguard 
Zone projects) to extend the same approach in non-owned land all around the North West 
England. From 2015 Upstream Thinking will enlarge the programme creating 17 catchment-
specific schemes around South West England (tripling the area of intervention). Existing schemes, 
therefore, demonstrates their effectiveness and expand both in term of investments and area 
covered.  
Regarding upcoming PWS, our inventory identified 15 pilots or PWS that are in design 
phase, most of them are likely to success and proceed to a more mature phase, as for the 
favourable policy context, especially in the UK. Besides, DEFRA has published the new call to fund 
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between 4 to 6 pilot projects of average funding € 24,000 to € 36,000. Therefore, new pilots are 
expected to emerge in 2015 and 2016. Dozens of other schemes are expected to emerge in UK 
from 2014 OFWAT pricing review of water utilities32.  
In our survey we identified several drivers that increase the adoption of PWS as a 
governance tool to achieve water regulation standards and internalize negative and positive 
externalities. The following are the main ones:  
Driver 1: Securing water quality and quantity: the first main driver that affects all type of 
actors (involved in PWS especially from the buyer side) is to secure water quality and quantity 
under increasingly climate variability. Most of PWS dealt with improvement of extractive water 
supply (79%) and water damage mitigation (29%). More than 80% of PWS targeted agricultural 
land and nitrates were the main hydrological issue for more than 70% of inventoried schemes, 
while at global level only 21% of buyers aimed to reduce agricultural water use and pollution 
(Bennett et al., 2014b). Our survey identified a main cultural and policy shift that involved many 
PWS: the water sector, pushed by the WFD, is shifting from the old industry based chemical 
treatment approach toward a more holistic and integrated catchment approach. Similarly, water 
quantity related issues (flooding, groundwater recharge, etc.) are gradually been tackled by using 
green solutions rather than investing on grey-infrastructures. However, although catchment 
management and green-infrastructure often offer a cost effective solution as shown by analysed 
case studies, they usually provide outcomes that are context specific. Regulatory standards rarely 
accommodate uncertainty related to outcomes, meaning that many water utilities cannot rely on 
catchment management or green infrastructures alone to ensure water quality or flood protection. 
This means that PWS will not substitute old fashion technology based solutions; they will rather 
complement them to seek for more co-benefits.  
Driver 2: EU funding opportunities: our survey showed that around 55% of inventoried 
programmes declared to use multiple sources of funding, 32% used EU funding, and 1 out of 4 
used CAP payments. Considering that the majority of schemes targeted diffuse pollution in 
                                               
32
 The new formed Natural Resource Wales is committed to deliver a country action plan on the use 
of PES for natural conservation, probably following the path of DEFRA in England.  
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agriculture, EU sources of funding were thus a major driver that allowed the start-up of many 
schemes and that ensured their economic sustainability through match funding of PWS scheme 
with existing agro-environmental measures. However, the greening of CAP is likely to raise the 
baseline of hydrological service provision higher than it was. Therefore, if environmental standards 
to obtain CAP payments are quite high, many private actors will act as free riders, enjoying the 
benefits deriving from public EC payments, without contributing directly to enhance the already 
high hydrological service provision of some areas.  
As shown in the paragraph 4.2, EU funds are likely to keep and increase their driving role in 
the new programming period (2014-2020). LIFE+, EU structural funds, CAP payments, the 
upcoming Green Infrastructure Fund, etc. are some of the funds that could positively contribute to 
existing and future schemes. However, most of them look for incentivising projects that are 
economically viable and seek to fund projects that ensure co-funding from multiple sources. PWS 
therefore, can compete with other projects and approaches only if they will base their strategy on 
multiple funding sources.  
Driver 3: CSO support toward multiple benefits based PWS: PWS have demonstrated 
in many cases to reach hydrological service while providing other important co-benefits, such as 
carbon stock, biodiversity conservation and providing economic opportunities for landowners. 
According to our analysis, 56% of PWS directly targeted biodiversity co-benefits, 41% social co-
benefits related with increasing economic opportunities of landowners, while carbon was only a 
targeted co-benefits in 25% of the projects.  
Environmental organizations are often concerned about biodiversity conservation rather 
than drinking water quality issues. However, they understood that through collaborating with water 
utilities and agriculture sector, they could maximize their impacts and successfully collaborate for 
delivering multiple benefit projects. In some cases, CSO pushed for adopting PWS as a main 
donors’ approach, such as in the Danube related pilot projects by WWF. In other cases, such as 
RSPB in the UK or WRT in South England, environmental organization lobbed for national and 
local political support, allowing the development of emerging schemes and triggering water utilities 
and policy makers to adopt PWS as catchment approach.  
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Conclusions on typologies of governance models 
Our governance assessment framework provided an important contribution to understand 
and assess PWS against the main principles of PES theory, namely, voluntariness, directness, 
commoditization, and conditionality. For each of the principles we characterised the main scheme 
design arrangements, providing a scoring system that allowed us to understand how a given 
scheme meet the considered principle.  
The assessment framework helped us to characterise the identified PWS and to further 
refine a diagram for a logical assessment of PWS typology of governance models. We used the 
voluntariness (supply and demand), the main project aim regarding (compensate, avoid impact, 
providing additional ecosystem services), and directness of the transfer between supplier and 
beneficiary to built the diagram. We thus identified four main groups of PWS (public – non-
voluntary, public regulated, compensatory private initiatives, private voluntary payments) divided 
into eleven typologies. We then described and characterised these eleven typologies, taking 
several examples and descriptions from inventoried case studies at EU level. The framework thus 
provides a simple and clear guide to classify the variety of existing PWS governance models. It 
also identified new proposed categories, such as the “multiple benefit partnership” which 
represented the 25% of assessed schemes. The multiple benefit partnership is defined as a PWS 
scheme that is characterised by a partnership-based model, aiming at providing projects with clear 
multiple co-benefits (biodiversity, carbon and social). The model bases its viability on guaranteeing 
multiple source of funding, and ensuring territorial collaborative learning processes, through the 
establishment umbrella organizations, partnership or crosscutting institutions, representing the 
interests of all involved actors.  
Main findings and conclusions on institutional analysis  
The institutional analysis allowed us to complement the study of policy and market drivers, 
governance arrangements and typologies, and future challenges of the schemes. The refined 
institutional framework initially provided by Prokofieva (2013) and Corbera (2009) helped to 
systematically assess all inventoried case studies and to provide a detailed analysis of selected 
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case studies. The main goal of the institutional analysis was to relate several PWS characteristics, 
such as ecosystem services, actors’ interactions, scheme design, institutional interplay, capacity 
and scale to the performances and outcomes. The qualitative analysis has raised some PWS 
features and governance arrangements that can improve performances and outcome and increase 
the success of a scheme. However, we understand that these characteristics are case specifics 
and sometimes cannot be generalized. The following are the main findings from our institutional 
analysis. 
Ecosystem structures, functions and services: the geographical scale of the scheme 
shall be proportionate to the scale to which hydrological services are provided by nature. However, 
the scheme shall take into account all type of ecosystems involved within the catchment and 
provide a differentiated portfolio of management practice. For each desired hydrological services, 
the scheme should identify the structures (ecosystems), functions and type of final environmental 
benefits. Qualitative and quantitative indicators, using hydrological services attributes should be 
appointed in order to create a baseline and facilitate final monitoring of outcomes.  
Actors’ interactions: the first assessment of partners (buyers, intermediaries and 
suppliers) has to be based not only for their willingness to participate but also for their capacity 
(readiness) and scale. Technical capacity is fundamental and better if it is linked with the right 
geographical and/or territorial scale for hydrological service provision. Project managers should 
design PWS in order to allow key actors that have an interest on conservation of water related 
ecosystems to be part of the design and implementation process. The inclusion of key actors such 
as intermediaries, universities, farmers associations, etc. is a prerequisite for the scheme success. 
The coordination of all actors through cross-cutting institutions or partnerships allows the 
implementing organization to increase the scheme acceptability, technical and financial scale. 
Choosing the right intermediary or the organization with high local acceptability and recognition is 
the most fundamental step in the development of a PWS.  
Institutional interplay: PWS schemes in Europe have high transaction costs, as they are 
relative new approaches to communicate in a very intricate and multi-layered institutional context. 
Communicating the idea of PWS in the right way and at the right actors is fundamental as first 
step. The second fundamental step in order to obtain a positive institutional interplay is to identify 
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and involve key experts from national/regional administrations at an early stage. This will help to 
have a clear picture of the natural assets and its relations with existing actors and institutions. 
PWS should study accurately all institutions that could affect the development of the 
scheme, not only within the water sector but also within those institutions that deal with agriculture, 
biodiversity conservation and environmental compensations. One of the main success factors of 
PWS seemed related to how the scheme is able to engage and create synergies with institutions 
from other sectors (horizontal interplay), such as Natura 2000, environmental compensations 
funds, CAP, etc. Moreover, at political level, it should be able to aligning and harmonize all EU, 
national, regional and local institutions that related with the scheme focus.  
Design: win-win approaches with farmers are one of the best solutions to decrease 
negotiation costs together with reducing the times of negotiation process. Farmers want to be 
farmers; they want to see which benefits they can gain through being part of the scheme; not only 
through the payment they receive but also how their farming activities can be improved. 
Rationalization and chemical input saving, organic farming, capital works improvements are 
examples that have demonstrated to be effective within the inventoried schemes.  
Since the scheme managers (utilities and municipalities) do not have perfect information 
about the individual farmer’s cost baseline, the farmers have an opportunity to obtain over-
compensation. Therefore structuring the right design system is of a paramount importance. For 
example, in the case of Fowey River in South West England, the auction system stimulated 
competition between farmers by only funding bids that offer the best value for money for South 
West Water. In particular, the Fowey River Improvement Auction delivered between 20% and 40% 
better value for money than the fixed-price alternative (Day and Couldrick, 2013). However, the 
advisor-led schemes are to be preferred when an advisor’s expert judgement is needed on the 
ground to distinguish between different alternative options. Auctions also have a considerable 
advantage in that they scale-up with relatively little additional cost. Accordingly, an auction might 
be preferred for large-scale schemes, particularly where there is little detailed local knowledge of a 
region through which farms can be effectively targeted. Advisor-led schemes fit best where the 
scale of the scheme is small and where advisors have a good local knowledge to understand 
where the watershed investments have better return in term of service provision.  
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Some scheme managers have reported the use of commodity certification standards as a 
tool for decentralized compliance monitoring and to increase win-win benefits for farmers & forest 
owners. Lower Saxony scheme and City of Munich in Germany are providing, among the portfolio 
of management practices, a payment for organic agriculture on groundwater recharge areas. 
Norda water (Monticchio Gaudianello) in Italy has a scheme based on organic certification of 
spring water catchments and promoted on the bottles’ label, using it to show corporate 
environmental responsibility to its customers. Schemes that work through match funding with CAP 
often let payment agencies in charge of controlling the correct use of EU funds to carry out the 
compliance monitoring. 
Compared to other studies where schemes reward either by cash or by providing in-kind 
inputs (Martin-Ortega et al., 2013; Sattler et al., 2013), Europe provides a very clear trend where 
payments are usually (44% of schemes) coupled with in-kind services or inputs. 
Capacity and scale: capacity and scale matters as the assessment shows that public 
bodies directly manage 49% of schemes; however, 29% are managed by cross scale partnership, 
which through collaborative approaches provide better territorial coverage, technical and financial 
capacity. When the private sector is involved, mostly only big organizations such as multinational 
companies such as CocaCola, Danone, Bionade are managing PWS. Therefore, PWS shall 
preferably be managed either by public organization or by organization with strong financial, 
technical and management capacity. PWS based on public budget allocation are often undermined 
by political instability that could affect the allocation of resources depending on availability and 
political decisions. To avoid instability public PWS should be coupled with regulations that set 
financial instruments such as water charges or funds that systematically raise financial sources to 
run the scheme. Considered schemes based on water charges are run on long-term and seemed 
to have bigger scale and impacts.  
Performances and outcomes: many factors influence performances and outcomes, 
among others, those above mentioned. The difficulties to monitor and assess hydrological service 
performances of a scheme make also difficult to assess its outcomes and performances. The 
definition of a hydrological baseline, with specific hydrological indicators, attributes and related 
quantities shall be the first step to allow a fair performance and outcomes assessment. However, 
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performances and outcomes in PWS are dominated by uncertainty related to how management 
practices impacts on hydrological services, as the relation is always site and context specific. 
Especially when working on diffuse pollution, a change on the behaviour of few farmers in the 
catchment can provide significant changes on hydrological outcomes of the whole PWS.  
In all four considered PWS, we found positive performances regarding cost benefit/saving 
of the scheme, compared with BAU scenario, taking into account co-benefits. However, results on 
cost-benefits analysis depend on case by case and on the boundaries of cost and benefits 
considered during the study. PWS are not always a better economic option compared to 
conventional water treatment, however if we consider the co-benefit in term of social, biodiversity 
and climate outcomes, payment schemes are certainly a valuable options to address water quality 
and other policy goals.  
Future challenges of PWS development 
PWS are likely to be soon replaced by cross-compliance and tightening of legal 
requirements for groundwater protection. Avoided impact bilateral agreements that only deal with 
decreasing the use of fertilizers (thus not providing many multiple benefits) are those that are more 
likely to be replaced by cross-compliance. Moreover, it is difficult and expensive to monitor the use 
of chemical inputs and identify those farmers that do not meet the scheme requirements. Several 
water utilities would prefer other types of investments such as afforestation or establishment of 
wetland as they are easy to control. However, the latter are more feasible when the number of 
service suppliers is low, and for which the negotiation process for the land use change is not that 
demanding. When the number of farmers is high, the system used by the city of Munich can be a 
good example to negotiate among farmers’ interests and water quality goals. The adoption of 
organic agriculture as proxy management practice has provided farmers with more market 
opportunities at no additional certification cost (as organic farming certification is paid by the 
scheme) while allowed the water utility to achieve important water quality targets. Monitoring and 
design process where easily achieved as organic farming has its own system which could be used 
146 
 
within the PWS of Munich city. However, the PWS had to invest to promote a marketing strategy 
for farmers’ products, as originally there were not markets for them.  
Water Trading Initiatives, although almost absent in EU, may have a future development. 
The UK peatland code it’s on pilot phase, however an extensive public consultation and broad 
management team is ensuring participatory design. On the other side, the Spanish initiative on 
groundwater trading rights, according to WWF who was initially part of the process, failed because 
speculation occurred during the acquisition and selling of water abstraction rights. These schemes 
have to be carefully considered as they draw from the experience of biodiversity offsetting, which is 
at European level a very controversial issue. The mechanisms shall ensure that there is a clear 
offset and distribution of trading rights in order to ensure the real conservation of the water related 
ecosystem. Environmental NGOs have to be consulted and involved since the beginning of each 
pilot project, the initiatives shall partner with universities to ensure that correct and reliable metrics 
systems are adopted.  
When developing PWS, practitioners should be imaginative and not tied to the theoretical 
idea of PES. Very few pure PES do exist and this is the first indicators to say that a pure PES is 
likely not to be successful. This is particularly true in the context of Europe and within the water 
sector, where there is sedimentation of actors and institutions with different roles and uses 
regarding water resources, at local, regional, national and European level.  
Finally, while implementing PWS there are a number of scientific and institutional 
challenges founded within the considered case studies and little evaluation of the transaction costs 
of addressing these challenges. However, the development of PWS increases the institutional 
capacity of the actors and improves trust and local knowledge among watershed institutional 
networks. When evaluating the cost of PWS special attention has to be paid to value these co-
benefits, in term of social capital and other ecosystem services.  
Multiple benefit partnerships are successful as they recognise the multiple benefit nature of 
PWS, which are implemented locally with the participation of all relevant actors, providing an 
extensive identification of potential buyers/beneficiaries and a diversified and locally adapted 
portfolio of service providers and management practices. The recognition of the multiple benefit 
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partnership provides social collaboration among different actors, improve synergies among CSO, 
regulators, private business and existing institutions and policy tools.  
Therefore, the multiple benefits concept, bring the idea of co-funding and networking and 
transform the traditional idea of PES (bilateral agreement between a service provider and a service 
buyer) into a watershed network where shared hydro-geological goals are funded and supported 
by multiple actors that collaborate in a win-win based relationship.  
Future research is needed to assess the performance of PWS schemes based on a 
detailed transaction costs analysis and/or cost benefit analysis. However, the same type of PWS 
should be selected in order to obtain results that can be comparable; the framework provided 
within this research can be helpful to identify similar typologies of PWS. Moreover, the boundaries 
of cost-benefit analysis should be well defined both in term of which costs are calculated and in 
term of accounted co-benefits.   
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ANNEXES 
Annex 1: List of inventoried case studies 
Scheme name N° Code Programme administrator Region 
The water sanctuary Taugl 1 AU1 
Provincial Governament of Salzburg  
(Landeshauptfrau) through the Directorate for 
Agriculture and Forestry 
Salzburg 
Spa Watersource Protected 
Area 2 BE1 SPADEL water company Walloon Region  
Liberty Island 3 HU1 WWF Hungary  Danube 
Persina Nature Park - pilot 4 BH1 WWF Danube-Carpathian Programme Bulgarian Lower Danube 
Iezer fishponds - pilot  5 RO1 WWF Danube-Carpathian Programme Romanian Lower Danube 
Ciocanesti fishponds - pilot 6 RO2 WWF Danube-Carpathian Programme Romanian Lower Danube 
Aalborg cooperative 
agreements 7 DK1 Aalborg City Council (Drastrup project) North Jutland 
Copenhagen Energy 
Corporation 8 DK2 Copenhagen Energy Corporation Region Hovedstaden 
Danish reforestation project 9 DK3 Public water works National wide 
Danish groundwater 
protection agreements 10 DK4 Public water works National wide 
The English Woodland Grant 
Scheme 11 UK1 
Forest Commission Yorkshire and The 
Humber Region 
Yorkshire and The 
Humber Region 
Voucher angling schemes (7 
schemes in UK) 12 UK2 The Wild Trout Trust and the The Rivers Trust National wide 
Westcountry Rivers Trust's 
Upstream Thinking 13 UK3 South West Water  South West England 
The Fowey River 
Improvement Scheme - 
Upstream Thinking 
14 UK4 South West Water  South West England 
Exmoor Mires Project - 
Upstream Thinking 15 UK5 South West Water  South West England 
Working Wetlands Upstream 
Thinking 16 UK6 South West Water  South West England 
Otter Valley - Upstream 
Thinking 17 UK7 South West Water  South West England 
Wild Penwith - Upstream 
Thinking 18 UK8 South West Water  South West England 
Hull Flood risk - Pilot 19 UK9 Land Trust East Riding of Yorkshire 
Poole Harbour - Pilot 20 UK10 RSPB Dorset 
The Tortworth  Brook Project 
- Pilot 21 UK11 Bristol Avon Rivers Trust South Gloucestershire 
Canal and River Trust - Pilot 22 UK12 JBA Consulting  North West of England 
Pumlumon Project 23 UK13 Montgomeryshire Wildlife Trust Wales 
Peatland code 24 UK14 Birmingham City University National wide 
Visitor Payback  - Nurture 
Lakeland Scheme 25 UK15 Birmingham City University North West of England 
Improving the River Lea in 
Luton  26 UK16 Cranfield University East of England 
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Cotswold Catchment Pilot 27 UK17 FWAG South West South West England 
Slowing the Flow at Pickering 28 UK18 Forest Research North Yorkshire 
Bassenthwaite Ecosystem 
Services Pilot 29 UK19 
The Bassenthwaite Lake Restoration 
Programme North West of England 
Sustainable Catchment 
Management Programme 
(SCaMP) 
30 UK20 United Utilities   North West of England 
Catchment Wise 31 UK21 United Utilities   North West of England 
Safeguard Zones 32 UK22 United Utilities   North West of England 
The Catchment Sensitive 
Farming Capital Grant 
Scheme (CGS) 
33 UK23 Environment Agency and Natural England National wide 
Wessex Water’s catchment 
management programme 34 UK24 Wessex Water South West England 
Ouse Upstream Thinking 
Project 35 UK25 South East Water South East England 
Yorkshire Water catchment 
investment 36 UK26 Yorkshire Water  Northern England 
Wicksters Brook nitrate 
scheme 37 UK27 Bristol Water South West England 
Metaldehyde action project 38 UK28 Bristol Water South West England 
Flood Resilience Community 
Pathfinder Pilot 39 UK29 DEFRA National wide 
The Vittel Scheme 40 FR1 Vittel (Nestlé Waters)  Lorraine 
Evian Catchment Protection 
Partnership 41 FR2 
Association for the Protection of the Impluvium 
of Evian Mineral Water (APIEME) (Evian 
Company - Danone Group)  
Rhône-Alpes 
Volvic Catchment Protection 
Partnership 42 FR3 
Environment Committee for the Protection of 
Impluvium Volvic (CEPIV) - (Volvic - Danone 
Group) 
Auvergne 
Badoit Green Bubble 
Partnership 43 FR4 Badoit (Danone Group)  Loire 
Salvetat PEP'S Partnership  44 FR5 PEP'S Association (La Salvetat - Danone Group)  Salvetat 
Naussac and Villerest dams 
schemes 45 FR6 
Etablissement Public Territorial de Bassin 
Loire (EPTB Loire) Loire 
Masevaux water scheme 46 FR7 Municipality of Masevaux (Haut Rhin) Haut Rhin 
Golfe de Saint Tropez fire 
protection scheme 47 FR8 
Union for the drinking water distribution of the 
Corniche des Maures (SIDECM) The Var 
Rennes Protection Project 48 FR9 Syndicat Mixte de Protection du Bassin Rennais (SMPBR) Haut-Rhin 
SIEM water protection 
project 49 FR10 
The Syndicat Intercommunal des Eaux des 
Moises (SIEM) Haute Savoie 
Coca Cola -Pennes- 
Mirabeau Partnership  50 FR11 Coca Cola France  Bouches-du-Rhône  
Lons le Saunier 51 FR12 Municipality of Lons le Saunier  Jura department 
Eau de Paris drinking water 
protection zones  52 FR13 Eau de Paris  Paris 
Saulce Plain cooperation 
agreements 53 FR14 
Association pour la qualité de l’eau potable de 
la Plaine du Saulce Yonne 
Munich water protection 
payments 54 DE1 
Stadtwerke München (SVM or Munich City 
Utilities) Bavaria State 
Kaufering scheme 55 DE2 Kaufering municipal water utility  District of Landsberg in Bavaria 
Bionade-Trinkenwasserwald 56 DE3 Bionade Corporation Rhoen region 
Lower Saxony cooperation 
model 57 DE4 Lower Saxony Governament  (NLWKN) 
German provincial state of 
Lower Saxony 
(Niedersachsen) 
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 SchALVO - Baden-
Wurttemberg 58 DE5 Baden-Wurttemberg Governament  Baden-Wurttemberg State  
Augsburg scheme 59 DE6 City of Augsburg  South-west of Bavaria 
Forest Infiltration Areas 60 IT1 Lowland Basin Authorities  Veneto Region 
Piedmont and Veneto Region 
water levies 61 IT2 Piedmont Region Council  Piedmont Region 
Romagna Acque Water Fund 62 IT3 Romagna Acque Spa  Emilia Romagna Region  
Hydroelectric power 
compensation 63 IT4 Mountain Basin Authorities (FEDERBIM) National wide 
Land stewards  64 IT5 Comunità Montana Media Valle del Serchio Tuscany 
Norda Bottle Water 65 IT6 Monticchio Gaudianello S.p.A. (Gruppo Norda) Basilicata 
Stewardship and improvment 
of water resources: Misura 
214/g  
66 IT7 Veneto Region Veneto Region 
Integrated Constructed 
Wetlands - Lombardy Region 67 IT8 Lombardy Region Lombardy Region 
Coca Cola Groundwater 
Compensation 68 PT1 APF Certifica Group Scheme (APFC) 
Alentejo and Ribatejo 
regions 
Special Plan for the Upper 
Guadiana (SPUG) 69 ES1 River Basin Authority (RBA)  Castilla la Mancha 
Nordic Shell Holdings 70 SE1 Lysekil local authority Lysekil 
Switzerland’s National Nitrate 
Strategy  71 SH1 
Federal Government, cantons and water 
supplier National wide 
Dutch groundwater 
protection zones  72 NL1 Water companies National wide 
Agricultural Claims Water 
extraction Drentsche Aa 73 NL2 Groningen water Province of Groningen 
Nature friendly banks Oude 
Rijn 74 NL3 Oude Rijn water boards Oude Rijn 
Active strips management 
Brabant 75 NL4 Brabant water boards North-Brabant 
Nature friendly banks Midden 
Delflan 76 NL5 Midden Delflan water boards Midden Delflan 
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Annex 2: Publication 1 - Gaining Depth State of 
Watershed Investment 2014  
Leonardi, A., Bennett, G., Nathaniel, C., 2014. European Chapter - Gaining Depth State of 
Watershed Investment 2014. Forest Trends Ecosystem Marketplace, Washington, D.C. 
Gaining Depth
State of Watershed Investment 2014
Donors:
A Report by Forest Trends’ Ecosystem Marketplace 
Genevieve Bennett and Nathaniel Carroll
Contributing authors: Michael Bennett, Alessandro Leonardi, and Kevin Moull
December 2014
Preferred citation: Bennett, G., and N. Carroll. (2014). Gaining Depth: State of Watershed Investment 2014. 
Available online at www.ecosystemmarketplace.com/reports/sowi2014. 
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Annex 3: Publication 2 - Impronta idrica e servizi 
ecosistemici  
Leonardi, A., Pettenella, D., 2012. Impronta idrica e servizi ecosistemici. I pagamenti 
ecosistemici quali fonti di reddito per le imprese agroforestali. Intersezioni 20, 1–5. 
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I pagamenti ecosistemici quali fonti  
di reddito per le imprese agroforestali.  
 
 
L'impronta ecologica quantifica la superficie di territo-
rio necessaria alla rigenerazione delle risorse naturali 
utilizzate da una certa popolazione umana.  
Il concetto affermatosi alla fine degli anni Novanta gra-
zie all'opera Our ecological footprint: reducing human 
impact on the Earth di Mathis Wackernagel e William 
Rees è stato studiato specificatamente per i consumi 
energetici e idrici. Mitigazioni e compensazioni ambien-
tali sono importanti, dunque, al fine di ridurre il più 
possibile l’impronta.  
La metodologia proposta da Madsen et al (2010) per 
diminuire le esternalità ambientali negative contempla 
quattro fasi procedurali: evitare, ridurre, mitigare, 
compensare [1]. Pertanto, l’azione di compensazione è 
l’ultima di una fase di pianificazione e progettazione 
che, attraverso scelte alternative, dovrebbe limitare “a 
monte” le ricadute negative arrecate da un’opera o da 
un’organizzazione. In secondo luogo, è opportuno ri-
durre le ripercussio-
ni di un’opera – per 
esempio, mediante 
l’aumento di effi-
cienza – e, infine, 
mitigare gli effetti 
negativi attraverso 
idonei accorgimenti 
progettuali. La com-
pensazione fa riferi-
mento alle attività 
che dovrebbero bi-
lanciare i danni crea-
ti dalla realizzazione 
di un progetto, generando valori ambientali almeno u-
guali a quelli persi. Per citare un esempio relativo al set-
tore forestale, la compensazione della Carbon footprint 
(Cf) – ossia la quantità di emissioni di anidride carboni-
ca associata a un prodotto, a un’azienda o a un processo 
– può avvenire attraverso opere di riforestazione e/o di 
gestione forestale migliorata, in modo da creare un au-
mento del carbonio sequestrato nei suoli forestali pari o 
superiore alle emissioni prodotte.  
 
L’impronta idrica 
Nel contesto della risorsa idrica, il concetto di “impron-
ta” è relativamente nuovo. In primo luogo, questo è do-
vuto alla complessità di calcolo del consumo della risor-
sa idrica in relazione alle diverse qualità di acqua im-
piegata (verde, blu e grigia, cfr. infra) e ai diversi tipi di 
uso (agricolo, industriale, domestico). L’impronta idrica 
è definita come il volume totale di acqua necessaria a 
un’organizzazione per produrre un bene o servizio. A 
livello internazionale, il Water footprint network ha 
sviluppato delle linee 
guida per il calcolo 
dell’impronta idrica 
(Water footprint, Wf) 
[2]: il manuale offre 
una serie di metodo-
logie standard per il 
calcolo della Wf su di-
verse scale: a livello 
nazionale, comunale, 
di bacino idrografico 
oppure di prodotto o 
di processo. Un’altra 
iniziativa di rilievo è 
in corso di realizzazione da parte dell’Organizzazione 
mondiale della normalizzazione (Iso) mediante la nor-
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ma Iso 14046 (Life cycle assessment – Wf – Require-
ments and guidelines) [3].  
Secondo le due iniziative la Wf corrisponde alla somma 
di tre componenti:  
• acqua blu (composta dalle acque superficiali e sotter-
ranee, rappresenta il volume d’acqua di superficie o di 
falda evaporata durante il processo produttivo): Wf 
blu = acqua blu evaporata + acqua blu incorporata + 
acqua che non viene riutilizzata in quanto non dispo-
nibile in termini sia di spazio sia di tempo; 
• acqua verde (composta da acque piovane conservate 
nel suolo impiegato, rappresenta il volume di acqua 
piovana evaporata durante il processo produttivo): 
Wf verde = acqua verde evaporata + acqua verde in-
corporata; 
• acqua grigia (composta da acqua inquinata, quantifi-
cata come il volume di acqua dolce necessaria per as-
similare il carico inquinante sulla base di norme idri-
che esistenti di qualità e ambiente):  
Wf grigia = L / (Cmax + Cnat)1. 
Un’altra caratteristica peculiare dell’impronta idrica ri-
spetto alla Carbon footrprint è la sua dimensione locale 
o site specific. Risulta infatti meno ragionevole com-
pensare gli effetti sul ciclo dell’acqua di un determinato 
bacino idrografico attraverso la creazione di opere di 
compensazione in altri bacini, non collegati dal punto di 
vista idrogeologico o geografico a quello d’interesse. 
Nonostante ciò, Hoekstra [4] dimostra che ogni nazione 
ha un’impronta idrica che si può schematicamente cal-
colare attraverso la sommatoria di Awu (Agricultural 
water use), Iww (Industrial water withdraw), Dww 
(Domestic water withdraw), Vwe (Virtual water e-
xport), dove Vwe sta per la Wf legata all’esportazione 
dei prodotti agricoli e industriali verso altri Paesi pari, 
in media, al 16% dell’impronta idrica totale del Paese. 
Secondo il medesimo studio, l’Italia ha una Wf tra le più 
alte al mondo, pari a 2300-2400 m3/anno/pro capite. 
Dunque l’impronta idrica ha anche una rilevante di-
mensione globale veicolata dal commercio internazio-
                                                 
 
1 Questa componente può essere quantificata calcolando il 
volume d´acqua necessario per diluire gli agenti inquinanti 
immessi nel sistema idrico durante il processo produttivo, 
ossia dividendo il carico inquinante (L, in massa/tempo) per la 
differenza tra lo standard di qualità ambientale delle acque di 
un tale inquinante (concentrazione massima accettabile, in 
massa/volume) e la sua concentrazione naturale nel corpo 
idrico ricevente (Cnat, in massa/volume).  
 
nale che sposta la Wf dal luogo di produzione al luogo di 
consumo. Studi autorevoli hanno stimato che entro il 
2025 il consumo pro capite di acqua aumenterà del 13% 
e che la disponibilità sarà fortemente condizionata 
dall’aumento della popolazione e dallo sviluppo econo-
mico. Considerando che meno del 3% dell’acqua mon-
diale è potabile e che l’83% di questa non è disponibile 
all’uomo, si prevede che nei prossimi decenni più di un 
terzo della popolazione mondiale andrà incontro agli 
effetti di scarsità d’acqua [5].  
 
I servizi ecosistemici  
come compensazione 
Date queste premesse, è plausibile che nel prossimo fu-
turo siano sempre più frequenti iniziative di compensa-
zione dell’impronta idrica a carattere sia locale che in-
ternazionale2. Nel mercato Italiano e internazionale 
molte aziende, tra le quali Coca Cola, si propongono 
come “Water neutral” o “Water free” o hanno 
l’obiettivo di diventarlo nel breve termine. Le iniziative 
di compensazione esistenti, tuttavia, presentano molti 
aspetti controversi dovuti alla mancanza di metodologie 
riconosciute per la certificazione e/o garanzia di effi-
cienza ed efficacia degli interventi compensativi. Una 
soluzione interessante che alcuni Paesi europei e ameri-
cani hanno già adottato è quella della creazione di “Ban-
che verdi” (Compensation banking) che – gestite da 
un’autorità (pubblica o pubblico-privata) chiamata a 
raccogliere e selezionare i progetti compensativi – fac-
ciano da intermediari con le organizzazioni che devono 
compensare e diano trasparenza al processo garantendo 
il carattere preventivo e possibilmente coordinato degli 
interventi, monitorandoli e dando una comunicazione 
obiettiva. È il caso delle Wetland mitigation banking 
negli Stati Uniti, dove, prima di iniziare un’opera, 
l’organizzazione deve acquistare una certa quantità di 
crediti per compensare l’effetto del progetto su aree u-
mide e biodiversità.  
                                                 
 
2 Nel caso della compensazione delle emissioni di CO2 sono 
ormai decine gli standard internazionali (Cdm, Vcs, Ccb, Cfs & 
Plan Vivo) che propongono linee guida per progetti di 
riforestazione in aree tropicali e non. Questi progetti, se 
debitamente certificati da standard credibili, garantiscono una 
serie di accorgimenti progettuali quali l’addizionalità e la 
permanenza, l’assenza di eventuali effetti di leakage, e 
producono crediti spendibili nel mercato internazionale della 
compensazione delle emissioni di CO2.  
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È dunque lecito immaginare che sempre più spesso le 
compensazioni dell’impronta idrica di organizzazioni 
pubbliche o private potranno avvenire attraverso il fi-
nanziamento o il pagamento diretto di progetti, iniziati-
ve e/o proprietari che contribuiscano alla conservazione 
e/o alla creazione di habitat in grado di garantire nel 
tempo esternalità positive rispetto alla risorsa idrica. Le 
aree umide e/o forestali sono un valido esempio di que-
sti habitat. Il trading o finanziamento può avvenire sia 
con modalità imposte da regolamenti elaborati dalle i-
stituzioni pubbliche (si veda, nel caso del carbonio, il 
Protocollo di Kyoto), sia attraverso meccanismi di libero 
mercato (standard e mercato volontario delle quote di 
CO2).  
Nel caso della gestione delle risorse idriche, negli ultimi 
vent’anni si è assistito a uno spostamento significativo 
di attenzione dagli strumenti di regolamentazione, ge-
nerali e vincolanti per i diversi soggetti economici coin-
volti, agli strumenti basati su incentivi e compensazioni 
e, più di recente, su iniziative ad adesione volontaria 
legate alla creazione di nuovi mercati. Questa evoluzio-
ne può essere letta alla luce della maggiore efficacia ed 
efficienza di questi strumenti rispetto a quelli di rego-
lamentazione, ma anche in relazione alla tendenza at-
tuale di ritenere che la creazione di nuovi mercati – ac-
compagnata da un ruolo pro-attivo delle imprese e della 
società civile (approcci bottom up in contrapposizione a 
quelli tradizionali top-down) – rappresenti una forma 
di intervento innovativa ed estremamente promettente 
nell’ambito delle politiche ambientali. Secondo Eco-
system market place3 il mercato dei cosiddetti Water 
ecosystem services (Wes), ossia i servizi idrici degli eco-
sistemi, ha un valore pari a oltre 9 miliardi di euro, se-
condo solo a quello dei crediti di carbonio che equivale 
a circa 117 miliardi di euro [6]. 
 
Pagamenti per servizi ecosistemici (Pes) 
Un mercato è costituito da una serie di transazioni. I 
Payment for ecosystem services (Pes) rappresentano 
un insieme di iniziative (schemi di pagamento) acco-
munate dall’idea che anche un servizio ambientale, in 
questo caso il miglioramento della qualità e disponibili-
                                                 
 
3 Il progetto di Forest trend è un’iniziativa su scala mondiale 
che si occupa della promozione e dello studio del mercato dei 
servizi ecosistemici. Per maggiori informazioni: 
http://www.ecosystemmarketplace.com/ 
 
 
tà idrica, possa essere acquistato sul mercato con un 
tradizionale atto di scambio. Seguendo la definizione 
proposta da Wunder (2005) [7], uno schema Pes può 
essere definito generalmente come un accordo volonta-
rio e condizionato da alcune regole concordate tra al-
meno un fornitore (venditore del servizio) e almeno un 
acquirente (beneficiario del servizio) in riferimento a un 
definito servizio ambientale. Alcuni autori, tuttavia, re-
stringono la definizione di Pes al caso in cui: 
• la transazione sia volontaria; 
• riguardi un preciso servizio ambientale, o una forma 
d’uso del suolo che garantisca la fornitura del servizio 
stesso;  
• il servizio sia acquistato da almeno un consumatore; 
• il servizio sia venduto da almeno un produttore; 
• il produttore garantisca continuità nella fornitura 
(Engel et al., 2008) [8].  
In effetti, in molte applicazioni dei Pes, una o più di 
queste condizioni non sempre sussistono, per cui spesso 
si fa riferimento a progetti e iniziative “quasi-Pes”. 
 
I pagamenti per i servizi idrici  
degli ecosistemi in Italia 
Nel contesto italiano si possono individuare alcune in-
teressanti esperienze di quasi-Pes, soprattutto per 
quanto riguarda la gestione delle risorse idriche e la 
compensazione dei prelievi a uso agricolo, industriale e 
domestico. In effetti, il sistema di pagamento di un so-
vra-canone per la produzione di energia idro-elettrica 
(Regio decreto 11 dicembre 1933, n. 1775 e successive 
modifiche) può essere considerato un quasi-Pes ante 
litteram. Per i servizi acquedottistici, la legge Galli (leg-
ge 5 gennaio 1994, n. 36, art. 24, comma 2), implemen-
tando un principio già affermato nella legge 18 maggio 
1989, n. 183, ha previsto la possibilità di una compensa-
zione per i gestori del bacino di captazione di cui tenere 
conto nella definizione delle tariffe per l’erogazione 
dell’acqua potabile. Solo nelle Regioni Piemonte e Ve-
neto tale possibilità è stata resa pienamente operativa. 
Per tutti gli esempi ricordati un punto di debolezza dei 
quasi-Pes italiani è legato ai beneficiari dei pagamenti, 
non sempre chiaramente costituiti dai gestori diretti 
delle risorse e compensati in misura delle attività svolte 
[9].  
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Il caso del fiume Brenta e le aree forestali 
di infiltrazione  
Un caso interessante di compensazione della Wf è costi-
tuito dal Modello strutturale degli acquedotti della Re-
gione Veneto. Questo prevede di disattivare progressi-
vamente tutti gli attuali piccoli impianti di potabilizza-
zione che prelevano dall’Adige e dal Po, sostituendoli 
con prelievi diretti dalle falde pedemontane4.  
Nell’ambito di questo progetto, Veneto Acque spa ha 
ottenuto l’autorizzazione per il prelievo massimo di 950 
l/s congiuntamente all’attuazione di una serie di misure 
di monitoraggio, compensazione e ricarica delle falde 
già attualmente compromesse dagli eccessivi prelievi 
idrici a uso agricolo, industriale e domestico.  
Nell’accordo di programma per la tutela delle risorse 
idriche superficiali e sotterranee del fiume Brenta – si-
glato dalla Regione, dalle Province di Padova e Vicenza, 
dai 12 comuni interessati dall’abbassamento del livello 
di falda, dall’Alto Consorzio di Bonifica, da Veneto ac-
que Spa, da Etra Spa e da Arpav – appaiono misure 
compensative interessanti e innovative. L’accordo pre-
vede la realizzazione di aree forestali di infiltrazione (A-
fi) tra le misure di compensazione a maggiore carattere 
strutturale e idraulico, per un importo di 15,5 milioni di 
euro. Le Afi sono superfici boscate messe a dimora e 
coltivate allo scopo di favorire l’immissione di acqua 
superficiale nel sottosuolo per la ricarica delle falde. I 
filari di alberi sono alternati da canalette che vengono 
sommerse di acqua superficiale durante i periodi di ab-
bondanza di acqua, prevenendo così il deflusso superfi-
ciale verso il mare e immagazzinando la risorsa idrica 
nelle falde sotterranee. Veneto Agricoltura da anni ha 
sperimentato l’efficacia di questi impianti attraverso 
sette progetti pilota, ottenendo risultati molto incorag-
gianti. In media, nelle aree più vocate, le Afi possono 
infiltrare fino a un milione di m3 di acqua all’anno. Se-
condo le stime di Veneto Agricoltura sarebbero necessa-
ri dai 50 ai 100 ha nella zona compresa tra Astico e 
Brenta per supplire all’abbassamento della falda, com-
pensare l’aumento del prelievo e rivitalizzare le risorgi-
ve [10]. Le Afi sono quindi un chiaro esempio di com-
                                                 
 
4 In modo particolare nel Comune di Carmignano di Brenta 
all’interno del sito Sic (Sito di importanza comunitaria) e Zps 
(Zona protezione speciale) IT3260018 denominato “Grave e 
zone umide del Brenta”. 
 
pensazioni volte a produrre in modo sistematico un ser-
vizio idrico proprio delle aree umide.  
Dal 2012 sono state attivate misure del Programma di 
sviluppo rurale di Regione Veneto che permettono di 
finanziare le Afi: in particolare la misura 221 (Azione 4, 
Impianti ad alta densità per il disinquinamento 
dell’acqua; Azione 5, Impianti ad alta densità per la ri-
carica delle falde), la misura 222 (Azione realizzazione 
di sistemi silvoarabili) e la misura 223 (Imboschimento 
di terreni non agricoli; Azione 4, Impianti ad alta densi-
tà per il disinquinamento dell'acqua; Azione 5, Impianti 
ad alta densità per la ricarica delle falde).  
I finanziamenti del Piano di sviluppo rurale per com-
pensare l’aumento dei prelievi del sistema acquedotti-
stico veneto e, quindi, la Wf dell’intera Regione Veneto, 
si possono configurare come un quasi-Pes: un accordo 
tra un agricoltore, fornitore del servizio ecosistemico di 
ricarica della falda, e la Regione Veneto, acquirente del 
servizio di compensazione della Wf dei beneficiari 
dell’acquedotto regionale. L’adeguata remunerazione 
delle funzioni produttive e ambientali svolte da questi 
impianti, in primis dei servizi legati all’acqua, può con-
tribuire a rendere economicamente sostenibile la loro 
diffusione, costituendo anche un’interessante opportu-
nità integrativa di reddito per il mondo agricolo.  
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Annex 5: Analytical framework for qualitative case 
study interviews 
FRAMEWORK FOR THE ANALYSIS OF ECOSYSTEM SERVICES  
Dimension of the 
analytical framework Research questions Variables 
Ecosystem structure, 
process, functions and 
services 
 Which are the ecosystems involved in 
service supply?  
 Areas and type of ecosystems (Haines-
Young and Potschin, 2011; MEA, 2005) 
 Which are the proxy management 
practices for service provision?  
 List of rewarded management practices 
likely to secure the service provision 
 Which are the ecosystem functions, 
process, provisioning and intermediate 
ecosystem services involved in the service 
provision?  
 Make reference to (de Groot et al., 2002; 
Groot et al., 2010) 
 Which are the provided ecosystem 
services?  
 MEA categories and Brauman hydrological 
service classification. (Brauman et al., 2007)f 
 Which are the services attributes?   Quality, quantity, probability, timing 
 Which are the unit of measurement 
(metric)  
 See Kroeger (2013) for a list of metrics 
(Kroeger, 2013) 
Environmental benefits 
 Where does the service demand come 
from? 
 Spatial characteristics of the flow between 
provisioning and benefitting areas are specific to each 
service. Representation of benefiting areas and 
provisioning areas. Area within which services from 
provisioning area can potentially be delivered. 
 Are there any bundled 
services/benefits?  
 Carbon, biodiversity, recreational, social 
benefits.  
 Which are the final benefits that 
contribute to the society well being? 
 Define the benefits (Keeler et al., 2012; 
Maille and Collins, 2012) 
Spatial temporal 
characteristics of flow 
between service 
provision and 
consumption 
 Do supply and demand geographically 
overlap? 
 Overlapping between benefiting and 
provisioning areas (Serna-Chavez et al., 2014) 
 Which temporal scale does apply to 
the service provision?   Seasonal, continual (Brauman et al., 2007) 
 Do supply and demand timely 
coincide?  Describe the timing of demand and supply 
 
FRAMEWORK FOR THE ANALYSIS OF ACTOR INTERACTIONS 
Elaborated mostly from (Corbera et al., 2009; Prokofieva and Gorriz, 2013)  
Dimension of the 
analytical framework Research questions Variables 
Actors identification and 
roles 
 Who are the internal actors of the PWS?  
 Who are the external actors? 
 What is their role within the PWS scheme?  
 Actor names 
Actor rights and 
responsibilities on 
resources 
 What de jure or de facto rights or claims do the 
actors have over using and managing the water 
resources? 
 Ownership rights toward the 
conservation area  
 Water rights system in the country 
 What are the responsibilities of different actors  Management or access rights to 
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regarding the use, management, control and conservation 
of resources?  
water related ecosystems  
 Rights to use/benefit from water 
related ecosystem services  
 Responsibility to protect and 
manage water related ecosystems in a 
sustainable way 
 Responsibility to inform landowners 
and other actors about management or 
protection decisions  
 To what degree do different actors influence how 
land management is carried out in relation to water 
services (landowner, environmental department 
technicians, consultant, forest /farmers associations, 
NGOs, etc.)? 
 
Preferences, interests, 
expectations and values 
 What are the driving forces that determine the 
actors' behaviour? 
 What are their expectations about their own and 
the others' use and management of resources?  
 What are the actors' values and preferences with 
respect to PWS strategies and outcomes?  
 What are the actors' beliefs about PWS strategy 
preferences and outcomes of other actors?  
 What are the actors' actual and perceived costs 
and benefits from PWS schemes? 
 Actors'motivations and preferences  
 Degree of preference homogeneity 
among the actors  
 Actors' expectations about the 
future of the resources  
 Actors' own views on PWS 
strategies and outcomes  
 Actors' perceptions on PWS 
strategies and outcomes' views of other 
relevant actors  
 Stakeholders' actual and perceived 
costs and benefits from PWS schemes  
Actions and interactions 
Use and management 
of resources 
 What ecosystem goods and services do the 
actors obtain from the resource?  
 What hydrological services do they provide?  
 What restrictions do they face over the use of 
the resource?  
 What are the forms and degree of management 
of the resource in question?  
 What activities can the actors implement and 
how these activities are related to final outcomes? 
 Hydrological services used  
 Hydrological services provided  
 Restrictions of land use for 
hydrological service protection 
 Management rules of the resource 
PWS activities  
 Relation of PWS activities to final 
outcomes  
Information sharing 
 How is information collected and used?  
 Where does the information come from and how 
frequently it appears? 
 Information collection and use 
practices  
 Frequency of information 
distribution/reception  
 Information channels  
 Degree and frequency of 
communications among actor 
Lobbying 
 Which are the coalitions exhibiting strong 
preferences for the use or management of resources? 
 Who are the actors participating in these 
coalitions?  
 What is the degree of the influence of these 
coalitions?  
 Are there other actors with weak preferences, 
who do not form part of any coalition? 
 Number and composition of relevant 
coalitions  
 Strength of the influence of 
coalitions and their degree of importance  
 Number and the degree of 
importance of non-affiliated actors  
Deliberation 
 Who decides what management operations will 
be carried out, or what ecosystem services will be 
produced, what will be conserved, what conservation 
instruments will be applied? 
  Which decision-making strategies related to 
PWS schemes are used? 
 Authority structure  
 Distance between rule makers and 
the participants in the scheme  
 Decision-making procedures related 
to PWS 
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FRAMEWORK FOR THE ANALYSIS OF INSTITUTIONAL INTERPLAY  
Elaborated mostly from (Corbera et al., 2009; Prokofieva and Gorriz, 2013) 
Dimension of the 
analytical 
framework 
Research questions Variables 
Institutional 
interplay 
 Which existing institutions interact with 
PWS schemes?  
 
 Number and type of institutions influencing or 
being affected by PWS schemes  
 Number and type of institutions targeting the 
same actors, including those from other policy domains, 
hierarchical levels of governance, geographical scales and 
across time 
 
Policy interplay 
 
 Which existing policies interact with PWS 
schemes? 
 Number and type of policies directly interacting 
with PWS 
Instruments 
interplay 
 Which existing including policies 
instruments interact with PWS schemes?  
 Number and type of policy instruments directly 
interacting with PWS 
Nature of the 
interplay  
 How do PWS account for other institutions 
in their design and implementation? 
 Which synergies and conflicts exist 
between the relevant institutions? 
 Which are the sources of such synergies 
and conflicts (e.g. compatible/ divergent rationales, 
goals or implementation approaches)? 
 
 TyPWS and effects of institutional interactions  
 Sources of institutional synergies and conflict 
 
INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN: Are rules conducive to achieve goals?  
Elaborated mostly from (Corbera et al., 2009; Prokofieva and Gorriz, 2013; Sattler et al., 2013) 
Dimension of the 
analytical 
framework 
Research questions Variables 
Start up 
 Which actors shape the rule-design 
process and how are their interests represented in 
the final rules? 
 Descriptive 
 Which are the main drivers?  Descriptive  
 At what development phase is the 
scheme?  
 Exploration, development, implementation, 
mature phase 
 Why is PWS proposed as a policy tool?  
 Definition and evolution of PWS rules over time  
 Number and type of actors involved in PWS 
design 
 Actors' interests taken into account and 
excluded in the definition of PWS Underlying reasons of 
procedural change 
(Kemkes et al., 2010)  
 Is there any study suggesting that the 
PWS would provide better outcomes than other 
policy tools?  
 Descriptive 
 How is the PWS idea communicated to 
external actors?  Descriptive 
Contract and 
procedures 
 How do scheme procedures work? From 
the application to the payments.  
 Description of the procedures, from application, 
payments, and monitoring and evaluation.  
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 Which is the duration of contracts with the 
suppliers?   Descriptive 
 Which are the regulations mentioned 
within the contract?   Descriptive 
 How is risk distributed or allocated within 
the parties?  Risk of no-compliance with water quality   
Payments 
 Pay source  Public, Private, Mixed 
 Pay mode  Input - based, Output - based 
 Pay type  Cash, In kind 
 Pay frequency  One off, Periodical 
 Pay time  Upfront, After ES delivery 
 Pay eligibility  Horizontal, Targeted 
 Pay amount in relation to costs of ES 
provision 
 Spill over; Partial cover of costs; Full cover of 
costs; Above the costs; 
 Pay aim 
 Avoided negative externalities; Compensate 
negative impacts; Compensate opportunity costs; Provide 
positive externalities; 
 How is the level of compensation to 
suppliers determined?   Descriptive 
Monitoring and 
evaluation 
 Are project outcomes (ecological, social, 
and economic) monitored?   Descriptive 
 If monitor occurs, how often?   Descriptive 
 If monitor occurs, are results public 
available?    
 Existence of website reporting data, monitoring 
reports, etc.  
 What type of monitoring?  Descriptive 
 Please describe the scope of monitoring  Descriptive 
 Please describe the methods and 
techniques used  for monitoring  Descriptive 
 Please describe the indicators for 
monitoring (what you look for)  Reference indicators (Maille and Collins, 2012) 
 Please describe the frequency of 
monitoring  Descriptive 
 
FRAMEWORK FOR THE ANALYSIS OF CAPACITY AND SCALE: How does scale affect PWS design and performance?   
Elaborated mostly form (Corbera et al., 2009) 
Dimension of the 
analytical 
framework 
Research questions Variables 
Scale 
 Does an optimal scale of governance exist 
for the provision of each ES?  Areas and type of ecosystems  
 Have there been any cross-scale 
institutions created to address problems of 
interplay? 
 Differences in PWS design, performance and 
interplay due to governance scale 
 Type of cross-scale institutional linkages to 
address interplay (e.g., stakeholder bodies, policy 
communities) and effects over the other analytical domains 
 How do cross-scale institutions benefit 
PWS design and performance? 
 How does cross-scale institutions respond to 
geographical and administrative scale 
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Capacity 
 What physical and human resources are 
required to provide hydrological services in focus?  
 What knowledge and information do 
actors have about PWS schemes?  
 What level of control does each actor 
have over own actions?  
 Are the organizational capacities across 
involved actors sufficient to ensure effective PWS 
design and implementation? 
 Labour and capital costs of producing water 
related ecosystem service (sustainable catchment 
management)  
 Actor's knowledge and technical capacity  
 Distribution of resources among the actors  
 Degree of control over actor's own actions  
 Actors' level of organizational capacity 
 
EVALUATION CRITERIA OF INSTRUMENT PERFORMANCE: Is an institution achieving its goals? 
Taken from (Prokofieva and Gorriz, 2013) 
Evaluation 
criterion Definition Dimensions  Indicators 
Environmental 
effectiveness 
 The extent to which the 
policy instrument achieves the 
stated policy environmental 
objective 
 Additionality — the extent to 
which the instrument achieves an 
improvement over the business as 
usual scenario 
 Permanence—the extent to 
which the induced change is 
permanent after the finalization of the 
funding  
 Side effects — the desirable 
or undesirable, foreseen or 
unforeseen impacts of the policy 
instrument on other sectors and 
activities  
 Perverse incentives — the 
degree to which the policy instrument 
generates undesirable behavior 
 Number of applicants  
 Number of participants  
 Area covered by the 
scheme  
 Number of non-compliant 
participants 
 Impacts on targeted 
environmental goods and services  
 Number of activities/land 
management actions executed 
Economic 
efficiency 
 The extent to which the 
policy instrument achieves the 
optimal allocation of resources. In 
practice, refers to the ability to 
achieve the stated objective at the 
lowest possible cost. 
 Cost-efficiency— the degree 
to which the instrument achieves the 
stated objectives at the lowest 
possible cost  
 Cost–benefit — the degree 
to which the benefits associated to the 
implementation of the policy 
instrument exceed the implementation 
costs 
 Direct programme costs  
 Indirect programme costs  
 Transaction costs 
Equity  
 The extent to which the 
policy instrument achieves 
equality in access, treatment or 
outcome in an acceptable 
manner. 
 Distributive justice 
(fairness)—the distribution of costs 
and benefits among different 
segments of population 
 Distribution of costs and 
benefits among key actors 
 Eligibility criteria and 
participation requirements 
 Participation rates of small 
and large forest and land owners 
Flexibility 
 
 
 The extent to which the 
policy instrument can retain its 
effectiveness in changing 
conditions. 
 Internal flexibility — The 
extent to which the instrument can 
automatically adjust to external 
changes in environmental, economic, 
technological or social conditions  
 External flexibility — The 
extent to which the instrument can be 
modified by relevant actors (e.g. 
government, or regulated agents) to 
accommodate changes 
 Sensitivity to changes in 
external conditions  
 Re-negotiation and 
termination clauses 
 Mechanisms ensuring  
flexibility  
Implementation 
complexity 
 The extent towhich the 
policy instrument is easy to 
 Information intensity—how 
much information (e.g. data, predictive 
 Information and skills 
necessary  
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design and implement. modelling skills) is necessary to 
design the policy instrument  
 Ease of introduction — the 
extent towhich the policy instrument is 
easy to implement in the existing 
context and business environment  
 Administrative feasibility — 
the extent to which reliable 
compliance monitoring and 
enforcement can be implemented at a 
reasonable cost 
 Number and intensity of 
changes that need to be introduced  
 Human resources for 
monitoring and compliance  
 Technical needs for 
monitoring and compliance 
Acceptability 
 The extent to which the 
policy instrument is understood 
and accepted by the key actors 
 Awareness (transparency) 
of key actors about any aspect of the 
instrument, such as the purpose and 
the technicalities of the instrument, 
financial consequences, time of 
introduction, possible future 
adjustments etc.  
 Participation — the 
involvement of key actors in the 
design and implementation of the 
policy instrument  
 Progressive implementation 
— the process of gradual introduction 
of the policy instrument  
 Predictability— the extent to 
which the outputs and outcomes 
resulting from the implementation of 
the policy instrument can be foreseen 
 Public awareness of the 
existence, goals and guiding norms of 
the instrument  
 Awareness of forest and 
land owners, and public officers of the 
PWS scheme, and of their rights and 
obligations under this policy 
instrument  
 Awareness among public 
policy makers of how a particular 
PWS scheme relates to other 
schemes  
 Information available on the 
instrument 
 Actors' reactions to the 
instrument 
 Number of consultations 
with key actors 
 Existence of pilot projects  
 Length of the anticipation 
period 
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